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ABSTRACT OF THESIS. 
 
This thesis investigates how the Conservative party coped with the far-reaching effects of 
democratic reform between 1867 and 1914. It analyses the performance of successive party 
leaders through their exploitation of high politics; and how ideology influenced their policy, and 
decision making. It also examines how the party’s organization was periodically revised to 
manage changing political circumstances. The relationships between these three elements, high 
politics, ideology, and organization are then analysed to explain the Conservative party’s appeal 
for electoral support during the period of study. The respective contributions made by the three 
elements to the party’s electoral performance are considered in relation to each other. Using this 
approach the thesis explains how the Conservative party managed to improve upon its dismal 
electoral record between 1832 and 1874; how it achieved electoral dominance between 1886 
and 1906; and why its electoral fortunes declined so dramatically thereafter. 
 
The conclusions reached are threefold. Firstly, the importance attached to high politics by the 
Peterhouse school of thought may, in some respects, be exaggerated, certainly regarding 
elections. High politics, by its very nature seeks to exert influence at a level far removed from 
the mass electorate. Political rhetoric has obvious uses during elections, not least in the field of 
extra-parliamentary speech-making. But in the absence of any reliable indicators of what the 
electorate actually felt or desired, the effectiveness of political rhetoric could not be gauged a 
priori. The results of political manoeuvring at the highest levels may have been apparent to 
voters, but was of little concern to them. At worst, they were ignorant of it, and at best, 
ambivalent to it. Secondly, party leaders, whether knowingly or unknowingly, exploited the 
flexibility of Conservative ideology in their quest for votes. However, the core concepts of that 
ideology remained inviolable, only contingent values were successfully subjected to re-appraisal 
and revision to attract the voters. When ideological core values were misunderstood or 
misinterpreted the party suffered accordingly. Thirdly, the value of the Conservative party’s 
organization has been underestimated. High politics and ideology may have combined to 
produce a Conservative message for the voters, but the appeal of that message was unknowable. 
On the other hand, the party’s organization, when empowered to do so, adroitly and effectively 
utilized all the tools available to them to manage and maximize all potential Conservative 
support. Organization may be viewed as a make-weight, but like all make-weights it possessed 
the power to tip the electoral scales one way or the other.     
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AN ELITE’S RESPONSE TO DEMOCRACY: HOW THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
ADAPTED TO EXTENSIONS OF THE FRANCHISE; AND COPED WITH ENSUING 
POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS 1867-1914. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
Democracy was not the progenitor of the British Constitution; rather democracy was 
incrementally wedded to a pre-existing, elitist parliamentary system. Unsurprisingly the 
marriage was not always a happy one. Nevertheless it has become a commonplace to assume 
that once the missile of democratic reform was launched, in the shape of the 1867 Reform Act, 
it would travel unerringly to its target viz. universal suffrage, and liberal democracy. But this 
was not the case. Opinions vary on the impetus available. For example, R. B. McCallum writes 
that ‘in 1851 Lord John Russell had made an attempt to alter the parliamentary franchise, and 
from that moment the finality of the Act of 1832 was disavowed.’1 Whereas Maurice Cowling is 
of the opinion that ‘there was nothing inevitable about the course they followed. If a restrictive 
Act could have been passed on a conservative basis they would have passed it. If party 
conditions had been suitable, they would have persisted in March 1867 with a restrictive 
proposal.’2 Gertrude Himmelfarb rightly adds that ‘it was during the debate over this Act [1867] 
that the case for and against democracy was most cogently argued. But once this first step was 
made, no one seriously doubted that others would follow,’ but she cogently adds that ‘this was 
not an orderly, planned, or even coherent progression, to claim so does violence to the reality, 
imposing order upon chaos, necessity upon contingency, and principle upon expediency.’3 Thus 
                                                 
1  R. B. McCallum writing in Elie Halevy, (1951) Victorian Years (Incorporating The Age of Peel and 
Cobden). Ernest Benn Ltd, London, p.440.   
2  Maurice Cowling, (1967) 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone, and Revolution. Cambridge University Press, 
p.310. cf. Contemporary evidence supports this opinion. For example, St Paul’s Magazine of March 1868 
said, ‘ if vote by ballot had existed in Parliament, surrounded by inviolable secrecy, time after time Mr. 
Disraeli’s household suffrage measure would have been thrown out by overwhelming majorities.’ 
3 Gertrude Himmelfarb, (1975) Victorian Minds, Peter Smith, Gloucester Massachusetts, pp.333-335. 
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although the path of democratic reform can be closely followed its trajectory is much harder to 
track. One of the main forces influencing that trajectory was the debate over democracy itself, as 
referred to by Himmelfarb above. However, that debate was not stilled by the passage of the 
1867 Act, in fact evidence suggests that the debate actually intensified post 1867. ‘Victorians 
did not claim that their system of government was democratic, a term that smacked of 
continental abstraction and implied an excess of equality characteristic of American society, 
rather it produced effective government, it guaranteed liberty, and it was representative.’4 The 
debate coalesced around several key interrelated themes, representation (including proportional 
representation), the actual nature of the franchise (right, trust, privilege etc.), liberty (the swing 
from negative to positive liberty), equality (characterized by the rise of meritocracy) and 
whether democracy should be seen as an ideal or as a workable system of government. Although 
the debate can be seen as ongoing, certain issues brought one or other of these themes into 
prominence. For example, the passage of the Ballot Act in 1872 highlighted differences of 
opinion over the nature of the franchise; or the Northcote Trevelyan report on the Civil Service 
influenced attitudes towards equality. Post 1884-5 the debate over ideal or policy shifted, 
significantly, into the realm of the practicability of democracy rather than idealism. 
 
Similarly it has become a commonplace to contend that the dominant ethos of Victorian Britain 
was Liberalism. The core value of liberal ideology, liberty, became the determinant of both 
political philosophy and policy. J. S. Mill’s On Liberty published in 1859 set out the concept of 
“negative” liberty in unequivocal terms 
‘the object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and 
 
4 Martin Pugh, (1982) The Making of Modern British Politics: 1867-1939, Blackwell, Oxford, p.2. 
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control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or in the 
moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind  
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of any of their
 number is self protection.’5 
 
He could hardly have been more assertive, the only justification for interference of any kind in 
the affairs of anyone was to prevent harm to oneself or to others. Nevertheless, even though 
nineteenth century Britain may not have been a democracy ‘it was a free society in which the 
ideas bubbling out of the controversy of public opinion fashioned and re-fashioned the form of 
the state’;6 and it was this idea, that society possessed its own dynamic, an underlying sense of a 
common interest, that philosophers such as T. H. Green seized upon later to justify a new 
definition of liberty. It was accepted that liberty was a right, and Green argued that rights could 
not exist independently of society. ‘There can’, he said, ‘be no right without a consciousness of 
common interest on the part of members of society.’7 He agreed that ‘freedom rightly 
understood, is the greatest of all blessings,’ but he was adamant that freedom should not be 
defined as ‘merely freedom from restraint or compulsion’, or ‘merely freedom to do as we like 
irrespective of what it is we like.’ According to Green 
‘when we speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive 
power or capacity of doing something or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, 
and that, too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others…the ideal of true 
freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the 
best of themselves.’8 
 
Cliff Leslie encapsulated the argument, writing in 1879 ‘practical freedom involves more than 
the absence of legal and social restraint, every limitation of power [of the individual] is an  
 
 
5 J. S. Mill, (1859) On Liberty (Everyman Edition 1940) pp.72-73. 
6 Esme Wingfield-Stratford , (1930) Those Earnest Victorians, Longmans, London, p.318 
7 T. H. Green, (1924 edition) Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation. Longmans Green & Co., 
London, p.48.  
8 T. H. Green, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’, in R. L. Nettleship, (Ed.) (1888) The 
Collected Works of Thomas Hill Green, London, p.368. and pp.370-372. 
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abridgement of positive liberty.’9 
 
Within the context of nineteenth century politics the new concept of positive rather than  
 
negative liberty could be seen as a victory for progress. But, just as, in the absence of universal 
suffrage, giving all votes equivalence is not political equality, so, positive liberty without 
universal suffrage is not political liberty. Nevertheless such a reading of events would provide 
the  foundation of a framework which could be used to investigate political advances and 
developments in nineteenth century Britain. It has been noted, however, that 
 ‘all histories are fictions, reconstructions of the past, never the past itself. The quality  
of the fiction depends on how it is constructed – the methods and the framework of 
interpretation that are employed. It is a mistake to suppose that the necessity of choosing 
between frameworks can ever be dispensed with, and some standard of objective truth 
and objective method enthroned to guide research…Though there are good grounds for 
choosing between theoretical frameworks, there are no absolute objective ones.’10 
 
This is undoubtedly an important observation, and the main, and most obvious, objection to the 
framework suggested above is that although Liberalism may indeed have been the dominant 
ethos during the nineteenth century, and the evolution of its core ideological value, liberty, may 
indeed have been the pre-eminent political development; the most successful political party, 
following the 1884 Reform Act until 1906, was the Conservative party. This, despite the fact 
that it has been argued 
‘in the Conservative conception of freedom…there is a great deal of double-talk and 
many layers of concealed consciousness. Conservatives, if they talk about freedom long 
enough, begin to believe that that is what they want. But it is not freedom that  
Conservatives want; what they want is the sort of freedom that will maintain existing 
inequalities or restore lost ones, so far as political action can do this.’11 
 
If we accept the dominance of Liberal values, such a conception of freedom would appear to be  
 
9 Quoted in Anthony Arblaster, (1984)  The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford and New York. p.287. 
10 Andrew Gamble, (1974) The Conservative Nation, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p.VII. 
11 Maurice Cowling, ‘The Present Position’, in Maurice Cowling, (Ed.) (1978) Conservative Essays, 
Cassell, London, p.9. 
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incongruous with the Conservative’s electoral success, especially as they were not viewed by 
everyone as the “natural” party of government. ‘As for the conservative party its proper function 
in the Edinburgh [Review]’s scheme of things was to provide the opposition.’12 The Edinburgh 
Review was, of course the official organ of Whig opinion, but this attitude was not confined to 
opponents of the Conservative party. Salisbury, writing to the Rev. C. R. Coneybeare on 19th 
September 1881offered his opinion that ‘if it were possible to maintain a party under such 
conditions, I should be disposed to wish that the Conservatives should remain permanently a 
very strong opposition. That is undoubtedly the condition of things under which the wearing 
away of the constitution is most nearly suspended.’13 Others saw Conservative electoral success 
as the beneficiary of external influences, for example, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach wrote to Arthur 
Balfour on 20th September 1909, ‘all the political history of the last fifty years shows that the 
Unionists (or Conservative) party cannot win a General Election without some special aid, such 
as Home Rule, or the South African War. Without that we are in a minority.’14 
 
It can be argued that that there was little to choose between the competing parties. For example, 
‘in debate, differences of principle might be discovered or differences in matters of detail 
exaggerated, but this dialectical athleticism and point scoring in parliament and on the  
platform cannot disguise how small a gap often divided the parties.’15 On the other hand it has 
been suggested that  
‘the opposition between Liberalism and Conservatism in the political market was a 
contest in which each party drew on different sections of the nation for support…The 
 
12 R. B. McDowell, (1959) British Conservatism 1832-1914, Faber and Faber, London. p.94. See 
Edinburgh Review, Vol. 137, p.581; Vol. 139, p.288, and pp.557-9; and Vol. 198, p.282. 
13 Quoted in Peter Marsh, (1978) The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury’s Domestic   
Statecraft 1881-1902, Harvester Press, London, p.37. 
14 Quoted in Lady Victoria Hicks-Beach, (1932 Two Vols.) The Life of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach (Earl St 
Aldwyn) Macmillan & Co., London, Vol.2, p.260. 
15 R. B. McDowell, (1959) op cit. p.10.   
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electoral ideologies of the Conservative nation in its period of formation were the 
ideologies of the Empire and the established order of England. This separated them  
sharply from the Radicals in the Liberal coalition.’16 
Depending upon prevailing circumstances either “a small gap dividing the parties” or a “sharp  
 
separation” may have  been correct, to a greater or lesser degree; but both may be 
accommodated in the statement that ‘traditional Toryism …has its boundaries located in the 
centre of British politics.’17 The questions, therefore, which must be addressed are, what exactly 
are those boundaries? What gave Conservatism its unique character? And, quintessentially what 
did Conservatives stand for in the years 1867 to 1914? It may then be possible to evaluate how 
much these factors contributed to the Conservative Party’s electoral fortunes. It is important at 
this juncture to explain why this specific time period has been chosen as the focus for this 
investigation.  
 
Firstly, the history of the Conservative party can be said to have begun in the 1830s under the 
leadership of Sir Robert Peel. This opinion  
‘is in conformity with the distinguished contributions of modern historians. It is a 
convenient and appropriate date in that, for the first time, the expression “Conservative” 
was coming to be commonly and popularly applied to a distinctive party grouping in 
Westminster and to a body of recognizable political attitudes.’18 
 
By the time of the 1867 Reform Act the Conservative party was a force to be reckoned with in 
British politics; a force that must be ready to enter the debate that the 1867 “leap in the dark” 
engendered. Politicians had argued and calculated how far they dared travel (mainly in their 
own interests) towards democracy, and whether remodelling the system of representation would 
be necessary to dull the cutting edge of Reform: others were campaigning to have the 
 
16 Andrew Gamble, (1974) op cit. p.203. 
17 Neill Nugent and Roger King, (Eds.) (1977) The British Right: Conservative and Right Wing Politics in 
Britain. Saxon House, Farnborough, p.5. 
18 Philip Norton and Arthur Aughey, (1981) Conservatives and Conservatism, Temple Smith, London, 
p.92. 
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democratic ideal accepted in its own right. For example, Macmillans Magazine declared in 
1865, ‘it cannot be too often or too emphatically repeated that without political equality there is 
no real political liberty.’19 A year later the Westminster Review echoed the words of Auguste 
Comte that, ‘the fundamental doctrine of modern social life is the subordination of Politics to 
Morals.’20 Those of a more prosaic bent countered that the argument was ‘not a subject in which 
excitement has any place, as little is it a question of abstract philosophy or metaphysics. It is a 
question depending upon facts to which no abstract meaning will help us,’21 or, put more 
bluntly, ‘the truth is that the exercise of political power is a function, not a right…the beginning 
and end of it is good government…it cannot be an end in itself.’22 The Conservative party 
needed to enter this seminal debate knowing exactly where it stood on this issue. Was 
democracy an ideal worthy of pursuing for its own sake; or must it be tailored to meet the 
demands of political expediency? 
 
Secondly, in this debate the Conservative party supported the latter position, that of expediency 
and practicality. Conservative politicians became a party of political practice driven by ideas 
rather than dogma, with the qualification that ‘ideas are only important in so far as they are part 
of that practice.’23 This doctrine was to guide and inform Conservative policy and form the 
basis of their political practice. However, it was later pointed out
‘to understand a political practice we must understand the political system in which it 
takes place. In Britain since the nineteenth century the political system has been radically 
transformed by the introduction of universal suffrage, and there is little meaningful 
continuity across this divide.’24 
 
 
19 Macmillans Magazine, Vol.13, 1865, p.260. 
20 Westminster Review, Vol.30, 1866, p.483.  
21 Edinburgh Review, Vol.122, 1866, p.283. 
22 Quarterly Review, Vol.123, No. 245, July, 1867, p.250 
23 Andrew Gamble, (1974) op cit. p.2.           
24 Ibid. p.2. 
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In 1914, the outbreak of World War One obviously disrupted “normal” political practice; and 
universal male suffrage and limited female suffrage were introduced immediately it ended in 
1918. It can be legitimately argued, therefore, that 1914 represents a date when “continuity” was 
broken and the “divide” opened up. The period from 1867 until 1914, therefore, represents a 
time when an uneasy relationship developed between expanding democratic practices, and 
groupings that became recognizable as modern political parties. Ever since the publication of 
Mosei Ostrogorski’s Democracy and the Organisation of Political parties in 1902 it has become 
accepted that ‘oligarchic controls, manipulation of the electorate, and a blurring of ideological 
differences between parties are inherent in the organizational pressure on parties operating under 
conditions of universal suffrage.’25 Put simply, therefore, the accepted view is that democracy 
gave birth to modern political parties and party machines. This may be true under conditions of 
universal suffrage, but the position is less certain during the transitional period between 1867 
and 1914 when the suffrage was being incrementally expanded. Research suggests that the 
reverse opinion also carries some weight, in so far as evidence suggests that the rival political 
parties in 1867, or at least their leaderships, saw the advantages to party of a wider democratic 
mandate and backed reforms on this basis. Furthermore far from being a time of “a blurring of 
ideological differences” this was a time of establishing ideological differences to attract new 
voters. Contemporary evidence makes clear that politicians were aware that extensions to the 
franchise would enhance and consolidate the position of political parties; as early as 1860 the 
Secretary of the Liberal Association of London had warned ‘if the suffrage were extended an 
election would depend to a much greater extent than it does at present (and it does too much 
now) upon political organizations. It would increase the power of those political associations.’ 
 
25 Seymour Martin Lipset, (Ed.) (1964) (in his introduction to an abridged version of Democracy and the 
Organization of Political Parties (1902) by Mosei Ostrogorski), Anchor Books and Quadrangle Books inc. 
Chicago, p.XII.)   
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(my emphasis)26 Thomas Hare’s system of  proportional representation which represented a 
system to ensure the much feared “tyranny of the majority” may be nullified, was eventually 
discarded because it was realized that it would render party organizations largely redundant. 
Leonard Courtney wrote in 1876 that if it was adopted they would fade away; ‘they may return’ 
he said, ‘but will come as supplicants to beseech. Instead of masters to command.’27 By 1885 
Gladstone was articulating what he saw as the clear ideological divide between the two main 
parties; ‘the principle of Liberalism’ he said, ‘is TRUST IN THE PEOPLE, QUALIFIED BY 
PRUDENCE. The principle of Conservatism’ he argued, ‘is MISTRUST OF THE PEOPLE, 
qualified by fear.’ (original emphasis)28 
 
Both main parties, but especially the Conservative party, strove to establish a recognizable 
identity and ethos in the face of constantly changing circumstances. The responsibility for 
carrying out this process fell to the respective party leaders. ‘The Victorian era in Great Britain; 
[was] the golden age of individualism. Parliament [was] dominated by persons rather than 
politics.’29 The influence exerted by Gladstone and Disraeli, as politicians grappled with the 
development of democratic processes, can hardly be exaggerated. They were also great rivals 
and their rivalry ‘became personal and insults were traded.’30 A. G. Gardiner succinctly 
captured the essence of the relationship between the two men when he wrote ‘Gladstone always
seemed to be hurrying with a message from Mount Sinai and meeting Disraeli coming from the
feet of Scheherazade. The gravity of the one and the levity of the other left them no common 
 
26 Blue Books of 1860 Vol. 12, p.226. Evidence given to the Committee of The House of Lords. 
27 Leonard Courtney MP, (1876) ‘The Representation of Minorities’, in Nineteenth Century Vol. 6, July     
1876, p.155. 
28 Quoted in Donald Read, (1979) England 1868-1914: The Age of Urban Democracy, Longmans, 
London. p.119. (From Why I am a Liberal: Being Definitions and Personal Confessions of Faith by the 
Best Minds of the Liberal Party, published 1885) 
29 The Marquis of Zetland (Earl Ronaldsway) (Ed.), (1929 Two Vols.) The Letters of Disraeli to Lady 
Bradford and Lady Chesterfield, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, p.13. 
30 Donald Read, (1979) op cit. p.168. 
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ground of intercourse.’31 The conflicting personalities of these two leaders would have a potent 
influence, not only on the parties they led, but on the relationship between those two parties, and
even on the relationship between the two houses of parl
‘Each had created a new party. Gladstone had been a Tory, but had never been a Whig, 
and the party he led was a new instrument, forged by his own genius and inspired by his 
own imperious purpose. Disraeli had been a Radical in his youth, but he had never been 
a Tory, and the party he led was the creation of his own romantic imagination.’32 
 
Previously political parties had been ‘the instruments through which politicians at Westminster 
worked upon the constituencies’33 post 1867 the electoral necessity of party re-organization 
risked giving greater influence to constituency associations. Politics entered a transitional state 
of flux, ‘politicians acknowledged that the interests which it was their profession to reconcile 
had shifted significantly…but they lacked any understanding of what the new order required of 
them,’34 and this uncertainty applied as much to party leaders as to their followers. 
 
The details of franchise reform; the history of the Conservative party; the nature of conservative 
ideology; and Conservative party organization, have all been the object of much discussion and 
examination by scholars. Indeed, much of that scholarship will be referred to and utilized later. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationships between these different themes and to 
discover how those relationships translated into the electoral success that the Conservative party 
came to enjoy during much of our period of study. 
 
‘High politics, as a mode of traditional political behaviour, did not die with the birth of  
 
democratic conviction, (in the Edwardian era)…the assumption [remained], common to virtually 
 
31 A. G. Gardiner, (1923 Two Vols.) The Life of Sir William Harcourt. Constable & Co., London. Vol. 1, 
p.208. 
32 Ibid. p.208. 
33 H. J. Hanham, (1968) The Reformed Electoral System in Great Britain 1832-1914, The Historical 
Association, p.5 
34 Michael Bentley, (1984) Politics Without Democracy 1814-1914: Perception and Preoccupation in 
British Government, Fontana, London, p.194. 
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everyone who operated the political system, that a tiny oligarchy still possessed the power to 
start and stop, to accelerate or retard.’35 Or, as Viscount Esher put it ‘newspapers, politicians, 
mobs, all these are useful enough. But the support of the half dozen men or so -who count- is  
vital’36 It is for this reason that this study will view evidence through the prism of “High 
Politics”. However, this choice is not to be interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of the 
 “Peterhouse” school of thought,37 if only because Peterhouse tends to focus exclusively on 
those circumstances in which the elite can be deemed to have dictated change, leaving occasions 
when the electorate appeared to exert power to be explored by social and labour historians, 
whose focus is upon history “from below”.  Rather it is an acknowledgement that during the 
period under investigation, there was a ‘stubborn persistence of gentry and aristocracy at this 
higher level, when at the lower echelons of politics, new groups had already gained 
ascendancy.’38 High politics remained a “closed shop” accessible only to a chosen few. 
 
Chapter One, therefore, will investigate how the intrigue and artifice of high politics impacted 
upon nineteenth century British politics, and explain more fully why this “top down” 
methodology has been adopted. 
 
 
Party leaders were influenced by their interpretation of ideology, and because of the power they  
 
35 Michael Bentley, (1984) op cit. p.343. 
36 Lord Esher to Fisher 15th October 1907.In Maurice V. Brett (Ed. For Vols. 1 &2) and Viscount Oliver 
Esher, (Ed. For Vols. 3&4) (1934 Four Vols.) Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, Ivor 
Nicholson & Watson Ltd., London, Vol. Two, p.252. 
37 In the words of its leading proponent, Maurice Cowling, ‘the phrase “the Peterhouse school of   history” 
was coined, I believe, on the fertile tongue of Professor Joseph Lee of the University of Cork who was a 
fellow of Peterhouse in the 1970s. What Professor Lee meant, however, was not a philosophical position 
but what he called…the “high political” works which had been written about the history of nineteenth and 
twentieth century English politics by Professor J. R. Vincent, Dr. A. B. Cooke, Dr. Andrew Jones, and 
myself in the years between 1965 and 1976.’ (Maurice Cowling, (1986) ‘The Peterhouse School’, New 
York Review of Books, Vol. 33, No. 6, 10th April, 1986.) 
38 David Cannadine, (1990) The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London, p.21 
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wielded, this interpretation guided what the Conservative Party actually stood for. Whilst the 
substantive core of Conservative ideology may have remained inviolable, there were many re-
assessments and changes to contingent values, principles, and concepts. The question of whether 
such developments altered the very nature of Conservatism between 1867 and 1914 will be 
addressed, within the context of changing political circumstances, in Chapter Two. 
 
 
Changing political circumstances, of course, impacted not only upon the upper echelons of the 
party, but also upon those further down the hierarchy, the party workers in the constituencies. 
These were the people who conducted elections at the local level and attempted to maximise the 
party’s support. Chapter Three will, therefore, examine the organization of the party to discover 
the extent to which organizational changes, designed and implemented by the party leadership, 
affected the character of the party, and contributed to its electoral performance. 
 
High politics, ideology, and organization were all necessary components in the pursuit of 
electoral success. Chapter Four will use evidence from the preceding chapters devoted to these 
elements to analyze the Conservative Party’s appeal for electoral support during our period of 
study. In an era of extensions to the franchise, and an increasing acceptance that democracy was 
to be a permanent feature of the political process, direct appeals to the electorate assumed ever 
greater importance. The public face of the party, therefore, needed to be carefully constructed to 
appeal to as broad a constituency as possible. The Conservative message needed to be assertive 
but flexible; attractive but practical; and most of all, to promote policies that appeared 
achievable and workable. 
 
 13
The fortunes of the Conservative party waxed and waned during our period of study. The final 
chapter will draw conclusions from all the evidence presented to explain these fluctuations. How 
did the Conservative Party improve so successfully upon its dismal electoral record between 
1832 and 1874? What respective merit ought to be given to the contributions made to the party’s 
electoral revival from 1885 until 1906, by its organization, its ideology, and its leadership? And 
why did the party’s fortunes decline so drastically in the early twentieth century?  
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CHAPTER ONE. 
 
HIGH POLITICS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN. 
 
Any investigation into high politics must, self evidently, begin with two questions. Firstly, what 
is taken to be understood by the term “high politics”; and secondly, what form of methodology 
is to be employed. Then follow two secondary questions, is the definition of “high politics” 
valid; and why has a particular methodology been chosen. 
 
The first question is reasonably straightforward. High politics was formerly the term used to 
describe the formulation and operation of foreign, as distinct from domestic, policy. However, 
in its modern interpretation high politics can be taken to mean, as the phrase suggests, politics 
that took place at the highest level. It was the politics employed by party leaderships and top 
politicians, the nature of the relationships between them, and their reactions one to another. Who 
ought to be included within the realm of high politics was largely decided by those who actually 
engaged in high politics. The criteria for membership was based, as Maurice Cowling has 
argued, upon ‘mutual recognition; not from office, but from a distinction between politicians, 
inside parliament and outside, whose actions were thought reciprocally important, and those 
whose actions were not.’39 High politics set the parameters for all other political action and 
initiative, it was, therefore, unsurprisingly, not an exact science. ‘High politics was primarily a 
matter of rhetoric and manoeuvre…Political rhetoric was an attempt to provide new landmarks 
for the electorate. Political manoeuvre was designed to ensure that the right people provided 
them.’40 Put simply, high politics in nineteenth century Britain was the politics of leadership, 
and  was the preserve of a small select band of hugely influential people, who would decide 
                                                 
39 Maurice Cowling, (1971) The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginning of Modern British Politics. 
Cambridge University Press, p.4. 
40 Ibid. p.5.   
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what they and their party stood for, and what image was to be projected to the people. 
 
It can be argued that Cowling’s definition of high politics is too narrow, and ignores important  
 
outside influences. For example, Stuart Ball argues that  
 
‘despite the more extreme arguments of the “high politics” school, grass-roots party 
opinion did matter and was constantly in the awareness of MPs and cabinet ministers. 
Party opinions could not simply be massaged and managed, though skill in response 
made a considerable difference; politicians had to work with the grain of their supporters 
and those who failed to do so soon found their influence and even their careers to be at 
an end.’41 
 
There is a great deal of evidence to support this point of view, but even so it need not detract 
from the validity of our investigation. Certainly studies focusing on local politics, and therefore, 
much nearer to “grass roots Party opinion” have proved to be illuminating and informative. 42 
To extrapolate the conclusions derived from local studies into a national perspective would be 
extremely problematical, if only because of the pre-eminence accorded to local issues in specific 
regions. Even so, evidence from local studies will be useful when considering the changes that 
were made to party organization, and in examining the Conservative party’s appeal for electoral 
support. Nevertheless, decisions of major importance were still only taken at the highest 
possible level, albeit possibly from a range of options circumscribed by ideology and more 
populist opinion; and, furthermore 
‘if we ascend the political hierarchy, from the voters upwards, we find that at each level 
– the membership of political parties, party activists, local political leaders, MPs, 
national leaders – the social character of the group is slightly less “representative” and 
slightly more tilted in favour of those who belong to the middle and upper levels of our 
society.’43 
 
41 Stuart Ball, (Ed.) (1996) ‘National Politics and Local History: The Regional and Local Archives of The 
Conservative Party 1867-1945.’ in Archives The Journal of The British Records Association. No. 94, Vol. 
XXII, April 1996, p.59. 
42 See, for example, J. Lawrence, (1998) Speaking for the People: Party Language and Popular Politics in 
England, 1867-1914, Cambridge University Press, for a study of Wolverhampton, and  Patrick Joyce, 
(1980) Work, Society, and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian England, Harvester 
Press, London, for a study of Lancashire. 
43 W. L. Guttsman, (1963), The British Political Elite, MacGibbon & Kee, London, p.27 
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This was never more true than in nineteenth century Great Britain. Those who engaged in high 
politics were invariably drawn from a narrow stratum at the apex of society. Moreover, even if 
we accept that ‘the more political affairs are analysed the more difficult it becomes to establish a 
point where party domestic affairs end and high policy begins,’44 the realm of high politics will 
still lie at the opposite end of a continuum from grass-roots activism. It is equally true that the 
nearer any investigation gets to the apex of political decision making, self-evidently, the more 
those who participate in it will appear to constitute a “closed circle”. The scope of high politics, 
therefore, may also be retrospectively  discovered from the political activities of those who 
constituted that “closed circle”. ‘The study of politics at the top, is, therefore, not a simple 
matter. One is dealing with a problematical, high-level activity where the meaning of the 
material is not self evident’,45 however, the specific realm of activity that constitutes “high 
politics” may be assessed with reasonable certainty and accuracy, even if tapping into it remains 
extremely difficult. 
 
Having concluded that only a comparatively small group of people engaged in high politics; it 
would appear reasonable that any investigation into the subject ought to concentrate upon the 
activities of those very people. Certainly it has already been noted that the Victorian era in Great 
Britain was the golden age of individualism. Parliament was dominated by persons rather than 
political dogma.46 We can  claim, therefore, that a few individuals are of paramount importance, 
but even they relied upon the support of their party. Unfortunately where party politics are 
concerned the public pronouncements of politicians must always be treated with the utmost 
 
44 Eric Alexander, Third Viscount Chilston, (1961) Chief Whip: The Political Life and Times of Aretas 
Akers-Douglas First Viscount Chilston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p.xi. Nb. Even if in this 
instance “high policy” is taken to mean “foreign policy” the implication remains unaltered. 
45Maurice  Cowling, (1971) op cit. p.9. 
46 See footnote 29, page 9. 
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caution, political expediency and, on occasions, deliberate obfuscation are often the order of the 
day. Can we justify concentrating upon the small group who engaged in high politics, and if so, 
can an adequately rigorous academic methodology be constructed to do justice to such an 
investigation. 
 
 
It has been suggested, perhaps somewhat patronisingly, that in the nineteenth century 
 
‘for the greater part the newly enfranchised masses, being uneducated, unsophisticated 
and sentimental were incapable of developing anything that could be called a political 
opinion. Hence they were apt to find a focus for their feeling more easily in the person of 
an individual: to such the right or wrong of politics were represented by Gladstone or 
Disraeli, Randolph Churchill or [Joseph] Chamberlain etc. Indeed, in 1868 and in 1874 
the vote of the country was virtually a plebiscite in favour of Gladstone in the first place  
and of Disraeli in the second.’47 
 
On the other hand it has been noted by H. J. Hanham that  
 
‘politics for more than twenty years after the 1867 Reform Act became the central pre- 
occupation of the nation. The party system was remodelled to encourage popular 
participation on an unprecedented scale. The number of votes cast in general elections 
rose rapidly, each party gaining over a million votes for the first time in the general 
election of 1874.’48 
 
Hanham goes on to suggest that ‘almost everywhere politics came to occupy a central position 
in community life. Workingmen’s clubs, co-operative societies, friendly societies, and other 
charitable organizations were often identified with one party or the other.’49 However, he also 
observes that ‘everywhere the normal pattern was for the “natural” leaders of the community to 
take their place as political leaders.’50 These local political leaders were well down the hierarchy 
described by W. L. Guttsman, referred to earlier, and were distanced from the elite; however, 
Hanham is in agreement with Viscount Chilston on the popular influence exercised by those at 
the top, those who engaged in high politics. ‘Disraeli and Gladstone’ he points out, ‘became 
 
47 Eric Alexander, Third Viscount Chilston, (1961) op cit. p.7. 
48 H. J. Hanham, (1978 ed.) Elections and Party Management: Politics in the Time of Disraeli and 
Gladstone. Harvester, London, p.XI. 
49 H. J. Hanham, (1978 ed.) op cit. p.XIV. 
50 Ibid. p.XIV.                    
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popular heroes featured on hundreds of thousands of plaques, horse brasses, salt cellars, and 
tiles.’51 The inference is that even if voters were ignorant or well informed, apathetic or 
interested, it was those who influenced politics at the highest level who exerted the greatest 
influence upon them, who had the capacity to mould their opinions. For example, a 
Conservative party organizer wrote to the principal party manager Lord Nevill in 1867 
‘It is quite wonderful the way these working men devote their time and energy to 
politics. I trust however that we shall not be like Frankenstein, and have raised a spirit 
that we cannot control! – it is a dangerous power to give them, but they are so 
determined to have it, that all we can do is to keep them on the right road.’ 52 
 
The influence exerted by Gladstone and Disraeli, as political circumstances changed and 
developed has already been noted. They became indispensable talismans. It may even be argued 
that they became the embodiment of their respective parties: it was they who interpreted the 
ideology which underpinned doctrine and informed party decisions. Neither had been party 
leaders at the time of the 1867 Reform Act but both had been chosen to steer their parties 
through the minefield of franchise reform. As the Act took effect they were entrusted with the 
task of ensuring that their respective parties gained the best advantage possible from its 
provisions. Thus, to a certain extent, they were allowed a free hand until the repercussions of the 
Act became apparent. This is not to suggest that either were autocrats who exercised total 
control over cohorts of “yes-men”, or that they were the only formulators of policy and strategy. 
They were ably assisted by like-minded colleagues. ‘The most important political leaders did 
not occupy small patches of rhetorical ground: they “recognised the force” of all effective 
opinions and batted on all sides of whatever wicket they chose to make their own.’53 They were 
also flexible, pragmatic and able to manage changing circumstances; as when new members  
 
51 H. J. Hanham, (1978 ed.) op cit. p.XIV.   
52 Major the Hon. C. J. Keith-Falconer to Lord Nevill, 1st September 1867, quoted in Paul Smith, (1967) 
Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp.117-118. 
53 Maurice Cowling, (1971) op cit. p.7. 
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aspired to engage in high politics. Men such as  
‘Bright, Forster, Stansfield, and Chamberlain who came into the political elite as 
spokesmen of new social groups and a new segment of the “body politic”. Their power 
and influence at Westminster often derived from the fact that they were the leaders and 
spokesmen of the new party organizations, both on the local and on the national level.’54 
 
The nineteenth century was a time of great change, Reform, and upheaval in British politics, but  
 
it can be argued with much certainty that in the nineteenth century power was concentrated in an 
 
oligarchy which was not very different in form from that of the eighteenth century. That 
oligarchy was overwhelmingly aristocratic, ‘new men …entered it, but they…generally become 
assimilated into the groups from which the majority of their colleagues spring.’55 There may 
have been exceptions to this rule, for example ‘the entry of David Lloyd George, a man of a 
very different social background, into the House of Commons in 1890 may have shown that the 
era of the “cottage-bred man” had arrived.’ But this did not signal the end of the ancien regime,  
it may have been under attack, but the old order was still resilient ‘the entry of William  
Waldegrave  Palmer [later Lord Selborne] into that same House five years earlier demonstrated 
that the era of the estate-bred man was far from over.’56 Further evidence that a tight-knit 
oligarchy continued to hold sway in the field of high politics can be deduced from the fact that 
‘the character of Cabinet membership is still [by the 1900s] much more predominantly 
aristocratic and upper class than that of the House of Commons from which it is drawn.’57 This 
suggests that at the highest level politics is concerned with influence rather than numbers, thus 
‘by 1906 the aristocratic group of the cabinet had been relegated to a minority position, although  
a strong one.’ (my emphasis)58  Entry into the world of high politics, however, had to be earned  
and needed to bring something other than loyalty, finance, or industry into the arena.. Many  
 
54 W. L. Guttsman, (1963) op cit. pp.84-85.          
55  Ibid. p319. 
56 George Boyce, (Ed.) (1987) The Crisis of British Unionism: Lord Selborne’s Domestic Political Papers 
1885-1922, Historian’s Press, London, p.VIII. 
57 W. L. Guttsman, (1963) op cit. p.90.          
58 Ibid. p.78.          
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wealthy people, of elevated social rank, may have seen new democratic practices as a pathway 
to office and power, but the circle remained closed to all except those with the right contacts and 
credentials. Consider this  somewhat bitter complaint, 
‘it becomes clearer after every appointment that though men may work their hearts out 
and make every sacrifice, financial and otherwise, when the Conservative party is in 
opposition and in difficulties, yet in prosperous times all is forgotten and all honours, 
emoluments and places are reserved for the friends and relations of the favoured few, 
many of whom were in the nursery while some of us were fighting up-hill battles for the 
party.’59 
 
Effort alone was never enough, whereas ‘the appointment of R. A. Cross as Home Secretary by 
Disraeli in 1874 was, so Disraeli’s biographer wrote, “the natural outcome of the substantial  
support given by his native Lancashire to the Conservative cause.”’60 Cross’ biographer, on the 
other hand, suggests that his appointment may have been influenced by his relationship with 
Lord Derby; adding that Disraeli ‘looked upon the appointment as a gamble.’ 61 The Liberal 
Party’s inner circle were equally exclusive. 
‘The governing hierarchy of the Liberal Party in the age of Gladstone [were] something 
of a distinct group within, but also apart from, the Parliamentary Party; a group with its 
own traditions, its own loyalties, and its own code of disinterested, efficient and high-
minded service.’62 
 
Nor were those excluded from high politics unaware of their ostracism or always ready to 
quietly acquiesce. Robert Wallace MP. complained in 1895, 
‘The House [of Commons] has no voice in the selection of the Government, only the 
invidious and practically useless option of objecting. Once in, the party heads, not 
elected, but co-opted by predecessors similarly co-opted, are masters of the situation. On 
any signs of independent action in their party, they can put the pistol of dissolution to 
 
59 G. C. T. Bartley (Cons. Party Agent 1882-85) to Lord Salisbury 22nd Oct. 1898, quoted in J. P. 
Cornford, (1967) ‘The Parliamentary Foundations of the Hotel Cecil’, In Robert Robson, (Ed.) (1967) 
Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain: Essays in Honour of George Kitson Clark, G. Bell & Sons, 
London, p.268. 
60 W. F. Moneypenny and G. E. Buckle, (1929 Two Vols.) The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of 
Beaconsfield, John Murray, London,  Vol. 2, p.629. Quoted in Guttsman W. L. (1963) op cit. p.85. 
61 Dennis J. Mitchell, (1991) Cross and Tory Democracy: A Political Biography of Richard Assheton 
Cross, Garland, New York and London, pp.56-57. 
62 Paul Adelman, (1970) Gladstone, Disraeli, and Later Victorian Politics, Longman Group, London, pp. 
4-5.  
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their heads and say “your vote or your life, if you do not come to heel, we will blow your 
parliamentary brains out,” and so bring mutineers to their senses. Looking at facts rather 
than phrases, the actual government of this country is properly neither a Monarchy nor a 
Democracy, but mainly an alternation of two traditional Oligarchies, each composed of 
an aristocratic nucleus, continually drawing recruits that suit it into its “ring,” getting 
into power and place through the efficacious manipulation of party resources, and then  
sticking to them as long as it can, by managing the members of its Parliamentary 
following through a dextrous blending of menace, cajolery, and reward.’63 
Nor was criticism confined to the left of the political spectrum 
 
‘[Hilaire] Belloc and Cecil Chesterton from the radical right argued, in a similar vein, 
that the old-boys network dominated parties. They sought to show “how restricted a 
group of men the functions of government have come to be entrusted…Groups of this 
size could not possibly arise in a genuine democratic society; and, what is more, [they] 
are more closely and intimately bound together even than they were in the days when the 
government of this country was avowedly that of an oligarchy. The tendency to govern 
by decree is not decreasing; it is increasing.”’ 64 
 
We can conclude, then, that the ruling groups of both parties were enduring and resilient,  
 
furthermore they were pragmatic and capable of utilising legislation to their own ends, even  
 
when such legislation was ostensibly of a democratic nature. Even the Parliament Act of 1911  
 
served to reinforce the grip on power of those who actually pulled the levers of power. 
 
‘[One] result of the Parliament Act was to tighten the grip of the executive on the House 
of Commons. Alarm at the growing subjection of the Lower House to the cabinet had 
begun as far back as the [18]90s. Sidney Low published an article called “If The House 
of Commons Were Abolished?”  in which he pointed out the transfer of the Commons’ 
powers to the cabinet, the party caucus, the press and the platform. This transformation 
was in part a natural consequence of the extended franchise which had led to the creation 
of party machinery which increased the subjection of private members to the whips on 
the one hand and their constituents on the other. It was partly the result of revised rules 
of procedure, restricting the rights of unofficial members and reducing the opportunities 
for criticizing the general policy of the government…Members are urged and induced to  
support the cabinet on many matters on which they might otherwise oppose it in order 
not to imperil the bill, which means that the power of the party machine over the 
individual member is largely increased.’ 65 
 
63 Nineteenth Century, No. XXXVII, March 1895, pp.192-193. 
64 Hilaire Belloc and Cecil Chesterton, (1911) The Party System, S. Swift, London, p.41. Quoted in H. J. 
Hanham, (Ed.) (1969) The Nineteenth Century Constitution 1815-1914: Documents and Commentary, 
Cambridge University Press, p.210. 
65 Emily Allyn, (1931) Lords Versus Commons: A Century of Compromise 1830-1930, The Century Co., 
London. p.219.    
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There is, therefore, overwhelming evidence that the realm of high politics during the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century was the exclusive preserve of a limited oligarchy who 
jealously guarded their privileged position. Moreover it cannot be gainsaid that the individuals 
who made up the membership of this oligarchy were the pre-eminent political personalities of 
their time, or how great their influence was.  
‘If it be objected that this suggests that it can be “rational” for a few men to exercise a 
political and economic power and political and intellectual influence very much greater 
than the influence exercised by others, it must be answered that the recurrent existence 
of such disproportion is one of the plainest facts of human history,’ 66 
 
 
Having determined the realm, nature, and scope of high politics in nineteenth century Britain,  
 
and an understanding of which groups operated within this realm, the salience of an  
 
investigation into the activity is unquestionable. What is open to question is what methodology  
 
is best suited to carry out such an investigation to enable the workings of high politics to be 
documented. It can be argued, for example, that ‘it would be unreal to separate artificially the 
drama of high politics from either the slow burning changes in the cities, the countryside, the 
factories, and the boardrooms, or from the movement of ideas and perceptions.’ 67 Indeed there 
can be little doubt that social changes impacted upon the realm of high politics, 
‘The world of high politics was not, of course, entirely monastic or Rotarian. But there 
were two reasons why it was atypical. In the first place, it was self-perpetuating. 
Secondly changes in the social structure were not readily reflected in the character of the 
political power. Until 1916 the original “workshop of the world” was governed by 
country gentlemen, dukes’ relatives, rentiers, literary radicals, educated intellectuals and 
professional politicians.’ 68 
 
We have seen previously that “cottage-bred” men began to make inroads into the closed shop of  
 
high politics, the same may be said of industrialists, businessmen, trade unionists and others. 
 
 
66 Maurice Cowling, (1963) The Nature and Limits of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, 
p.193. 
67 E. J. Feuchtwanger, (1985) Democracy and Empire: Britain 1865-1914, Edward Arnold, London, p.146.         
68 Maurice Cowling, (1971) op cit. p.10.          
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‘The entry of the men from other ranks and occupations than those which had been 
traditionally associated with the political career could not have taken place if the growth 
of local party associations, although limited in scope and uncertain of their powers at 
first, had not brought new voices and methods into the process by which candidates, and 
consequently MPs were selected.’ 69 
 
But they, and anyone else who aspired to positions of power had little choice but to adopt the 
rules and conventions that awaited them. According to Cowling ‘these conventions are only 
intelligible from within.’ 70 This is obviously to overstate the case, since if taken literally, it 
would preclude study by any outsider, including Cowling and his colleagues, but the basis of the 
argument is nevertheless  worth noting. Parliament represented ‘an arena for conflict between 
politicians...[but] In practice conflict divided parliamentary politicians far less than 
consciousness of the power of parliament united them.’ 71 For example, there were at least three 
prominent politicians of the period, namely Harcourt, Campbell-Bannerman, and Edward 
Stanhope, who had brothers sitting on the opposite side of the House. 72 Moreover they were not 
only affiliated by familial ties, Lord Beaconsfield wrote to Hartington in 1876 to thank him for a 
gift of some grouse in these terms, ‘My Dear Lord – It is very kind of you to remember me; one 
likes to be remembered. I am sorry I shall not meet you so often in the future, but we may meet 
perhaps more frequently in those secret societies where we sometimes encounter each other…I 
hope you are well, and that you will win all your encounters; except, of course, at St Stephens.’ 
73 The situation hardly changed after the turn of the nineteenth century, ‘Balfour and Asquith 
shared many friends, sometimes leaving dinner parties in the same hansom for the House of 
Commons to lambaste one another in a late debate.’ 74 An esprit de corps existed between those 
 
69 W. L. Guttsman, (1963) op cit. p.80. 
70 Maurice Cowling, (1971) op cit. p.10. 
71 Ibid. p7.  
72 See J. P. Cornford, (1967) op cit. p.272. 
73 Lord Beaconsfield to Hartington, 6th September 1876, quoted in Bernard Holland, (1911 Two Vols.) The 
Life of Spencer Compton Eighth Duke of Devonshire, Longmans Green & Co. London, Vol. One, pp.174-
175.  
74 Max Egremont, (1980) Balfour, Collins, London, pp.215-216. 
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privileged to occupy positions of power, conflict was inescapable, but fell within “the rules of 
the game”. It has been noted that ‘the adoption, when the [Conservative] party was in 
Opposition, of sharp and constructive alternatives to the policies of  those in power was not 
common, the tendency being in such circumstances to exaggerate, by attacks on the governing 
party, the differences between ministers and alternative ministers by mainly destructive attacks.’ 
75 The reason for this strategy is that, as has already been made clear, high politics was 
concerned with rhetoric and manoeuvre, it was about people and individuals; and about the 
business of government. It remains an inescapable fact that, at least, in nineteenth century 
Britain,     
‘immediate and effective power in the sphere of government is vested in a very small 
number [of people]…A democratic political system cannot make elites superfluous, 
though it may ensure their rapid and regular circulation. Hence our interests in the 
wielders of power.’ 76 
 
May it not, therefore, be appropriate to investigate high politics by concentrating upon the men 
who mattered, those who actually participated, in the context of the environment in which they 
operated. ‘It was from these politicians that almost all initiative came. The language they used, 
the images they formed, the myths they left, had a profound effect on the objectives other 
politicians assumed could be achieved through the political system.’ 77  
 
The first objection to such a methodology is that it may limit the scope of any investigation. 
Peterhouse, for example, often implies that it was Westminster which ultimately determined 
decision making, therefore, historians need to study Westminster in intricate detail. It is argued 
that it was a ‘highly specialized community’ whose members’ ‘primary interest’ was their own 
 
75 Donald Southgate, (1974) The Conservative Leadership, Macmillan, London, p.14. 
76 W. L. Guttsman, (1963) op cit. p.15. 
77 Maurice Cowling, (1971) op cit. p.3. 
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‘very private institutional life’ 78 This argument, though, was somewhat challenged by Maurice 
Cowling when he pointed out that the academic study of politics should be explanatory, not 
predictive, and not judgemental; because ‘at a certain stage in the development of an academic 
discipline, when the landmarks have disappeared from sight, attempts must be made to bring 
them back into view.’79 Concentrating research upon individuals, therefore, need not necessarily 
mean that wider issues are excluded, for example, it may be convincingly argued that demands 
from the working class for better conditions could only be accommodated through existing 
institutions, but in the process needed to be transformed in order to be made tolerable to ruling 
opinion. Therefore, ‘if we observe British politicians within the context of their society and see 
their rise under the influence of new social forces and in changing social conditions we may also 
gain some understanding of structural changes in British society.’80 The main thrust of our 
investigation, therefore, must be upon individual politicians, but also in the context of their 
environment. We have already noted that the public utterances of politicians must be treated 
with caution, especially if the intention is to manipulate opinions. Thus the contentious “Irish 
Question” of the 1880s may be interpreted as ‘a temporary and particular name’ given to ‘a 
continuous and permanent existential problem’ which confronted party managers. The difficulty 
was to uncover ‘party lines, divisions, and alignments, and then rationalizing these for the 
benefit of that great majority of even their senior colleagues.’ 81 Research, therefore, needs to 
concentrate upon private opinions and statements, gleaned from diaries, memoirs, 
correspondence, etc. It can, of course, be argued that even by this approach it is, perhaps, 
impossible to discover what a person actually “believed” or “intended” ‘what one is talking 
 
78 See A. B. Cooke and John Vincent, (1974) The Governing Passion: Cabinet Government and Party 
Politics in Britain 1885-1886, Harvester, Brighton, pp20-22.   
79 Maurice Cowling, (1963) The Nature and Limits of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, p.17. 
80 W. L. Guttsman, (1963) op cit. p.16. 
81 A. B. Cooke and John Vincent, (1974), op cit. p.18. 
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about…whether writing about the nineteenth century or the twentieth, is the springs of human 
conduct, to these we have but uncertain guides’ and some ‘prefer to stop short of making 
definite pronouncements about such matters’ because it appears uncertain ‘that information in 
such fields can be convincingly related to a sound structure of theory.’ 82 However, if the theory 
postulated is one of the exclusivity and detachment of the world of high politics, such obstacles 
may be overcome, because even if the focus is upon the Westminster elite it will also involve 
contextualizing these men into a wider culture. Since we have concluded that high politics relies 
upon rhetoric and manoeuvre within the confines and conventions of the system , we may 
assume that senior politicians holding positions of power and responsibility within their parties  
‘cannot usefully be said themselves to have wanted, desired, or believed anything except 
 what was wanted by all other participants in the system…[we may assume] on the 
contrary, that, by the time they emerge as commanding figures, they have adopted a way 
of thinking and acting whose function is the playing of a role which their positions as 
repositories of the hopes and ambitions of their followers forces them to respect. In a 
sense, therefore, it is idle to ask whether they self-consciously believed, personally 
desired or independently wanted anything in particular.’ 83 
 
Except, of course, the power of office to put into practice their chosen policies. Also, as Maurice  
 
Cowling has argued, too much importance may be attached to political intention. Confusion  
 
arises, he says, from three misleading tendencies. Firstly there is a  
 
‘tendency to forget that consequences are as important as intentions and that the 
consequences of even the most limited intentions are at the mercy of many factors over 
which no single will can have control.’ 84 
 
Thus although it is important to concentrate upon individuals, this cannot be done in isolation  
 
from all other actors who may exert an influence. Secondly it is important not to forget  
 
‘that intentions are as important as consequences, and that, in explanation, it is difficult 
to determine the intention of any particular actor and misleading to infer it from the 
consequences of his action. The goodness of an action resides not in the consequences 
 
82 H. J.Hanham, (1978) op cit. p.XX. 
83 Maurice Cowling, (1967) op cit. p.311. 
84 Maurice Cowling, (1963) op cit. p18.        
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merely but in the intention also; and the connection between intention and consequence 
is as devious as the nature of the intention is elusive.’ 85 
 
Therefore, concentrating upon intentions or consequences in isolation one from another will not  
 
provide a legitimate interpretation of events. Thirdly we should not suppose that by studying the  
 
structure of government  
 
‘light will be thrown on the way government works – as though those who govern 
make public the factors which determine the decisions they take (whereas it is as likely 
that the reverse is true.)’ 86 
 
If these pitfalls are not avoided, argues Cowling, the resulting explanation will show ‘only the  
 
outside of what happened and not at all how it happened, it tends to imply that nothing else  
 
could have happened.’ 87 To discover, and attempt to explain what happened on the inside there 
is no alternative other than to concentrate research upon the individuals who were inside. This is 
probably the only way to comprehend how politicians understood the responsibilities they 
shouldered in the exercise of power. The elite was as much subject to the established ways of 
politics, which it was their function to perpetuate, as were those voters whose acceptance of the 
status quo politicians wanted to encourage. 88   
 
Outside movements and developments cannot be ignored but the essence of any investigation of  
 
high politics must lie with the individuals concerned. 
‘we must examine the varying impacts made by the movement of events on the major 
political leaders. It is important to examine the leaders one by one. Although we speak of 
a movement of events which it is the historian’s business to uncover, that movement was 
the outcome of conflict between the wills and minds and actions of the actors who were 
responsible for creating it. No one actor was responsible completely. No one actor could 
know the inwardness of the whole movement. The historian cannot know completely, 
but he alone has the chance to see what went on over the heads, beneath the feet or 
 
85 Maurice Cowling, (1963) op cit p.19. 
86 Ibid. p.20.        
87 Ibid. pp.21-22. 
88 A. B. Cooke and John Vincent, (1974), op cit. pp.12-13.. 
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despite the intentions of all the actors in the movement. He alone can begin to 
distinguish the parts they controlled or knew from the parts about which they had no 
knowledge or understanding at all. If he is to show to what extent they were carried 
along by forces they did not control, and forced by circumstances into reactions they did 
not intend, he must not only recognize that some of them knew exactly what they wanted 
and got it…he must also deal with them in the first place individually.’ 89  
 
Adopting such a methodology, therefore, need not restrict the scope of the investigation; in no 
way devalues it; and does not detract from its academic rigour. On the contrary the resulting 
explanation will throw light upon other areas which fall outside its remit, and inform other 
investigations which may approach the subject from a wholly different perspective.  
 
The following chapter will employ the methodology described above to determine what 
conservatism actually meant to Conservatives in our period of study: how that meaning was 
informed by ideology; how high politics adapted that ideology: and, of equal importance, how 
conservatism and the Conservative party was promulgated to a much wider audience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 Maurice Cowling, (1967) op cit p.289. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
WHAT DID CONSERVATIVES STAND FOR IN THE PERIOD 
1867-1914? 
What is it that distinguishes Conservative ideology from all others? This is a difficult question 
to answer, not least because 
‘Conservatives themselves have often tried to place their ideas and beliefs on a different 
plane from communism, socialism, liberalism, fascism etc. on the grounds that 
conservatism is not an ideology…on this account, conservatism is a set of attitudes and 
dispositions rather than a fully fledged political programme, and this serves to emphasize  
the basic problem of dealing with conservatism as a theory of politics.’ 90 
 
This may be so, but it has already been established that as early as the 1830s the term 
“Conservative” represented “a body of recognizable political attitudes”, so at the very least, 
there existed by 1867 a tradition of conservative thought that was felt worthy to be put before an 
enlarged electorate. If a “tradition” is taken to be ‘a conception of how things should be done, a 
manner of understanding and dealing with certain matters, a complicated cluster of criteria and 
skills which cannot be captured in simple formulae or diagrams,’ 91 we may begin to discover 
what parameters constitute the “boundaries” of conservatism. ‘If then we are searching for the 
real Tory tradition…it resides…in the history of the Conservative party.’ 92 A history that 
betrays a yearning for office and the power bestowed by that office. It was Robert Peel who 
rebuilt the old Tory party after the Reform Act of 1832 and 
‘at the social and economic level Peelite Conservatism sought to bring the ideas of old 
Toryism into line with the new world of industrialisation and urbanization; in an attempt 
to generate industrial and economic growth while protecting the powers and privileges of 
the landed interest and preserving what could be preserved of the structure of the old  
constitution.’ 93 
 
                                                 
90 R. J. Bennett in Neill Nugent and Roger King, (Eds.)  (1977) op cit. p.12. 
91 Shirley Robin Letwin, ‘On Conservative Individualism’, in Maurice Cowling, (Ed.) (1978) Conservative 
Essays, op cit. p.62. 
92 Andrew Gamble, (1974) op cit. p.15. 
93 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) British Conservatism: Conservative Thought from Burke to Thatcher, 
Longmans, London, p.26. 
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Yet, although seeking to update his party, and bring it well and truly into the industrial age, Peel 
also endorsed ‘and sought to preserve many of the traditional elements of the old Toryism. It 
was the gospel of strong and sound government, of law and order, of the defence of property 
and preservation of the constitution.’ 94 Some elements were not only seen as desirable, but 
indispensable, ‘what was inviolable was strong executive government, buttressed by the 
constitution and the Anglican establishment, and so thereby capable of suppressing popular 
agitation in the interests of order and property.’ 95 Added to this, of course, was the imperative  
of convincing the voters that conservatism was a just and equitable political philosophy. 
We can see from the above some basic form of the party inherited by Benjamin Disraeli, a 
desire to conserve what is considered valuable, a dislike of radical change, a suspicion that 
human nature is inherently untrustworthy, a belief that society is in some way “organic” and not 
a human construct. In fact Disraeli feared that society was in danger of total disintegration, 
‘throughout his life he assumed that traditional civilisation was threatened by a 
combination of social and political dangers. The emerging urban world of the industrial 
revolution threatened the old balanced constitution, while the selfishness of    
Whig oligarchs in enriching their class threatened to provoke revolution.’ 96 
 
Added to his fears for tradition, continuity, and law and order, were his concerns regarding the 
almost doubling of the electorate which resulted from the 1867 Reform Act which he himself 
had piloted through parliament. For Disraeli was no democrat, in fact ‘his fear of democracy 
should never be underestimated.’ 97 The Conservative party now had to appeal to a new 
electorate if they were to have any chance of gaining office, and the necessity became even 
more pressing after the party lost the general election of 1868.  It has been argued that he 
‘embarked  upon a series of brilliant and bewildering ideological and political stratagems 
 
94 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. p.26. 
95 Robert Eccleshall, (1990) English Conservatism Since The Restoration: An Introduction and an 
Anthology, Unwin Hyman, London, pp.80-81. 
96 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. p.31.      
97 Ibid. p.32.      
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designed both to satisfy the powerful political and psychological needs he was arousing while 
shifting his party on to more attractive political ground.’ 98 Although he was to restore his 
party’s electoral credentials and point it in a new direction, this opinion may be seen as 
hagiographic. It is equally convincing to argue that 
‘Disraeli’s intellectual liveliness makes it easy to over-emphasize the importance of 
theory in his political life. Successive sessions in opposition bred in him a grim 
determination to score a point by any methods which an elastic pragmatism permitted 
him to square with his party’s principles.’ 99 
 
In any event, he had realised that there was a necessity to woo the middle and working classes 
by a promise of social and humanitarian reform. This was partly a response to developments 
within the Liberal party; after about 1865 Liberalism had moved from being primarily a 
“defender of property” into a more democratic “commercial” Liberalism appealing to the urban 
classes. 100 The need to counter this rival initiative was clear ‘The Conservative party must 
become the party of popular welfare. Tory Democracy concerned not merely the people’s 
electoral rights but their welfare, providing Conservatism with both popular and legislative 
purpose.’ 101 To do this Disraeli began to expand upon a theme he had introduced as early as 
October 1867 when, in a speech made at Edinburgh he had argued ‘that the opportunities 
presented by the [1867] Act in a new and uncertain situation amounted to a challenge which 
only a truly national party could meet.’ 102 His “brilliant stratagem” was to create the concept of 
“one nation conservatism.” The Conservatives’ desire to focus their appeal to the electorate on a 
national perspective rather than on a class basis became central to their whole electoral strategy.  
The problem remained, however,  how to convince the electorate that such a policy was 
 
98 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. pp.31-32. 
99 R. B. McDowell, (1959) op cit. p.83. cf. ‘Scholars are in general agreement about Disraeli’s approach to 
practical politics…as a practical politician he was largely uninfluenced by principles or beliefs.’ John 
Vincent (1990), Disraeli, Oxford University Press, p.55.     
100 See Michael Bentley, (1984) op cit. pp.180-183 
101 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. pp.32-33.   
102 Ibid. p.157. 
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practical and workable. ‘Disraeli’s own solution…was to proclaim the Conservatives the party 
of imperialism on the one hand, and the party of social reform on the other.’ 103 It has been said 
that ‘Conservatism and the patriotism which emphasizes the importance of power, do not 
necessarily go together, but they are frequently allied.’ 104 As early as 1809 in his Tract on the 
Convention of Cintra, Wordsworth, a “romantic conservative” had pointed out moreover, ‘that 
the humblest peasant is the most likely recipient of sentiments of nationalism than the upper 
class, who tend to cut themselves off from the life of the nation.’ 105 Thus by wedding 
imperialism (tinged by patriotism) and social reform (based upon humanitarian foundations) to 
existing conservative values 
‘Disraeli had enabled the party to face two ways at once. On the one hand it could claim 
to be the party of order, property and stability, appealing to the innate instincts and to the 
vested interests not only of the landed aristocracy and gentry but also of the urban 
middle class. On the other hand, by its image of a socially reforming party with a 
concern for the rights of labour, it could also claim to be the party of the people.’ 106 
 
Following electoral success in 1874 the Conservatives took office and historians have pointed 
out ‘the contrast between Disraeli’s rhetoric and his achievements, the failure of his second   
Ministry to prepare a considered programme of reforms and, still more, its failure to legislate 
one,’ 107  For whatever reason this is probably true, but Disraeli’s and his party’s certainty about 
the efficacy of “one nation conservatism” should not be underestimated. ‘The Tories use, in 
1874, of public houses for meetings (and paying for the privilege) shows the importance they 
placed on getting to the people. Few people are so well placed to influence voters as 
publicans.’108 The party was quoted in The Times as saying ‘we are not for the classes or the 
 
103 Andrew Gamble, (1974) op cit.  p.18. 
104 R. B. McDowell, (1959) op cit. p.179.  
105 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. p.108. 
106 Philip Norton and Arthur Aughey, (1981) op cit. p.108. 
107 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. p.33. 
108 H. J. Hanham, (1978 edition), op cit.  p.22. 
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masses, for their interests are one.’ 109 In his private correspondence Disraeli wrote to Lady 
Bradford  
‘we did well in the House [of Commons] last night and carried the second reading of our 
Friendly Societies Bill. That, with the Artisans Dwelling Bill, is the second measure of 
social improvement that, I think we shall now certainly pass. It is important, because 
they  indicate a policy round which the country can rally...I have the Court with me, and 
the Parliament and, I really think, the country’ 110 
  
Although he had no way of knowing the “country” was with him. And again he wrote of 
 
‘the great good fortune and triumph which attended us in our labor (sic) Laws last night. 
I cannot express to you the importance of last night. It is one of those measures that root 
and consolidate a party. We have settled the long and vexatious contest between Capital 
and Labor (sic) [Giving the same news to Lady Chesterfield in another letter he wrote 
‘This is the greatest measure since the Short-Time Act and will gain and retain for the  
Tories the lasting affection of the working classes.’] 111 
 
Events would demonstrate that he had seriously overestimated “the lasting affection of the 
working classes”. Nevertheless, he had created a style of Conservatism that was prepared to be 
flexible, even pragmatic, in the face of pressing changes in society. This, however, ought not to 
be taken as a softening of attitude towards the necessity and relevance of class boundaries in that 
society. For example, on one occasion Disraeli left the House of Commons at midnight on the 
understanding that there would be no more divisions, but there was another. He wrote to Lady 
Bradford, not about being out-manoeuvred, or about the importance of him missing the division, 
what he complained about was, ‘Mr. Secretary Cross talked…of the Prime Minister’s absence 
on account of the state of his health!! What language! This comes of giving high office to a 
middle class man.’ 112 Such snobbery undoubtedly impacted upon policy. For example, when 
discussing the problems in Ireland Disraeli asserted that Irish MPs ‘got ashamed of their low 
 
109 The Times 18th September 1876. 
110 Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 26th February 1875, in The Marquis of Zetland (Earl of Ronaldsway), (Ed.) 
(1928 Two Vols.) op cit. Vol.1, p.208. 
111 Ibid.  Disraeli to Lady Bradford 29th June 1875, Vol.1 p.260. 
112 Ibid.  Disraeli to Lady Bradford 18th April 1874, Vol.1 p.72. 
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associates, the pork butchers of Covan, & co., who are now County Members!’ 113 This must 
not, however, be taken as a manifestation of straightforward pomposity, it merely illustrates that 
‘the Conservative conception of a social structure not only assumes that marked inequalities are 
inevitable but also declines to justify them because their inevitability makes justification 
unnecessary.’ 114 This view is consistent with the conservative attitude that society is organic, 
thus if all men were equal there would be no inequality, since inequality is a fact of life, there 
can be no right to equality. Moreover to tamper with society to produce greater equality was 
dangerous and pointless W. H. Mallock 115 wrote  
‘equality can mean nothing more than ruin. It can mean no process of levelling up…but 
a general levelling down, to a level below the lowest. Inequality would be seen to be a 
phoenix, which not only, if it died, would die amidst flames and ashes, but which out of 
those very ashes would be sure to redevelope (sic) itself.’ 116 
 
Disraeli, therefore, had attempted to reconcile conservative attachment to order and tradition  
 
with the needs of an ever changing society, as he himself said, 
 
‘in a progressive country change is constant and the great question is not whether you 
should resist change which is inevitable, but whether that change should be carried out in 
deference to the manners, the customs, the laws and the traditions of a people or whether 
it should be carried out in deference to abstract principles and arbitrary and general 
doctrines.’ 117 
 
The answer to this question was for Disraeli and his party straightforward and assertive; abstract 
principles and dogma had no place in conservatism. The controversial book Essays on Reform 
published, by various authors, in 1867 had in part, sought to justify democratic reform on moral 
grounds. In his contribution George C. Broderick had maintained that democracy was the only 
political doctrine which allowed men to freely exercise their rights 
 
113 Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield 31st July 1874, in The Marquis of Zetland (Earl of Ronaldsway), (Ed.) 
(1928 Two Vols.) op cit. Vol. 1 pp.119-120 
114 Maurice Cowling, (Ed.) (1978) op cit. p.11,  
115 William Hurrell Mallock (1849-1923) Author, notably of The New Republic (1877), and Social 
Equality (1882). Failed to gain a seat as a Conservative but wrote in support of them all his life. 
116 Nineteenth Century Vol.8, 1880, p.743.       
117 Quoted in T. E. Kebbel, (Ed.) (1882 Two Vols.) Selected Speeches of the Earl of Beaconsfield, 
Longmans, London, Vol.2, p.487. 
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‘the best government’, he argued, ‘is that which confers the greatest benefits on its 
citizens. The best man is he who acts from the best motives. The test of one is political, 
of the other moral. The one must be judged by a posteriori empirical considerations, the 
other by a priori principles…good government must imply a conviction of justice 
among its subjects, and thus involves considerations of morality.’ 118  
 
He conceded that ‘real facts are more trustworthy than the dictates of political justice,’ but  
 
insisted that ‘the latter are more trustworthy than hypothetical facts.’ Thus it was ‘quite essential 
that we should realize the existence of rights, both civil and political, distinct from so- 
called natural rights, and paramount to legal rights, which may properly be called moral rights.’ 
The existence of these “moral rights” was, he said, a real, not a hypothetical fact. Such thinking 
was anathema to the Conservative party and its main organ the Quarterly Review stated their 
case eloquently. They accepted that government ought to include a moral dimension, but argued 
that this aspect could only be acknowledged ‘only so far as sentiments of moral displeasure or 
approbation bear on the question of expediency.’ Expediency, ran the conservative argument, 
must be the watchword; adding that ‘if these moral rights really exist, it is no doubt essential 
that we should realise their existence, especially as they do not come by nature nor by law, and 
are paramount to the latter, without having the sanction of the former.’ The Quarterly hoped and 
thought that such rights did not exist, since they could only do so like ‘that most dangerous of 
all metaphysical figments “natural rights”, in the mind, and cannot be constrained by law.’ Such 
a situation, claimed the Quarterly was untenable because the law was sometimes called upon to 
expedite unpopular but necessary legislation. Equality in law was used as an example ‘the 
equality of all citizens before the law means not the fact of, but the right to such equality. The 
possible existence of political rights (of equality) which have not acquired a legal sanction 
cannot be assumed a priori.’ 119 This debate was instrumental in confirming that conservatism 
‘is not logically connected with any particular beliefs about the universe, the world in general, 
 
118 Quarterly Review Vol.123, No. 245, July 1867, pp.246-247. 
119 Ibid,  p.247.  
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or the nature of man, but only with beliefs about the activity of governing and the instruments of 
government,’ 120 
 
It has been argued that ‘Conservatism in the late Victorian era was an ideological response to 
the steady march of democracy.’ 121 The capriciousness of the electorate was brought home to 
the Conservative party when they decisively lost the 1880 general election. Disraeli told the 
Queen that they had lost because they had been ‘too confident, and that they had not had the 
same organization or worked as hard as the Liberals had.’ 122 Organization will be dealt with in 
a later chapter, but the issues of overconfidence and effort were also taken on board by the 
party. They realized the need to appeal directly to the voters. 
 
Disraeli died in 1881, and his eventual successor as leader, Lord Salisbury, was less than 
enthusiastic about democracy, even in his party’s limited conception of “Tory democracy.” 123 
‘Salisbury’s acceptance of the irrevocability of the Second Reform Act [1867] reduced his 
objection from the avoidance of popular government to the disciplining of it.’ His view was that 
‘the picture taken of the popular will at election time bore no necessary resemblance to its 
configuration later in the life of a parliament.’ He repeatedly pointed out that, if ‘two thousand 
voters in the constituencies where the contest was closest [in 1880] had cast their ballots for 
Conservatives instead of Liberals, the Liberals would not have emerged with a majority in the  
House of Commons.’ 124  Salisbury was not alone in his distrust of democracy and its  
 
120 Andrew Gamble, (1974) op cit. p.2. 
121 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. p.36. 
122 W. F. Moneypenny and G. E. Buckle, (1910-1924 Six Vols.), op cit. Vol.6, p.535. 
123 Dennis J. Mitchell attributes the creation of  “Tory Democracy” to R. A. Cross and his Lancashire 
allies. ‘It was a Lancashire created policy of the middle class – aristocratic alliance designed to substitute 
social and administrative reform for democracy.’ Dennis J. Mitchell, (1991) op cit. pp.235-236. 
124 Peter Marsh, (1978) op cit. pp.11-12. See also Salisbury in ‘Ministerial Embarrassments’ in the 
Quarterly Review Vol. 151, No. 302, April 1881, p.541; also Salisbury to the South Essex Regiment, 
quoted in The Times 25th May 1881, and Salisbury speaking at Dorchester, quoted in The Times 17th 
January 1884.   
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institutions, Richard Altick has identified what he describes as ‘an anti-democratic reaction  
which was intensifying in the years between the Reform Bills of 1867 and 1884.’ 125   
This was part of a more ‘general swing to the right by the intelligentsia in the 1870s and the 
1880s especially by Sir Henry Maine and Sir James Fitzjames Stephens. Yet their published 
works Liberty, Equality, Fraternity [Stephens 1873], and Popular Government [Maine 1885] 
were hailed as contributions to the philosophy of politics, whereas Salisbury’s Disintegration 
[1883] was criticised as illiberal and against popular government.’ 126 This demonstrates the 
care that those instrumental in high politics needed to take if making their innermost feelings 
public; despite the fact, that as Frank O’Gorman suggests, ‘a distinct shifting of emphasis 
towards a theoretical brand of right-wing politics was taking place in conservative circles, 
within and without the Conservative Party.’ 127  Academics although not immune to popular 
criticism need not necessarily react to it. Politicians, however, have a constituency whose 
support they rely upon, therefore, their reaction must be swift and convincing. Salisbury had 
d himself  
‘as the champion of the “sacredness of property”; and expressed a strong preference fo
the old form of parliamentary government which was controlled by the Crown and th
aristocracy. It was their task, he argued, to arbitrate between contending classes in the 
State. A House of Commons could never be an arbitrator – it was itself a cockpit o
contention. Moreover a democracy consisting of men who must be ordinarily engrossed 
fitfully. The people, he wrote, as an acting, deciding, accessible authority, are a myth.’128 
 
Indeed Sir Henry Lucy said of him that he regarded the House of Commons ‘with the animosity
of a dismissed lover.’ 129  Salisbury, then, was faced with the prospect that his deeply held,
style Tory, beliefs risked alienating his party from the middle and working classes whose 
 
125 Richard Altick, (1974) Victorian People and Ideas, J. Dent & Sons, London, p.294. 
126 Peter Marsh, (1978) op cit. pp.15-16. 
127 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. p.37.  
128 A. L. Kennedy, (1953) Salisbury 1830-1903: Portrait of a Statesman, John Murray, London, p.145. 
129 H. W. Lucy, (1908) Memories of Eight Parliaments, Heineman, London, p.120.  
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support Disraelian conservatism had striven so hard to secure and then let slip. ‘When Disraeli 
died in 1881 the party election manifesto was still a personal appeal from the party leader, not a 
statement of future policy prepared and endorsed by the leading men of the party.’ 130 Moreover
the very idea of election manifestos was in many respects alien to Conservative leaders but had
been forced upon them; Disraeli had written ‘I saw the necessity of accepting the challenge of 
Gladstone, which of course he counted on my not being able to do. But a political m
the most responsible of all undertakings and I had not a human being to share that 
responsibility.’ 131 That solitary task now fell to Salisbury, and he saw real danger ahead if th
Conservative party could not prese
. W. H Smith warned him  
‘the Radicals have the Trades Unions, the Dissenting Chapels and every society for the 
abolition of property and morality working for them. Our supporters only want to be left
will make no sacrifice of time or of pleasure to prepare against attack or to resist it.’ 
Salisbury was not to know, at that time, that the Liberal party would split over Home Rule, 
thereby severely damaging their electoral credibility, his concern was the electoral prospec
his own party, and to rally his own troops. His solution was to borrow from classic liberal 
ideology ‘he appealed to hard self-interest which he broadened for popular consumption by 
stressing the dependence of labour on capital.’ 133 The state, he argued, needed to be just, but 
this did not mean that it should be munificent, there was sufficient pot
the state to remain non-interventionist. He stated his case thus 
‘the Conservative points the working man forward to obtain wealth which is as yet 
uncreated: the Radical, on the contrary, does not tell him to create new sources of 
wealth, but says that the we
                                      
130 H. J. Hanham, (1978 Edition) op cit. p.200. 
131 Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 26th January 1874, in The Marquis of Zetland (Earl of Ronaldsway), (Ed.) 
gust 1883, in H. J. Hanham, (1978 Edition) op cit. p.247. 
(1928 Two Vols.) op cit. Vol.1, p.49. 
132 W. H. Smith to Salisbury 14th Au
133 Peter Marsh, (1978) op cit. p11. 
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the real remedy is to look back and fight among yourselves for the wealth that has 
134
In this way Salisbury was able to present conservatism to the electorate as forward looking and 
dynamic, rather than as a party of retrenchment and reaction. He acknowledged the urgent ne
for action in areas such as working class housing and sanitation and urged his supporters to  
dissipate ‘this absurd delusion that the dislike of democracy entertained by the Tory party means
indifference to the welfare of the poor.’ 135 He was, also, not averse to taking full advantage of  
his privileged position to articulate his vision of conservatism, even if this meant deviating fro
 
tradition. ‘By campaigning in the general elections of 1885 and 1886 until the eve of voting
…[he] shattered the convention which prohibited a peer from intervening personally in an 
election after the issue of writs.’ 136 Nothing was to stand in the way of his determination to  
impress upon the electorate that labour and capital were mutually dependent, that law and 
was dependent upon traditional values, or indeed that the existing social structure offered 
opportunities for all, requiring only minimum interference from the state. ‘The fun
Conservative politician henceforth was, for Salisbury, clear: to attach liberality to 
Conservatism;…to emphasize the practical and everyday “w
th
The Conservative party, under the leadership of Lord Salisbury, was to enjoy great electora
success, albeit with the support of Liberal Unionists. During this time the political climate 
changed not least because of the steady growth of the Labour movement, and the trials of th
Liberal party. It has been noted that ‘the period after 1885 saw the real rise of the modern  
 
134 A. L. Kennedy, (1953) op cit p.193. 
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Conservative party and the real construction of the political market and the modern party 
system.’ 138 The “politics of power” became the watchword for political parties, it being  
accepted that principles were worthless unless they could be implemented by the acquisition
power. The cooperation between Salisbury and Chamberlain ‘depended upon the continued 
subordination of doctrine to the requirements of a shared appreciation of political reality.’ 139 
The Conservative party demonstrated its ‘complete conversion to the politics of power…by t
resolute indifference to the decline of British agriculture in the 1880s and 1890s, despite the 
overwhelming support they now enjoyed from landed interests,’ 140 their attention was focus
on the more n
reas.  
‘The Conservative vision of London as an imperial and international financial capital
and emphasis on the intersection of the empire with the daily routines of Londoners, 
proved to be both durable and mutable in late-Victorian metropolitan parliam
the national political stage by elevating the importance of the capital.’ 141 
  
Initiatives
. 
 
‘Conservatism at the end of the nineteenth century then, concerns consolidation: of the 
United Kingdom, of the rights of capital over labour, of the power of the state over t
nation, and the rights of the ruling estab
caught  the mood of the moment.’ 142  
 
Catching “the mood of the moment” in order to court the electorate also sometimes entailed
 
g of attitudes on  principles that had previously appeared inviolable. Consequent
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t imperialist party. Fired by imperial potentialities, but fully aware that 
the British empire and British race had to maintain their place in a highly competitive 
intervention.’  
terventionism, and even planning, may initially appear inimical to the Conservative tradition,  
but as in so many other areas, the flexibility of the tradition means that it may be accommodated  
 
with ce
nal adherence to laissez faire so that when approaching 
cial problems it was not inhibited by a doctrinaire deference to an economic system, 
frequently by timidity.’   
his timidity is, of course, associated with the conservative principle of not tampering with the  
status quo unless absolutely necessary: but the conservative principles of order and hierarchy  
 
enable 
n 
m government. It is the persistent image of society as a command 
structure in which the responsibilities of leadership can be exercised within the 
ideologies.’  
It can, therefore, be argued that until the demise of Lord Salisbury in 1903, whilst displaying  
 
flexibil
and 
tion of the 
 
ve ideology 
enshrines the values that accompany this condition. This is the essence of the 
Conservative party’s role – to formulate policy that conserves a hierarchy of wealth and 
 
                                                
‘in the late nineteenth century British conservatives prided themselves on being 
members of a grea
world, conservatives advocated in some spheres planned expansion and vigorous state 
143
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rtain provisos. 
 
‘The party had not a traditio
so
though its policy was tempered always by a profound respect for property rights and 
144
 
T
 
interventions to be made because of the strength of the establishment. 
 
‘In conservative usage, then, the free economy has been consistently attached to a
argument for fir
framework of a strong state…that distinguishes English conservatism from rival  
145
 
ity and adaptability, 
 
‘Conservatism may be deemed the intellectual justification of inequalities in society 
the preservation of the privileges that such inequalities entail. It is the justifica
authoritative relationships based upon those inequalities, for just as Conservative politics
are geared to perpetuating a structure of social inequality, so Conservati
power and to make this intelligible and reasonable to a democracy.’ 146 
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properly to be described as a desire for the amelioration of the lot of the great classes of 
 
l 
 
would have provided an example of the power of 
the exe
all of th
‘By the end of the nineteenth century Conservative voices were being raised against the 
 
enemy is no longer liberalism but socialism; and what happens as a result, is that 
’ 149  
 
es within the party, and outside it, thought that conservatism was abandoning 
                                                
Unfortunately for Salisbury’s successors, however, cracks had begun to appear in the previously 
solid and united Conserva
ative leadership after Salisbury, had spoken as early as 1892 about the demand fo
ent. He said that, 
‘we all of us see – th
the last generation, which some people describe as Socialism, but…which ought more 
the community.’ 147 
Balfour was convinced that the Conservative party must address this desire or risk alienating the 
support of these “great classes”. He wrote to his uncle, quoting the opinion of the Liberal 
Unionist Joseph Chamberlain ‘the mood for “social legislation” is in the air; it is our business to 
guide it. This policy is as much (or more) in harmony with Conservative traditions than Libera
ones. We the Unionist Party, can do it, which the other side cannot. I am strongly in favour of a
programme and a Queen’s speech.’ 148 This 
cutive being utilised for interventionism under Conservative party tenets. However, not 
e party were prepared to go so far.  
evils of collectivism and Socialism. As Noel Sullivan has remarked: “the conservative
conservatism visibly begins to adopt the liberal values it had formerly opposed.”
As the fin de siècle approached new ideas and initiatives were constantly proposed. By 1900 
‘apostles of national efficiency were advocating all sorts of changes in the structure of 
government, in national institutions, and even in the national character.’ 150 Notwithstanding this 
many conservativ
 
147 Quoted in Blanche E. C. Dugdale, (1936 Two Vols.) Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour KG, 
OM, FRS, etc. Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London, Vol.1, p.207. 
148 Balfour to Salisbury 24th July 1892, in Blanche E. C. Dugdale, (1936 Two Vols.) op cit. Vol. 1, pp.211-
212. 
149 Frank O’Gorman, (1986) op cit. p.38.                
150 E. J. Feuchtwanger, (1985) op cit., p.238. 
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princip in 
Tory ha
‘indeed as things go at the present, all strong Governments by whatever political label 
majorities are only to be obtained by bribery, and as the bribes cannot yet be evolved 
 
rliament in 1900 to take advantage of the war 
fever su
conside
inet) had told him that ‘he considered the Tory party had ruined its prospects by 
[Joseph] Chamberlain’s doing, he, George, having strongly opposed it in the Cabinet. It 
 
riff 
se 
etition, despite the fact that 
such a iberal 
Unioni
‘In the course of another generation, this will be much less an industrial country,  
           
les in an unseemly attempt to retain power. A correspondent describing himself as a pla
d written 
they may choose to be known, must be socialistic, must be against property, since large 
from the ether of space, they must be extracted from the pockets of the wealthy.’ 151 
On the political front their policy of dissolving pa
rrounding the Boer War in South Africa was bitterly resented by the Liberal party and  
red unsavoury even by conservatives. 152 
‘Wilfred Blunt recorded in his diary that George Wyndham (Irish Secretary in the Tory 
Cab
forcing on the General Election after the Boer war, the Khaki Election. It had all been 
was unfair according to the rules of Party politics, and they were suffering from it now.’ 
153
Thus on taking over Salisbury’s mantle in 1902 Balfour was already facing divisions within his 
party, but a much more damaging division was to be the schism caused by the debate over Ta
Reform. Joseph Chamberlain leader of the Liberal Unionists and Balfour’s friend and ally cho
to “go-it-alone” to promote the cause of Tariff Reform; advocating the imposition of import 
tariffs to protect British goods from ever increasing foreign comp
policy would inevitably lead to an increase in the price of food. The Conservative/L
st alliance split over this issue. Chamberlain argued that  
                                      
151 Quoted in Peter Marsh, (1978) op cit. p.164.     
152 ‘The remark [that a seat lost by the government is a seat gained by the Boers] was originally made by 
the Mayor of Mafeking. Chamberlain quoted it, with attribution, in a speech at Tunstall Staffordshire, o
27th September. At that stage it did not attract great publicity. A few days later he was asked to send a 
message to the Heywood division of Lancashire and repeated the phrase, this time without attribution.
transmission it was changed to “A seat lost to the Government is a seat sold to the Boers.” The new 
version produced an even sharper storm of Liberal protest than the original would have done, but the 
protestors, quite naturally, were not greatly mollified when a correction was published. In any case, on
innumerable Unionist posters, the slogan was soon appearing as “a vote for a Li
n 
 In 
 
beral is a vote for the 
on, footnote (1) p.119. 
5.     
Boers.”’ Roy Jenkins, (1964) Asquith, Collins, Lond
153 Quoted in Emily Allyn, (1931), op cit. p.16
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consisting of rich consumers on the one hand, and people engaged in the work of 
 
 
, 
 
ited 
e of 
m 
 
lain stood for in 
respect the 
party fr
‘Around the turn of the century politics in the counties came increasingly to revolve 
to choose the best man to represent the county, than to register votes in a national 
                                                
inhabited by skilled artisans, than a distributive country with a smaller population 
distribution on the other…we may be richer, yet weaker.’ 154 
Paradoxically in this way Chamberlain was providing some opportunity to restore unity to the 
alliance. ‘In making his challenge after 1903, Chamberlain found a cause for the cause mongers
of the party. By treating unemployment, not dearer bread, as the real dread of the working man
and by inducing the working man to consider himself as a producer rather than a consumer, he
called urban conservatives to a crusade.’ 155 Unfortunately many Unionists and Conservatives 
were unwilling to embrace Tariff Reform, and many opposed it outright. The formerly un
party threatened to split asunder as disastrously as the Liberal party had divided over the issu
Home Rule. Around 1905 ‘a group of young, mainly aristocratic, mainly high Anglican, 
unionists, led by Lord Hugh Cecil (Hughligans) and including the new member for Oldha
Winston Churchill, felt that ‘if the Tory party became protectionist it would become “rich, 
materialist, and secular” and lobbies would produce corruption of an American type.’ 156
Concurrently ‘many of the strands of anti-statist sentiment were brought together after 1905 in 
the British Constitution Association founded to resist the rethinking tendencies in the 
Conservative Party and specifically to oppose everything that Joseph Chamber
 of economic and social reform.’ 157 Ironically these attempts served only to distance 
om its traditional grass-roots support and alienate the local electorate.  
round national rather than local issues…Constitutional associations were concerned less 
plebiscite, or to strike a blow in a national controversy.’ 158  
 
154 E. J. Feuchtwanger, (1985) op cit., p.248. 
155 Maurice Cowling, (Ed.) (1978) op cit. p.30. 
156 E. J. Feuchtwanger, (1985) op cit. p.248. 
157 W. H. Greenleaf, (1973) ‘The Character of Modern British Conservatism’ in Robert Benewick, R. N. 
Berki, Bhitkhu Parekh, (Eds.) (1973) Knowledge and Belief in Politics: The Problem of Ideology, George 
Allen & Unwin, London, p.197. 
158 J. Ridley, (1985) Leadership and Management in the Conservative Party in Parliament, 1906-1914. 
D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, p.21. 
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This placed ever more pressure upon the leader. Balfour was in a perilous position and tried his 
best to persuade Chamberlain that re-election would be impossible unless a compromise could 
be foun
that 
pression is that the local leaders, the squire, the middle-class members…and so forth, 
views…and that the obstacle with which the Candidate is confronted is not the opinion 
anything which they can be made to think would increase the price of bread.’ 159 
Chamberlain was unrepentant and continued with his crusade, imploring Balfour to support 
Tariff Reform. He wrote to the Prime Minister ‘in my experience the ordinary voter never cares 
for detail. He seizes upon a principle or a large issue, and is quite willing to delegate to his 
representative all questions of detail and method.’  An enlightening account of Chamberlain’s 
attitude was delivered to Sandars, Balfour’s secretary, by Iwan-Mullar who recounted a two and 
a half hour conversation with Chamberlain on 10  June 1905, ‘his last words were 
characteristic. “Arthur and I can win together, for each has the qualities the other lacks; Arthur 
can ma er-
confide
‘the cohesion of the party…depended to some extent on which kind of issue happened to 
conducted itself. Not only the Unionist alliance, but the Conservative party itself was in 
social questions.        
                                                
 
d. He wrote a long and involved eight page typewritten letter, including the argument 
‘the prejudice of a small tax on food is not the fad of a few imperfectly informed 
theorists: it is a deep rooted prejudice affecting the large mass of voters, especially the 
poorest class, which it will be a matter of extreme difficulty to overcome…My 
im
are as a rule highly sympathetic to Tariff reform and indeed often hold protectionist 
of the local leaders, but the absolute impossibility of inducing the mass of voters to do 
 
160
th
nage the House of Commons, and I can manage the electors.”’ 161 Chamberlain’s ov
nce was badly misplaced, it had been apparent for some time that 
be to the fore, and to some extent on the skill and tact with which the Government 
danger of disintegration whenever the focus shifted from Irish and Imperial affairs to 
162
 
 
159 Quoted in, Anthony Blond, (1965) Balfour’s Burden: Arthur Balfour and Imperial preference, Alfred 
Gollin, London, p.246. 
160 Chamberlain to Balfour 24th February 1905. Quoted in Peter Fraser, (1966) Joseph Chamberlain: 
Radicalism and Empire 1868-1914, Cassell, London, pp.260-261. 
161 Ibid. pp.267-268.  
162 J. P. Cornford, (1967) in Robert Robson, (Ed.) (1967) op cit. p.307. 
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 election of 
t, 
 
efeat. Balfour, it 
may be
taken o
mandat
 and I 
ass of my colleagues. But the party – 
e rank and file – have never adopted or approved that nomination. They may approve it 
my leader. I never chose him. I voted no doubt for the late Government, but I had no 
 A, 
B, or C, who were in the Government. They, and not he, were my guides and my 
 
lings 
 
he 
civil servant, and asked him for a frank opinion on attitudes to the new Government. ‘“Well” 
                                                
Tariff Reform represented just such a focus, and the beleaguered Balfour thus led his divided 
and squabbling party into the general election, and unsurprisingly lost. The general
January 1906 was not primarily a contest over tariff reform but ‘where this issue loomed larges
in Lancashire, the prevailing conditions of relative prosperity induced the artisan to prefer the
“large loaf” argument of the Liberals to the “more employment” argument of the  
protectionists.’ 163 Across the whole country the Unionists suffered a heavy d
 said, had failed to learn from the experience of the Liberal party; Lord Rosebery had 
ver as prime minister after the resignation of Gladstone, but quickly realised he had no 
e from the electorate or indeed from his own party. He wrote in 1896 
‘you must remember…that I have never been, actually or formally, chosen or recognised 
as leader of the Liberal Party. I was indeed nominated first Minister by the Queen,
accepted that office at the insistence of the great m
th
or they may not. But it is fairly open to anyone to say, “I do not acknowledge Lord R as 
other choice, except to let in the Tories; and I voted, not for him, but for the excellent
polestars.” This is an element in the situation.’ 164 
Rosebery had failed to command the respect of the party afforded to his illustrious predecessor, 
and could not heal the schism in his party caused by Irish Home Rule. He made his fee
public in a speech of October 9th 1896, saying, ‘a united party behind an inferior leader is more
efficacious than a disunited party with the best leader that ever lived.’ 165 To be successful in t
realm of high politics it was necessary to, at least, appear to be listening to one’s core 
supporters. Shortly after the 1906 election Campbell-Bannerman met a recently retired senior 
 
163 Peter Fraser, (1966) op cit. p.273.   
164 Lord Rosebery to Asquith 29th January 1896, quoted in J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, (1932 Two 
Vols.) Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith, Hutchinson and Co., London, Vol. 1, 
p.116 
165 J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, (1932 Two Vols.) op cit. Vol. 1,  p.117. 
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ey  
r hand, 
 
er his leadership, although he too could not command the respect his 
redecessor had enjoyed: and he had failed miserably to reconcile divisions in his party over 
Tariff Reform. 
 
ploy its in-built majority  
in the u
wrote t
ious 
e done with caution 
and tact, I do not believe that they will do themselves any harm. On the contrary, as the 
possible that your House may come out of the ordeal strengthened, rather than 
 
                                                
said C.B.s friend “it is generally admitted that it is good individually, collectively above the
average strength. But they say” and here he hesitated, “what do they say?” enquired C.B. “th
say the tail wags the head” “they are quite right,” C.B. replied, “and I am the tail.” 166 The  
Liberal party leadership had learned that to engage successfully in high politics it was now 
necessary to have a rank-and-file power base and popular appeal. Balfour, on the othe
owed his position to rank and privilege, and seemingly believed that this was still sufficient to
justify and bolst
p
Balfour was not magnanimous in defeat, in a speech at Nottingham on 15th January 1906, 
immediately after his defeat at Manchester in the general election, he declared that ‘it was the  
bounden duty of each one whom he addressed, to do his best to see that “the great Unionist 
Party should still control, whether in power or whether in opposition, the destinies of this great 
empire”’ 167 It is difficult to conceive of a more controversial and inflammatory statement, 
Balfour was making it clear that the Conservative party intended to em
pper House to stymie any distasteful Liberal legislation. On 13th April 1906 Balfour 
o Lord Landsdowne, the Unionist leader in the House of Lords 
‘I do not think the House of Lords will be able to escape the duty of making ser
modifications in important government measures: but, if this can b
rejection of the Home Rule Bill doubtless strengthened their position, I think it quite 
weakened, by the inevitable difficulties of the next few years.’ 168 
 
166 John Wilson, (1973) A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Purnell Book Services Ltd., London, 
p.495. 
167 Quoted in Emily Allyn, (1931) op cit. p.171. 
168 Balfour to Lord Landsdowne 13th April 1906 quoted in Max Egremont, (1980) Balfour, Collins, 
London, p.211. 
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 out by 
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 It is 
rds had a 
se 
c 
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A Bill reversing the Taff Vale judgement was allowed through the Lords (although it is worth 
noting that D. J. Shackleton, Labour MP for Clitheroe, had introduced a private members Bill 
do just this in 1903, and again in 1904 and 1905, the first being defeated on a second re
and the other two perishing in committee 169), but an Educational Bill of 1906, and the Plu
Voting Bill of 1906 were rejected. The policy continued in 1907, four Land Bills were 
introduced, two referring to Scotland were vetoed, and the other two concerning English 
smallholdings and the eviction of Irish Tenants were emasculated. ‘A resolution introduced b
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman for a curtailment of the Lord’s power was also thrown
the peers, [despite] having been passed in June by The House of Commons by 432 votes to 
147.’ 170 The die was cast and the policy of Balfour in opposition was clear to all; the 
Constitution, as interpreted by the Tory leadership, was to be ruthlessly exploited in their ow
interests, a course bound eventually to raise questions of fair-play with the mass electorate.
difficult for modern political commentators to comprehend how experienced and practical 
politicians such as Balfour and Landsdowne could embark upon such a short-sighted, and 
obviously suicidal path. The answer may be that they hoped to follow the example of Lord 
Salisbury, ‘whenever his party was in opposition he relied on what may be called a referral or 
“referendal” theory to cripple Liberal legislation.’171  He reasoned that the House of Lo
constitutional duty to refer controversial measures to the electorate, if in their opinion the Hou
of Commons had no popular mandate for the proposed legislation. Should the electors 
subsequently support the proposal, then the Lords would acquiesce. In this way a democrati
dimension could be claimed for a wholly unelected body. It is hardly surprising that Balfour an
 
169 See Roy Jenkins, (1958) Sir Charles Dilke: A Victorian Tragedy, Collins, London, p.394. 
170 Max Egremont, (1980) op cit. p.214. 
171 C. C. Weston, (1982) ‘Salisbury and the Lords, 1868-1895’ in The Historical Journal, Vol.25, Issue 1, 
1982, p.105. For a comprehensive account see C. C. Weston, (1995) The House of Lords and Ideological 
Politics: Lord Salisbury’s Referendal Theory and the Conservative Party, 1846-1922, The American 
Philosophical Society. Passim. 
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ctive Houses to a political war without any clear recognition as 
to what and 
misguid
d  
 
 
[ In the 1906 Parliament 
318 out of 670 were new members ] To persons born like Landsdowne and Balfour 
Commons so composed and led should effectively rule the  nation; and…they felt 
 
Be that sition,  
 
into the
 
rticular 
d left ministers with no choice, and 
had taken upon themselves the right of deciding when a government could carry on and 
im 
which, if allowed, would have made the Government as much a creature of the  
ective assembly.’ 174 
  
                                                
his colleagues endorsed this opinion; but rejection of a budget (and, therefore, supply) was 
unprecedented. Added to this, their alternative proposal for raising revenue, tariff reform, had
already been rejected by the voters, and several Liberal Bills had already been vetoed. They 
gambled everything without any method of gauging whether the electorate would agree with 
their point of view. Why then did Balfour, party leader in the Commons, and Lansdowne, leader 
in the Lords, commit their respe
 the consequences would be? Perhaps the answer lay in their venerable, but obsolete 
ed sense of patriotism, 
‘the psychology of it was that both were aristocrats born in the purple. Passionately 
devoted to the greatness of England, these men were convinced that she owed it to 
patrician rule. In their view her nineteenth century parliamentarianism had worke
successfully, because the personnel of parliaments and  cabinets was still (with a few  
much resented exceptions like Bright) upper-class, and the function of the lower orders
was limited to giving the system a popular imprimatur by helping to choose which of
two aristocratic parties should hold office…From their standpoint the House of 
Commons elected in 1906 was far worse than that of 1880…
172
(and only to a little less to Rosebery) it appeared out of the question that a House of 
justified in using any resource…to crush the challenge.’ 173  
 as it may, what is indisputable is that Balfour led the Conservative party, in oppo
 debacle of the Lords’ rejection of Lloyd-George’s 1909 Budget. 
 
‘A dissolution was of course inevitable once the Lords had performed the act of 
rejection. There was no dispute in the Cabinet about this. The legislature had refused 
Supply, and in these circumstances no government could carry on. This fact gave the full
measure of what the Lords had done. They had not merely confronted the Government 
with the choice between an immediate election and acceptance of the loss of a pa
measure, as they had frequently done before. They ha
when it could not, when a Parliament should end and when it should not. It was a cla
hereditary assembly as of the el
 
172 See John Wilson, (1973) op cit. p.494. 
173 Sir Robert Ensor, (1936) England 1870-1914, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.387-388. 
174 Roy Jenkins, (1964) op cit. p.202. 
 50
nd consequently the Conservatives suffered an ignominious defeat at the ensuing general 
election
 
ment went to the country [in January] with a magnificent electioneering  
battery. The liberties of England, the food of the people, the pensions of the old, the job 
authority of the Ten Commandments – all were in imminent peril from the Conservative 
 
 
 
 
ur 
te 
il July 1914.’ 177 Asquith, it appears, took all 
this in g
                                                
A
. It was noted at the time that, 
‘the govern
of the workman, the future of the trade unions, the continuance of non-conformity, the 
party.’ 175 
The subsequent Parliament Act of 1911 removed the House of Lords’ veto, thereby reducing the
stranglehold the Conservative party had previously held on the passage of legislation. 
Importantly, also, ‘one of the incidental results of the Parliament Act was to require Parliament 
to work at the highest pressure during the subsequent session, so that measures threatened by the
House of Lords [who retained a power of delay] might have the benefit of its provisions within
the term of the Parliament.’ 176 Thus reform of the House of Lords was inextricably linked with 
the organization of legislation, which now became the primary object of government. Balfo
resigned following the passage of the Parliament Act, and was replaced by Andrew Bonar Law. 
Bonar Law was left with few tools other than dangerous support for Ulster Unionism, and 
vituperative rhetoric, with which to attack the Liberals under Herbert Asquith. He ‘took an early 
opportunity of announcing that the era of compliments between politicians was ended, and 
greatly delighted an enthusiastic audience at the Albert Hall at the end of January with a speech 
which was described at the time as full of “biting japes and stinging sores”. The Government 
were “artful dodgers,” “Gadarene Swine,” “Humbugs,” and “tricksters.” This was the new no
which was to become shriller with every month unt
ood part, perhaps illustrating that the affinity felt between those in high politics still  
 
175 ‘The Elections and their Morals’ in Blackwoods Magazine No.187, March 1910, p.431. 
176 J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith Cyril (1932 Two Vols.) op cit. Vol.1,  p.355. 
177 Ibid, Vol.1, pp.351-352. 
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transce
here can be no doubt, whatever may be thought of its taste, that Mr. Law’s frequent 
d  
the enthusiasm of the more bloodthirsty of his followers, who spoke and wrote of him 
 
proved e 
Conser
s,  
 everything in the 
wrong way, Conservatives were ready to adopt any measure which would stimulate the 
recognized the rights of property and the need to preserve social continuity and regarded 
 
 
t society were regarded as being 
illusory ortant 
criteria
tly conservative approach to 
uman nature. 
(4) The view that government is a limited, and primarily remedial institution. 
           
nded party rivalry, he wrote in his memoirs 
‘T
resort to what I described as the “new style” in the early days of his leadership arouse
admiringly as the “Fighting Leader.”’ 178 
But pure rhetoric, despite what Cowling and his associates may assert, however combative, 
 to be no substitute for vision, policy, and direction, and by 1914 it appeared that th
vative party had lost all three. When the Conservative party was at a low ebb in 1913  
‘F. E Smith made a bold attempt to define the principles on which a conservative 
government programme of social reform should be based. Characteristically he  
proceeded to define by exclusion, that is to say by attacking the alternative system
laissez faire, individualism and radical socialism. The adherents of laissez faire wanted 
the state to touch nothing, the socialists wanted the state to touch
productive efficacy of the people even if it involved state intervention. But they 
the inculcation of class hatred as “the parricide of politics”’ 179  
The problem of trying to uncover exactly what Conservatives stood for between 1867 and 1914 
encounters a similar problem; it appears easier to discover what they did not stand for rather
than what they did. Conservatism was, self-evidently, anti-radical and anti-utopian; since society 
was not a human construct, any attempts to create a perfec
. The Conservative response to any concrete issue would be mediated by these imp
. Nevertheless as Nugent and King have observed, 
‘it is possible to select four main elements in a distinc
politics and society, namely, 
(1) A particular attitude towards political and social change. 
(2) A dislike of abstract rationalism. 
(3) A qualified pessimism as regards h
                                      
178 Herbert Asquith, (1928 Two Vols.) Memories and Reflections 1852-1927 The Earl of Oxford and 
9 R. B. McDowell, (1959) op cit. p.151. 
Asquith KG, Cassell & Co., London, Vol. 1, p.205. 
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least they will act as general guidelines, and at best they will rule out certain proposals as 
 
 
 
 
s of what 
 keeps 
der is 
is is a step forward, but is too reliant upon the supposedly inviolable 
conserv
conserv
both as
ed in a natural dislike of change is of 
negligible analytical value, conflating as it does ahistorical patterns of individual 
a cluster of ideas about the purposes of government and the organization of society. 
 understood not as an expression of recurring habits and instincts , 
ut as a distinctive perspective on society shaped by the political struggles and class 
 
Thus co   
 
for its o
 
different from other political doctrines because it belongs outside the realm of ideology 
ot an 
                                                
Of course these features are still vague, but they are not totally vacuous…at the very 
being inherently un-conservative.’ 180 
In extremis it has been argued that ‘Conservatism argues for continuity but recognises the 
necessity to adapt.’ 181 But can the twists and turns, the machinations, policy changes and even
reversals, displayed by conservatism throughout our period be accommodated in this analysis?
The answer may be that ‘because a tradition is perpetuated by individual interpretation
has gone before, there is unceasing change in every tradition. But because what is new
connections with the old, order is preserved by continuity. Consequently a traditional or
both stable and flexible, and can comprehend individual variations without losing its 
character.’ 182 Th
ative attachment to continuity; and the notion that it is impossible to uncover a 
ative “ideology” rather than a conservative “tradition.” Recent scholarship challenges 
sertions. 
‘The proposition that conservatism is root
behaviour with the emergence – at a specific moment…among particular social groups – 
Conservatism is to be
b
divisions of the post medieval state.’ 183  
nservatism may justifiably display a dislike of change, but not a dislike of change per se
wn sake. Moreover, 
‘nor should much credence be given to the suggestion that conservatism is qualitatively 
[because of its pragmatism and flexibility]…This insistence that conservatism is n
 
180 Neill Nugent and Roger King, (Eds.) (1977) op cit. p13. 
el 
 Rick Wilford, (1994 2nd Edition) Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 
ndon, p.62. 
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 the 
rough and tumble of political argument rather than an analytical exercise.’  
Such a theoretical framework begins to clarify how conservatism in our period could change so 
much, yet still remain quintessentially different from all other doctrines, with or without  
the knowledge of its moderators, namely those who indulged in high politics. ‘Whether 
someone is consciously committed to a particular ideological position, or whether his/her beliefs 
unconsciously reflect an established ideology, the implication is the same: and ideological 
position is a partisan position, non-neutral and non-objective.’  Therefore, we will be able to 
identify core Conservative values despite changes of policy and the expediency of government.  
To apply this school of thinking as an attempt to answer what did conservatives stand for 
between 1867 and 1914 it is necessary to make clear exactly what we mean by “ideology.” 
‘Ideologies are importantly attached to social groups, not necessarily classes.’ In our example 
this is clear, Conservative leaders constituted a group of privileged men who engaged in the 
practice of high politics and opposed radicalism. ‘Ideologies are produced by, directed at, and 
consumed by groups,’ again this is apparent as Disraeli’s conservatives directed “one nation 
conservatism” at the electorate, or when Salisbury convinced the electorate that labour and 
capital were mutually dependent. ‘Ideologies are distinct thought-products that invite careful 
investig
directin
possibl  rather than what it isn’t. 
thinking in the sense of planning what to do.- Conservatism is unreflective to the extent 
                                                
ideology is itself an ideological ploy by those sympathetic to the doctrine, part of
184
 
185
ation in their own right,’ which is, of course the purpose of this exercise. Thus ‘we are 
g our analysis at actual arrangements of political thinking.’ 186 Furthermore it is then 
e to state with some certainty what conservatism is
 ‘Conservatism is about doing, and about understanding what one is doing, not about 
that it does not deal with packages of coherent ideas about human beings and their 
 
ony Arblaster, ‘Ideology and Intellectuals’ in Robert Benewick et al. (Eds.) (1973) op cit.      
, (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Clarendon Press, 
23. 
184 Ibid. p.62 
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186 Michael Freeden
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ly 
unintelligible for non-participants.’ – Consequently ‘it is non-transmutable, unless this 
 
  
 
 
ready been 
conclud t 
Conser
hange; not necessarily in the sense of eliminating it, but to make it safe and manageable. Also 
it is apparent that Conservatism is responsive, though not necessarily reactionary. 
‘The conservative only thinks systematically when he is moved to reaction, perhaps 
cause he is forced to set up a system counter to that of the progressive, or because the 
process has progressed to a point where he has lost touch with the present state of things, 
 history.’188 
 
This is te a 
policy h 
politics
politicians…[but] The advantages conferred by leadership were some degree of control 
Salisbury’s position enabled him to delay and modify innovations to which he was 
dominant issues confronting his governments were ones on which his own views and 
  
e  
                                                
societies, but is a method of recognising reality through experiencing it, intellectual
be done by direct instruction in its practices.’ 187  
If indeed conservative ideology is hidden from all except those who are instructed in it, and/or
engage in its operation, then this would explain why it has become commonplace to assert that
conservatism is primarily concerned with upholding the status quo. This then becomes its 
central defining feature which substitutes for the absence of specific core and associated beliefs 
and values regarding, for example,  social justice, liberty, and democracy. It has al
ed in this investigation that such an analysis is too simplistic, but it is undeniable tha
vatism may be seen as an ideology almost obsessively preoccupied  with the problem of 
c
be
so that he is compelled to intervene actively in order to reverse the process of
the most convincing explanation for Lord Salisbury appearing to successfully promo
of retrenchment concerning the march of democracy. He was also adept in the art of hig
. 
‘Whether an issue became prominent or not was hardly within the control of 
over the manner and timing of the attempted solution. There can be little doubt that 
opposed: there can equally be little doubt that his position rested upon the fact that the 
sentiments were widely shared within his party.’ 189 
It is possible to identify with some certainty two substantive core concepts in conservativ
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c  
es 
n origins and therefore cannot and ought not to be 
subject
weighe s 
two un
adaptab
‘The fashioning of relatively stable (though never inherently permanent) conservative 
substantive concepts in the employ of conservatism, other than the two enumerated 
ique, 
superimposed on a retrospective diachronic justification of the current beliefs held by 
 
political beliefs and concepts that protect the first core concept of conservatism, and does 
 
rty’s 
e aspects which accord with ideological tenets, whilst 
ssociated aspects which do not are jettisoned. In Disraeli’s case these decontested concepts 
included “one nation conservatism” which eschewed any notions of equality, and the need to 
                                                
ideology. Firstly, ‘a resistance to change, however unavoidable, unless it is perceived as organi
and natural.’ Secondly, ‘an attempt to subordinate change to the belief that the laws and forc
guiding human behaviour have extra-huma
 to human wills and whims.’190 Unlike other ideologies conservatism does not get 
d down by any other additional substantive characteristic features, instead ‘it produce
derlying morphological attributes’ 191 which ultimately provide it with its flexibility, 
ility, and its pragmatism. Namely 
beliefs and values out of reactions to progressive ideational cores. This allows all 
above, to become contingent. They are subjected to a complex swivel-mirror techn
conservatives. In each instance, the consistent aim is to provide a secure structure of
so by utilising its second core component.’ 192  
This is a complex analysis, but would explain how Disraeli was able to overcome his pa
resistance to democracy and social mobility, by retaining the core substantive concept in 
defining the extension of the franchise as a natural progression, and a change that could be 
managed by the party to their electoral advantage. He was aided and abetted by ‘substantive 
flexibility in the deployment of decontested concepts, so as to maximise under varying 
conditions the protection of the conception of change.’193  A concept becomes “decontested” 
when focus is concentrated upon thos
a
 
190 Michael Freeden, (1996) op cit. p.344. 
191 Ibid. p.344.    
192 Ibid. pp.344-345.    
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Thus it can be concluded that from the mid nineteenth century, conservatism found itself in 
acute competition with the rising ideologies of the left, initially liberalism, and then socialism. 
Conservatives reacted by deploying, and adhering to, their core substantive concepts, and were 
surprisingly successful, simply because they were standing for what conservatism had always 
believed and stood for. By the end of that century, the struggle had become one of political 
survival on the institutional level. Again conservatism was able to succeed because of its  
underlying morphological attribute, it flexibly deployed the decontested concepts of limited 
interventionism, and social betterment through housing and sanitation Acts; it skilfully managed 
the Third Reform Act, utilising its key asset to garner political kudos. ‘The Lords rejection of 
the 1884 Franchise Bill because of the lack of a Redistribution Bill was nothing more than a 
political manoeuvre, since the Radicals and the Liberals would have been almost as anxious for 
this as for the Franchise Bill itself.’  All the while the Tories offered resistance to the 
democratic tide which they perceived as not a natural progression. The twentieth century 
confronted conservatism with major problems: it failed to fashion a relatively stable package of 
conservative beliefs and values when faced with divisions within the conservative party over 
expensive new demands for interventionist social legislation and over Tariff Reform. It could 
not marshal a divided party to counter the Liberal/Labour alliance. Socialism began demanding 
rapid and radical changes in society that conservatism’s  core concepts could not defeat, or 
accommodate if the Conservative party was in opposition. What conservatism stood for after 
1906 was seemingly not what the nation wanted, and conservatives were bystanders as ill 
                                                
pacify the working classes by limited social legislation, whilst simultaneously not endorsing 
extensive state intervention to do so. 
 
194
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conceived resistance resulted in the power of the House of Lords’ veto being removed. They 
became just a  catastrophe 
of World War One changed the po , the Conservative party had 
e main 
 
nother political party in the rough and tumble of political life until the
litical scene forever. Even so
enjoyed hitherto unparalleled electoral success, until losing its ideological way. One of th
reasons for that success was the astute marshalling of the forces at its disposal. The organization
responsible for marshalling those forces will be examined in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER THREE. 
CONSERVATIVE ORGANIZATION AND RE-
ORGANIZATION. 
Having established a methodology that concentrates, although not exclusively, upon the 
contribution and influence of individuals; and also having decided exactly what Conserva
actually stood for; our investigation of the Conservative Party’s organization will inevitably b
informed by those find
 
 
tives 
e 
ings, and reinforced by the notion that ‘ideology is best seen as the 
roduct rather than the precursor of political activity.’ 195 The empirical facts about the party’s 
organization are well known,  the focus of this investigation is more concerned with 
relationships. How did the party work in relation to its leaders, what was their response to 
incremental franchise extensions, what organizational changes were made in an effort to 
mobilize voters, and how did the various branches of the party relate to one another as these 
changes took effect.  
 
defeat in the general election of 1852 that Disraeli assumed the responsibility of instilling some 
           
p
196
Prior to 1867 Conservative Party organization was rudimentary, indeed it was only following 
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d  
d  
n the 
rn, 
n 
eed 
ought 
orts that the organization of urban 
onservatism involved finding the middle-class leaders who would in turn mobilize the working 
efficiency into the system. He divided, for the first time, the parliamentary and constituency 
functions, appointing Sir William Jalliffe as Chief Whip, and his personal solicitor Sir Philip 
Rose, a man known to him as an able and competent manager, to head a new network of 
constituency agents, and to interview all prospective parliamentary candidates. 197  The then 
leader of the party, Lord Derby, was to preside over three ministries, in 1852, 1858-1859, an
1866-1868, but none of these administrations enjoyed a majority in the House of Commons an
the need to secure a majority, and reaction to defeat, were to repeatedly stimulate reassessments  
of the party organization. Thus, for example, regarding the latter, ‘the conservative defeat i
election of 1865 caused Lord Nevill, the principal party manager, to increase the number of 
local associations concerned with the registration of electors and with bringing them to the 
polls.’ 198 As regards the former, an important meeting took place at The Freemasons Tave
London, on 12th November 1867 to form the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional 
Associations. It was made clear at the time that it was ‘not a meeting for the discussion of 
Conservative principles …, it is only a meeting to consider by what particular organizations we 
may make those Conservative principles effective amongst the masses.’ 199  Political principles 
and policy were to remain the preserve of the leadership and ‘the meeting showed not the 
slightest inclination to discuss any of the political issues of the day’ and with only one exceptio
‘none of the delegates showed any disposition to challenge the ideas of their betters.’ 200  Ind
it was noted in 1867 that ‘Disraeli… is the government,’ 201 and even John Gorst, who th
of himself as a Tory Democrat, ‘always emphasized in his rep
c
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To this end ‘in 1868 they had a network of committees every few days during the canvass. The  
principal Conservative agent in the division met with his local agents – both to spur them on,  
and to evaluate information.’   This would have appeared a reasonably sophisticated system 
prior to the 1867 Act, but the provisions and effects of that Act were far-reaching and largely 
unanticipated, although Robert Lowe had told the House of Commons as early as May 1867 
‘this session we have not had what we before possessed – a party of attack, and a party of 
resistance. We have instead two parties of competition who, like Cleon and the Sausage-seller of 
Aristophanes, are both bidding for the support of the Demos.’  The Act was to change 
electioneering for ever, ‘the “leap in the dark”…had ended the confusion of parties for which 
both Disraeli and Gladstone had despaired of finding a remedy….The electorate was now 
con
vot
‘after 1867 more seats were worth contesting, 374 were uncontested in 1859,’ furthermore, ‘the 
contest was often between candidates of the same party, or, in two member constituencies…the 
weaker party only put up one candidate.’ 206 Thus as a consequence of the 1867 Act 
           
class voters.’ 202  The nascent party organization, although much stronger than the intermittent 
ad hoc co-operation between those sharing a common goal which had previously passed as 
“party organization”, was dedicated to achieving office for the parliamentary party, not 
interfering with the prerogatives of that branch of the party.  
 
203
204
sciously choosing its Government.’ 205  It was, therefore, crucial that agents mobilized the 
ers, but the 1868 general election posed other problems for party managers. Quite simply, 
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ctions. 
In many cases contests occurred simply because local politicians realized the inadequacy of 
contest was their only means of discovering the relative strengths of the different political 
 
 
unately 
 
iberals 
 
never won by organization’ it is 
                                                
‘The elections of 1868 were contested in far more constituencies than any previous ele
their knowledge of how voters would behave if a contest did occur. In effect, an actual 
groups in the constituency.’ 207  
The Conservative party organization was thus faced with two simultaneous shortcomings  
 and although ‘the minds of the leaders (especially Disraeli’s) were groping after new party  
machines…it seemed more important to find numerous candidates and provoke as many  
contests as possible rather than to improve the party organizations.’ 208 In one sense this priority 
was achieved when only 211 seats out of a total of 658 were left uncontested, 209 unfort
the greater prize, election victory, was not. J. F. S. Ross has observed that ‘it is curious that a 
provision of the 1867 Act intended to secure the fair representation of minorities had its greatest  
effect in the fillip it gave to the organizations of the two big parties.’ 210 He was referring to the 
multiple vote in three and four member constituencies, and the Liberals, following the example 
of Joseph Chamberlain in Birmingham, had developed the “caucus” to operate in such 
constituencies.  In three-seat constituencies each voter had two votes, and where the L
were in a minority they organized to guarantee that they would win one of the three seats, where
they were in a clear majority they would organize to capture all three seats. The system worked 
so well that in Birmingham and Glasgow they won all three seats, in Liverpool they prised one 
seat from the Conservatives, and in the five cities with three seats they wrested seats as the 
minority group. The Conservatives had nothing to compare with such a sophisticated 
organization, and although it may be argued that ‘elections are 
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qually true that ‘the history of party organization is dominated by the rhythm of elections.’ 211 
Losing the general election in 1868 after having passed the 1867 Reform Act was a great blow 
to the Conservative party leadership. ‘Disraeli was the first to recognize the need for more 
elaborate party machinery to cope with the new conditions, and devoted much attention to the 
matter in the years of opposition between 1868 and 1874.’  
 
 
 
 
 
s 
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212
This study has previously examined Disraeli’s “one nation conservatism”, it is, therefore, 
unsurprising that his re-organization of the party was influenced both by this ideological  
approach, as well as his thirst for power. The general election failure of the Conservatives in
1868 prompted the party leaders to take steps to improve the party organization. 213  To this end 
in April 1870, Disraeli appointed John Gorst, who was seen as a young and able politician 
despite losing his seat at the election, as Party Agent in charge of the management of the party 
organization. Gorst’s  first innovation was to establish a central Conservative Office, partly, 
ostensibly to organize election administration and arrangements, but also because the  party 
leadership felt that the efficient operation of the National Union of Conservative Associations (
formerly the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations) ‘required the 
establishment of a cadre of full time professional party workers…responsible to the Leader of
the Party rather than to the popular organization  of the Party.’ 214 This may be interpreted as an 
early sign that the Leadership had no intention of allowing the NUOCA to build a power base
that could challenge their hold over the party, a view perhaps reinforced by the fact that it wa
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ns to the 
Men of Great Britain on Points of Policy and Duty in the present Crisis,’ whilst 
number
classes  
Politica the Real friends of The People’ clearly set 
e nation 
d 
money is always timid – the artisan and the labourer are the first sufferers. The 
 
[however]…continued agitations destroy the confidence of the classes above 
 
           
the Central Office which held the register of approved candidates which it would make available 
to the constituencies. Gorst also became Secretary of the NUOCA in 1871 and thus occupied 
unprecedented dual positions from which to co-ordinate the party machine. Under his direction 
the NUOCA rapidly became ‘the propaganda arm of Central office, calling conferences and 
publishing a stream of pamphlets intended for popular reading.’ There can be no doubt that 
‘Gorst concentrated on winning support from urban middle and working class voters’, 215 in fact 
it has been suggested that ‘the urgency of the Conservative appeal to the working classes is the 
most striking feature of the early work of the National Union.’ 216 This view gains support when 
examining the literature issued by the NUOCA .The earliest publication date is 1872, but some 
of the pamphlets are reprints of literature in circulation during the 1868 election. For example,
pamphlet number five (originally published March 1868) is entitled ‘Practical Suggestio
Loyal Working 
 six, gives details of prior Conservative legislation which it claims benefited the working 
 (for example, Lord Shaftsbury’s Factory Acts). 217 Pamphlet number seven ‘The
l Future of the Working Classes or Who are 
out the reasoning behind the Conservatives’ appeal to the voters, and the need for “on
conservatism”  
‘whatever troubles the waters of society, whatever frightens the timid and the rich – an
shopkeepers or the manufacturers lose their profit, but he loses his daily bread.
us…capitalists can seek other spheres.’ 218  
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rapid 
isited constituencies, met local leaders and 
orked to co-ordinate and assist the growing number of Conservative working men’s 
associations and clubs that had been formed as a result of the agitation for, and passage of, the 
reform act in 1867.’  By and large, he was very successful, as the general election victory of 
1874 was to prove, but some independent extra-parliamentary initiatives proved to be too radical 
to gain universal acceptance within the party. 
 
l 
r, 
the 
d 
posed to 
prospects of acceptance…[furthermore] In the Quarterly Review of October 1872 he insisted 
           
G. N. Sanderson characterizes the period after the 1868 general election as a time of 
‘unprecedented impact of parliamentary politics upon the “common man” and [of] the 
emergence (within a decade or so) of a recognisably modern form of party politics and party 
organization.’ 219 John Gorst, occupying two key roles in the new Conservative Party 
organization, certainly sought to ensure that the conservative message was disseminated as 
widely as possible to the new electorate. ‘He v
w
220
Many of the Tory leaders felt that the party needed to drum up support among the working 
classes even if this meant creating unprecedented initiatives. This is well illustrated by the 
‘curious episode of the New Social Movement in 1871.’ 221 This movement sought to give rea
substance to Disraeli’s vision of a union between the upper and the working classes, howeve
had it reached fruition, it would have been largely autonomous and beyond the control of 
party leadership. Under the plan a “Council of Legislation” consisting of Peers, would meet an
negotiate with a “Council of Workmen” consisting of Labour Leaders, in an attempt to secure 
mutual agreement on better working class conditions. Amongst those vehemently op
this initiative was the, already influential, future prime minister Lord Salisbury. ‘The Times 
commented that Salisbury’s repudiation of the New Social Movement … was fatal to its 
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 stood, 
 
 
ith 
 
rterly 
-
nterests of working class leaders for the 
enty years after 1867 were social not political. 225 Thus, even at this early stage of 
onservative party re-organization, it becomes obvious that any ‘appearance of democratic 
control was rather deceptive, as the real control of candidates and funds was in the hands of the 
Central
 
For all mplicit in a measure  
 
                                                
that Toryism was incompatible with offering a rival programme of change…The Parties
and ought to stand for two opposite moods …of the English mind.’ 222  Because of 
incompatibility and mounting mutual recriminations The New Social Movement was probably
doomed from the start, ‘in some ways it was too absurd to be regarded as very important, but
even Gladstone took it sufficiently seriously to utter a public warning against the Tory 
machinations.’ Nevertheless it proved that ‘the Tory leaders were at least prepared to toy w
these ideas.’ 223 It may also be taken as another indication that the “Tory leaders” intended to
keep tight control over their party organization; and not risk alienating their core support, or 
those naturally inclined towards their party. It has been noted that by the 1870s further reform 
was likely to be ‘“radical” (even socialist) and a threat to property,’ thus many of the new 
middle class voters veered towards conservatism. As Lord Salisbury noted in the Qua
Review of October 1869 in The Past and Future of The Conservative Party, ‘ “the army of so
called reform, in every stage of its advance necessarily converts a detachment of its force into 
opponents.”’224 It has also been noted that the chief i
tw
C
 Office, a secret, unrepresentative body.’ 226  
his rhetoric about “one nation conservatism” Disraeli had been co
 
that was specifically designed to ensure that there were in fact, politically, two nations.  
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franchise entirely different from that of the counties, so increasing rather than playing 
old order, the boroughs, or rather the bigger boroughs, became the field for experiment 
 
f 
 exert 
hese areas.’ 229 Gorst 
was far  
mandat
gave to d by 
is efforts, spread over two long years, to organize Disraeli’s visit to Manchester in 1872. The 
visit proved to be worth the effort and was a great success. For his part  
‘Disraeli gave the National Union the seal of respectability by choosing it as the 
ational 
Union became an integral part of the Central Office organization and was used by the 
The National Union had thus assumed its role as the main body through which the 
 
s 
                                                
‘The reformers of 1867 deliberately went out of their way to give the boroughs a
down the traditional difference between them…The counties became strongholds of the 
in “democratic” political organization.’ 227 
It would be folly to underestimate the major role Disraeli’s played in formulating the reforms o
1867: Gorst, however, charged with re-organizing the party, now found himself ‘unable to
much influence in the counties and smaller boroughs where pre-democratic methods of 
electioneering prevailed under the influence of local landowners.’ 228 Disraeli, rather than cause 
friction with his core vote ‘recognised the limitations of Gorst’s influence when he set up a 
special committee of influential men in 1873 to manage the elections in t
 from happy with this arrangement, and as far as is known he received ‘no special
e on his duties, or on how to reorganize the party.’ 230 Nonetheless, the importance he 
 achieving and then consolidating the party’s support in urban areas is well illustrate
h
audience for his great Crystal palace speech in 1872, and from that point on the N
party leaders as a mouthpiece and as an organizational front for popular demonstrations. 
leadership could organize the party’s voluntary workers.’ 231 
It is perhaps also worth noting that in 1872 the National Union had its headquarters moved 
under the same roof as the Central Office, at that time under the administration of the Whip
office and directly responsible to Disraeli. Lord Hamilton, in an attempt to forestall any 
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et  
whilst the  
ty over its opposition to the 
Ballot B  
the clos
ast, worrying, at worst, intimidating. This, however, did not stop the parliamentary party 
soul of you. Don’t suppose you have finished your work when you go home tonight; pull 
some half-dozen to the poll.’  
ed 
 
 1874 
misgivings, said that the move was ‘not to restrict or fetter local actions, but to endeavour to 
stimulate and assist country associations, and to promote the circulation of opinion between 
them and the leaders of the party.’232  Such circulation of opinion was certainly needed,  the 
Conservatives were not universally viewed as the next party of government, and were still 
viewed in some quarters as reactionary. The Economist of 24th June 1871 wrote of ‘the secr
opinion of the Conservatives that the classes could govern better than the masses’, 233 
Saturday Review of 6th July 1872, castigated the Conservative Par
ill, then before parliament, accusing them of “flogging a dead horse.” 234 Nevertheless
e proximity of  Central office to the NUOCA was, for the local associations, at the very 
le
continuing to urge local agents to redouble their efforts for the good of the party. Mr. 
Wheelhouse MP told the 1873 Conservative Annual Conference  
‘work not only at your dinner on this occasion, but at your register; work every single 
someone up to the register, and when the day of election comes, every man of you take 
235
 
Despite his trials and tribulations, Gorst was recorded as saying in March 1873 that he believ
the party was as well prepared for an election as it ever should be. 236  His whole strategy 
appeared to be vindicated in 1874 when the Conservatives not only won the general election but
won handsomely. Explanations were sought for the massive swing to the Conservatives in
‘but nowhere was it mentioned that since 1868 the Conservatives had developed a national 
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ad 
ive 
 
 
 
ay 
 
 was more 
concern
wrote t
satisfac d working places to include every “representative” 
regardi
                                                
organisation and the Liberals were still without one.’ Except that is amongst those who h
actually done the hard work; the minutes of the Eighth Annual Conference of the Conservat
Party, organized by the NUOCA, boasted of ‘a remarkable fact…which appears to prove, in an 
unanswerable manner, the great value even for electoral purposes possessed by political 
associations.’ 237  The party leadership, especially Disraeli who had done so much to improve
the party’s organization, inexplicably offered little reward to those who had secured victory.
Disraeli, incredibly, told the Queen on 18th February, ‘nothing like this could have been 
anticipated, and no party organization could have caused this result of a majority of nearly
64.’238 He and the party leadership were too preoccupied with government appointments to p
much attention to party organization, which was allowed to run down. Gorst who had so ably 
rallied and marshalled support in the urban constituencies felt that the rewards of patronage
which came with office had ‘gone to the landed gentry who dominated the party. The Tory 
strength in the boroughs was totally neglected..’ 239 Gorst was so incensed that, even eight 
months after the election, he ‘wrote at length to Dyke [Sir William Hart Dyke, Patronage 
Secretary]  complaining about misdirection of patronage.’ 240  Disraeli, it appears
ed with party unity than with rewarding the work-horses of the party organization, he 
o Lady Bradford that ‘the government is a very strong government and gives much 
tion. I have contrived in minor an
man, that is to say every one who might be troublesome…and all those sort of men, who would 
have made a Tory cave.’ 241 He was, of course, under pressure from a number of quarters 
ng his dispensation of patronage, he wrote, again to Lady Bradford, that  
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t 
 of his friends – and always 
the most unqualified candidates. But because the Prince is good-natured, I must not be 
ts 
than any other circumstance.’  
To add to Gorst’s annoyance others within the party, but higher placed than he, were successful  
in promoting their protégés. The Chief Whip Gerard Noel, wrote to Disraeli,  
‘I am most anxious to see four new men brought prominently to the front because I am 
he 
country. These are W. H. Smith, Cross, Beach, and Sandon, all are good speakers and 
 
y 
 
at at a by-
on when 
arliamentary Whips office. This 
was ‘m
method  
party m  1877 when he finally resigned.’  Meanwhile Disraeli continued to 
                                                
‘it is a curious thing, but there has not been a place or a living of importance, in my gif
that HRH [The Prince of Wales], has not asked me for one
silly. And I think that the reputation of a Minister depends more on his appointmen
242
 
 
 
sure they would add greatly to its strength not only in the House of Commons but in t
men of ability and sound judgement. (original emphasis) 243   
Eventually Smith became Financial Secretary to the Treasury, R. A. Cross became Home 
Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach became Chief Secretary for Ireland, and Lord Sandon 
became Vice President of the Council for Education. It became obvious to Gorst that the 
professionals at Central Office, and those of high social standing, could exert some influence, 
but the voluntary party workers, and even himself, could not. He was disappointed not onl
because his own efforts and achievements appeared to go unrecognized, but also because those 
who had worked tirelessly in the boroughs, where success had been essential to bring the new
administration into office, were similarly overlooked. He regained a parliamentary se
election in 1875, but his influence as Party Agent had evaporated after the general electi
management of the party’s organization had reverted to the p
uch to Gorst’s disgust as he saw this as a move back to the corrupt and inefficient 
s which had prevailed before his appointment. He continued to give advice and help in
anagement until 244
exercise his patronage in a manner hardly likely to encourage loyalty from his party 
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Household]. It was a compliment to his father who has been a most useful and influential 
e 
only man who ever stood two contested elections and never opened his mouth: 
 
 
t 
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 247 
and we are not likely to get it from any 
other so
Model]
           
organization. He appeared wholly unaware that his eccentric appointments could cause 
discontent and rancour. In 1879 he wrote to Lady Bradford  
‘I am glad you approve of Y’s [Lord Yarmouth] appointment [as Controller of the 
member of the party. Y himself, I am told, is the stupidest fellow that ever lived – th
absolutely.’ 245 
Thus although ‘once the Tories were in power, the bulk of their domestic legislative activity was 
in fact directed towards the urban working classes’ 246 the organization that had secured the 
votes of those classes was allowed to wind down, whilst those who had been instrumental in tha
effort were left out of government and went unrewarded. Patronage favoured the old Tory  
hierarchy at the expense of seemingly more worthy candidates and problems for the futu
steadily built up. However, even though the Conservatives had been more nimble than the 
Liberals in adapting their Party organization to the new circumstances, and reaped the benefit of 
the changes in the election of 1874, the Liberals did not lag far behind. ‘Joseph Chamberlain 
copied American machine politics in his organization of the Birmingham Caucus, and was th
prime mover in the formation of the National Federation of Liberal Associations in 1877.’
The NFLA differed from its counterpart the NUOCA in that its impetus came from the 
constituencies rather than from the party hierarchy; nevertheless it was welcomed, albeit with 
reservations. Gladstone wrote to Lord Granville in 1877 saying that ‘as I understand the matter, 
you are in great want of improved electoral organization, 
urce.’ 248 In 1878 he wrote again to Granville ‘I am sensible of its [the Birmingham 
 dangers but I think it may cure the worst of the evils that beset the Liberal party.’ 
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(original
the Bir f 
recover e NFLA 
ad no such doubts . In the view of Joseph Chamberlain 
‘The chief aim of the Caucus was not to make government but to make opinion. The 
leader and without any policy…pledged to no measure, with no programme, for every 
supporters in the country was the cause and also the result of such a spineless party. The 
various sections of Liberalism and carried by the combined force of all. Only in this 
forces of “organised selfishness” which combined instinctively without formal 
 
e Conservatives operated without any “formal organization”. 
s own brainchild, the NLFA, itself posed many questions ‘were party machines in every town 
to be allowed to dictate to the mass of Liberal electors the way in which they should vote? Was 
a nation-wide federation of these machines to determine current political orthodoxy? And was 
the party outside parliament to become almost as important as the party within it?’  These 
questions it may be argued, were equally applicable to the new Conservative organization as 
they were to the Liberal caucuses. 
   
 great 
                                                
 emphasis)  249 By 1880 he was becoming more concerned writing that, ‘my opinion is that 
mingham organization is a good thing…But it is like a tonic, good at a certain stage o
y from disease, and inapplicable to other stages.’ 250 However, the founder of th
h
election of 1874 had in Chamberlain’s view returned individual Liberals “without a 
man to do what seemed to him right in his own eyes.” The apathy of the Liberal 
remedy was to form a programme of interlocking policies serving the needs of the 
way, Chamberlain contended, could the party make head[way] against the concerted 
organization.’ 251 
We may forgive Chamberlain’s rhetoric about “organized selfishness” but he was being less 
than accurate in his assertion that th
Hi
252
Donald Southgate has described Disraeli’s decision to go to the country in 1880 as his last
error; 253 the party’s popular organization was now de facto under the control of the Whips’ 
 
0. Ibid p.113. 
 
ey will be gratified I 
pect soon.’ Quoted in Nancy E. Johnson, (Ed.) (1981) The Diary of Gathorne Hardy, Later Lord 
ranbrook, 1866-1892: Political Selections, Oxford University Press, p.435. 
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253 This may be a harsh judgement. Gathorne Hardy noted in his diary on 9th February 1880, that ‘the
general bias is now to an early election & if it is pushed for by our opponents th
ex
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gs that the 
ad  
ise 
gap between the borough and county 
electora
opportu he 
register
Conser
oroughs where the population was greater than 20,000.’ 255 Registration and challenges to 
registrations were a vital component of electioneering and 
‘the annual sessions at the receiving barristers court [registration lists] became a struggle 
magnates, and on the outcome of these struggles depended the result of elections. 
1914 was the supervision of registration. Useful as this might be as a spur to party 
umber of 
people, and of making inclusion on the register essentially a matter for the local party  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
office and despite mounting evidence he ignored, intentionally or not, Gorst’s warnin
new party organization was stagnating. Since Gorst’s resignation in 1877 the organization h
simply not kept up with developments. There had ostensibly been no extension of the franch
since 1867 but the 1878 Registration Act had increased the 
tes by ‘providing much fuller preliminary lists of borough voters and by reducing 
nities for frivolous objections. In some constituencies more names were added to t
 after 1878 than after 1867.’ 254  It was in these urban constituencies that the 
vative victory in 1874 had been won, ‘in fact 35 of their 85 gains [in 1874] were in 
b
between rival attorneys paid by the local parliamentary candidates, MPs, or party 
Indeed, all over the country the main function of the local party organizations down to 
organization, it had the effect of excluding from the register a considerable n
organization.’ 256   
Disraeli’s neglect of his party’s local organization was now ready to return and haunt him. An 
indication as to the extent of that neglect can be gleaned from his comments to Lady 
Chesterfield about the 1880 general election, he wrote ‘how can there be news about the 
Election? Both sides have now placed their men and both are at the mercy of the Ballot, which 
baffles estimates.’ 257 The party had also overlooked another important facet of the 
electioneering process ‘three of the inner Cabinet, Beaconsfield [Disraeli], Salisbury, and 
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Cairns, were, as peers, by custom debarred from the electioneering struggle and thus unable t
copy Gladstone and other Liberal leaders on whistle-stop tours.’ 258 In the final analysis the 
Conservative party’s organization was run-down and demoralized, it was in no fit state to fig
an efficient co-ordinated general election campaign. After the defeat Disraeli told the Queen that 
‘that the Liberals had worked on that American system called caucus, originated by the great 
radical, Mr. Chamberlain.’ 259 Recognition, it appears, that the Liberal’s organization had been
vital component in their victory; and praise, albeit grudgingly given, for the architect of that 
organization. Strangely it appears that, in a similar reaction to the Conservative victory in
‘no newspaper put down the result to the Liberals superior organization, and when [Joseph
Chamberlain wrote to the Times pointing out that the caucus had been successful in 60 out of 67
boroughs where it was established, the letter provoked neither a reply nor an editorial 
comment.’260 However, the Conservative party leadership realised, albeit belatedly, that their 
organization was not up to scratch. In July 1880, during a meeting with W. H. Smith and Sir 
Stafford Northcote, Gorst was prevailed upon to revitalize the party’s organization, and 
promised that if the next election could be won ‘the offer of office for which he might be 
eligible would be made.’ 261 Gorst cynically replied that a similar offer had been made in 
but had not been honoured - but he acquiesced. Northcote, Conservative leader in the House o
Commons since Disraeli’s elevation to the peerage, had noted in his diary on 1st May 1880, ‘it i
my notion that we ought to have a small committee of parliamentary leaders, who should keep 
themselves in constant communication with the managers of the Central Association. Much 
might be done, and many mistakes avoided, if we were better informed as to the feelings of t
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260 Cornelius O’Leary, (1962) op cit. p.129. 
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eaders 
ple, using by-election results as ‘a yardstick of the governments popularity among the 
reforme  
resolve
were al s 
of individual opinion…reflecting oligarchy at one end, organization projected the purely 
symbolic nature of participation at the other end of the social spectrum.’ 264 It was now manifest 
that 
‘the neglect of party organization and the weaknesses of the traditional methods of 
Conservatives in 1880 and Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, established a committee to 
his 
committee, which became known as the central committee, assum d 
 
me 
 
uses 
                                                
party throughout the country.’ 262 It is noteworthy that Northcote concentrated upon “the 
feelings of the party” rather than the feelings of the voters. This suggests that he felt that the 
ordinary voter was not considered to be sufficiently knowledgeable about the intricacies of the 
new party politics to be addressed directly. Conversely it also demonstrates that political l
saw little possibility of accurately assessing public opinion other than in the crudest fashion, for 
exam
d electorate.’ 263 The difficulty of appealing directly to the new voters had yet to be
d. The thoughts and desires of the voters, and the effects of political rhetoric upon them, 
l unknown. ‘The political culture engaged areas of feelings far removed from the politic
conducting elections were exposed by the electoral disaster that engulfed the 
consider methods of reforming, popularising and improving the party organization. T
ed the direction an
management of party affairs and control of central party funds.’ 265 
 
Unfortunately all this was too little and too late for Disraeli, already aged and ailing at the ti
of the 1880 election he died on April 19th 1881. After his death ‘it was far from obvious who
took precedence between Salisbury and Northcote when, after 1881, they led in the two Ho
in uneasy partnership. Salisbury was senior in rank and the party’s favourite, Northcote the 
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as 
elf 
dure or 
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s the tension between existing and possible party alignments 
which g
possibi ticians 
claimed ll 
was a young, popular, and charismatic politician, whose activities with the so-called “Fourth 
Party”, 269 with his allies  John Gorst, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, and Arthur Balfour, had 
given him a very high profile 
‘As Churchill’s popularity among Conservatives in the country grew, it was natural for 
the 
party and supplant the ineffective official leadership. He was well aware of the 
arliament 
and the way the party organization was being run, over neither of which they had any 
 
of the 
 climb  
                                                
senior in length of service and still backed by many Conservative MPs.’ 266 The succession w
further complicated when Lord Randolph Churchill opted to utilise the party organization its
to further his own bid for the party leadership. The Conservative party had no proce
mechanism designed to elect a leader, the reasons being that such an arrangement ‘satisfied 
those who believed that party leaders should emerge by general agreement rather than by 
election, and reduced the danger of a rift in the party to a minimum’ 267 Salisbury and Northco
had both accumulated adequate credentials to be considered as party leader, but as Maurice 
Cowling has pointed out ‘it wa
ave alternative leaders the chance to identify their futures with unexplored 
lities…The centre of tension was continuous theorising about the next thing poli
 to wish to do with party, government, or the constitution.’ 268 Lord Randolph Churchi
him to attempt to capitalize on this support in his efforts to improve his position in 
dissatisfaction of provincial Tories both with the conduct of the opposition in P
control.’ 270 
He saw the “tension between existing party alignments” and the “unexplored possibility” 
next thing he “wished to do with party, government, and the constitution”. He would
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d freely on points of tactics, and made it their business 
ies did not adequately cover a multitude of sins.’ Blanche E. 
. 
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269 Arthur Balfour described the Fourth Party thus ‘It possessed no distinctive creed: its very name was an 
accident of debate; it consisted at its gayest and best of no more than four friends who sat together in the 
House, supported each other in difficulties, consulte
to convince the Government that large majorit
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aboard the bandwagon of democracy. ‘Churchill, therefore, put himself at the head of the 
campaign for Tory democracy and determined to capture the democratic part of the party 
organization – the National Union… [he] wished to abolish the undemocratic Central 
Committee and transfer its functions and powers to the National Union.’ 271  He had chosen 
what to “identify his future with.”. ‘Tory democracy was the catch-phrase of Churchill’s 
campaign, yet, as he himself admitted, opportunism was its chief characteristic.’ 272 
Opportunistic or not, he succeeded in becoming Chairman of the NUOCA in 1884, and waged
campaign for the leadership which lasted approximately ten months. It has been observed that 
his ‘profound cynicism was not lost on those able to observe him at close quarters,’ 273 bu
popularity, or at least the power of his popularity, remained undiminished, Mich
o Lord Salisbury that ‘whatever objections may, in any case, exist to the formation of a 
vative Government would, I think, be rendered insuperable if such a Government had t
ed without the man [Churchill] who is far and away the most popular Conservative 
se of Commons.’ 274  Churchill’s popularity both within the party, and with many of th
oters, forced Lord Salisbury, no lover of democracy, to seek a reconciliation and 
mise to prevent any further damage to the party. He wrote to Ch
‘it appears to us [himself and Northcote] that organization is, and must remain, in all i
essential features local. But there is still much work which a central body like the 
Council of the National Union can perform with great advantage to the party. It is the 
representative of many associations on whom, in their respective constituencies, the 
work of the party greatly depends. It can superintend and stimulate their exertions; 
furnish them with advice, and in some measure with funds; provide them with lecturers; 
aid them in the improvement and the development of the local press; and help them in 
perfecting the machinery by which the registration is conducted and the arrangem
providing volunteer agency at election times. It will have special opportunity of
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 Central Committee, 
who at 
ization was necessary if the party was to stand any chance of 
ver regaining office. He was, therefore, surprisingly amenable to a compromise 
           
upon the local associations which it represents the paramount duty of selecting, in time,
the candidates who are to come forward at the dissolution.’ 275 
 
to concentrate upon the business of ry, therefore, made it clear that the NUOCA was 
running and winning elections in their respective localities, and that the Central Council mus
accessible by the NUOCA and assist and guide them in any way possible. No contemplation
made of influence being exerted upon the party leadership. The issue of the
that time oversaw all aspects of party organization was addressed a week later. 
 ‘The Central Committee,’ Salisbury wrote, ‘are appointed by us and represent us: and 
we could not in any degree separate our position from theirs. I hope, however, that there 
is no chance of the paths of the Central Committee and the National Union crossing: for  
there is plenty of good work for both to do.’ 276  
 
Churchill, however, had two great assets to his campaign, he had the support of John Gorst, 
reinstated as Chief Party Agent following the defeat of 1880, who had wide experience and 
knowledge of the party’s management; 277 and, perhaps more importantly 
‘the provincial leaders who were represented on the council of the National Union were 
increasingly dissatisfied with the leadership of the party and the reliance of the central 
committee on traditional methods of electioneering which were totally unsuited to 
he vote in urban areas.’ 278 conducting elections and organizing t
 
Salisbury’s main concern was that the leadership must retain their independence from the   
NUOCA, continue to be the sole formulators of policy, and the final arbiters of party affairs. 
He was also aware that re-organ
e
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organization of the National Union, and official support for the Primrose League which 
remained with the party leaders.’  
Salisbury took Churchill into the party leadership, then turned his attention to propaganda, 
which had been sadly neglected because of ‘the internecine conflict into which it…pleased RC 
to plunge our organization’   
 
ar 
dleton alm
                                                
‘The main results were the abolition of the Central Committee, democratic reforms in the 
had been founded by Churchill and Gorst. The management of party affairs, however,  
279
 
280
In the summer of 1885 Richard “Skipper” Middleton replaced Gorst as Chief Party agent and 
immediately set about re-starting the party’s propaganda machine, he wrote to Salisbury in July  
‘we are raising a special fund for the purpose of distributing pamphlets, leaflets and etc, from 
house to house throughout England. The men we employ for the purpose of distributing these 
leaflets are good Conservatives and working men who will talk to any they meet on the way’281 
The initiative was apparently a great success, in September he reported to W. H. Smith ‘the free 
distribution of leaflets is giving great satisfaction and I think will prove of great service – as f
as possible we are endeavouring to leave some Conservative literature at every house in 
England.’ 282  The NUOCA already spent from one half to two thirds of its budget annually for 
literature and lectures, with the help of his special fund ‘Mid ost doubled the annual 
rate of publications in his first year. It doubled again in 1886 and redoubled in 1895.’ 283 He 
followed the precedent set by Gorst when in 1886 he became honorary Secretary of the National 
Union. He thus occupied a pivotal role and ‘became the key figure in tying together the three 
principal sections of the party, the party in parliament, the mass organization (the National 
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wever, the fact that the Area Offices were in the employ of Central 
ffice has led some to see Salisbury’s involvement as crucial in determining their actual raison 
d’etre. A. L. Lowell claimed that the provincial divisions ‘were expected to act like watertight 
compartments, as it was believed that all ten divisions would not go mad at once, and that any 
man would find it hard to capture enough of them, one at a time, to control the Union.’  If this 
interpretation is correct, and Lowell was writing only some twenty years after the event, then it 
illustrates that the leadership had learnt a salient lesson from the challenge of Randolph 
Churchill and had determined that never again should their own party organization be utilised as 
a weapon against them.  
 
                                                
Union) and the Central Office. He had direct access to the Leader of the Party, he administere
the affairs of the Central Office as Principal Agent, and he had effective control of the w
the National Union in his capacity of Honorary Secretary.’ 284  Middleton was also charged  
with overseeing the changes brought about by Salisbury’s compromise with Churchill. In 1885 
it was decided that every Conservative Association should be affiliated without the need of any
formal action. This simple device ensured that the NUOCA became a truly national body. A 
new set of rules were adopted in 1886 which included provision ‘for the setting up of ten 
provincial or divisional unions which were to include all the members of the National Union 
within the territorial divisions concerned.’ 285 It has been argued that ‘the Area Offices w
established…in order to bring Central Office into closer touch with the organization at 
constituency level’ 286 Ho
O
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‘In [June]1885 Gladstone was forced into resignation by dissension within the Liberal Party and 
a change of tactics by the Irish Party’. 288 And ‘with the defeat of the Liberal government in 
1885, the Queen called Salisbury to the office of Prime Minister; her selection was accep
Salisbury was now the unchallenged leader of the Conservative Party. His aims he made cl
‘were to keep the Tories together, and to present them as a party of government, while educating
the public and moderate Liberals in particular, about the dangers, in which he really believ
from the new model radicalism. Like Northcote but with greater boldness and more 
constructively, he worked to create the conditions for a Liberal split.’ (my emphasis) 290  Salisbury 
was also amenable to embracing any faction that would help him further his aims. As early as 
October 1880 he had written to his nephew Arthur Balfour saying ‘the leader, even of a 
diminished party, must behave as the arbitrator between its various sections: and if he has 
ground for hoping to attract a new section, they must come within the scope of the arbitration.’ 
291 He had taken office as head of a minority government only reluctantly, and at the first 
opportunity in November 1885 he resigned office forcing a general election. Salisbury had, 
unlike Disraeli, always privately acknowledged that if the Conservative party were to remain 
true to the principles that underpinned it, then it may be necessary to concede a majority in the
House of Commons and rely upon the in-built Tory majority in the House of Lords to stymie 
any radical legislation. In fact ‘he saw the House of Lords and the Conservative Party a
mirror of the checks and balances written into the American Constitution.’ 292 He was, therefore, 
not overly concerned that the Liberals won the most seats in the general election in December
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1885, since they had no overall majority, but he still had to rely upon the support of 86 Irish 
Nationalist MPs. He had written as early as 1867 that ‘it is the duty of every Englishman, an
every English party, to accept a political defeat cordially, and to lend their best endeavours to 
secure the success, or to neutralize the evil, of the principles to which they have been force
succumb.’ 293  It would be mistaken to assume from all this that Salisbury was simply 
complacent. Although he was aware of the potency of the Conservative majority in the House of 
Lords, he was also aware that a party appearing to be permanently in a minority could not be 
successfully sustained indefinitely, and although he had opposed Disraeli on many issues ‘he 
found in Disraeli when he was an old man, one fixed political principle – that the party must 
no account be broken up.’ 294 Despite this conviction he had ‘wondered whether the country 
would move [after the death of Disraeli and Gladstone] from two ideologically amorphous 
parties into several more strongly defined groups on the French model and that prospect held
ttractions for him.’ 295 When ‘Gladstone’s official adoption of Irish Home Rule [in 
ber 1885]…irrevocably split the Liberal Party and, more importantly, the Radical 
6 Salisbury seized his opportunity and engineered a Commons defeat for his governm
leaving Gladstone with no alternative but to take office. A sizeable faction within the Liberal 
Party opposed to Irish Home Rule, led by Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Hartington, christened
“Liberal Unionists”, pledged to support a Conservative government that would oppose Irish 
Home Rule. Salisbury was happy to accommodate the Liberal Unionists, and after Gladstone’
Irish Home Rule Bill was defeated in the House of Commons in June 1886, the alliance became 
formal and arrangements were made to combine forces in the forthcoming general election. 
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issue 
in British politics, a symmetrical swing of the [political] pendulum was unlikely to recur. 
large number of successful candidates fighting independently as Liberal Unionists 
7 
 
 
s.   
nd 
 is that 
 Act had come from Conservative back-benchers 
‘who loudly protested the impossibility of conducting an election within the narrow expense 
margin 300
           
‘As long as Irish Home Rule remained, either actually or potentially, the dominant 
Nor did it do so. In the election of 1886 there was certainly a massive swing; but the 
suggests that it was against Home Rulers rather than towards the Conservatives. 29
 This may be true, but Salisbury’s contribution ought not to be underestimated. He had seen the 
“tension between existing party alignments” in the Liberal Party, discovered the “unexplored 
possibility” of Irish Home Rule, and now saw the way clear to next thing he “wished to do with
party, government, and the constitution”. He would retain power in alliance with the Liberal 
Unionists, and thereby guarantee the cohesion and influence of his own party and its principle
Whilst it is true that ‘in 1886 Gladstone dissolved for a second election within six months, a
with his party rent by schism and with few of the prominent figures in the party sharing his 
suicidal enthusiasm for home rule,’ 298 it would be misleading to assume that Gladstone’s 
“suicide” was the only reason for the Conservative election success. Gladstone’s ministry had 
passed four Acts of parliament which had impacted greatly upon party organization. The 
Representation of the People Act in 1884 and the Redistribution Act of 1885 which came to be 
collectively known as the Third reform Act, and in addition The Corrupt and Illegal Practices 
Act of 1883 and the Registration Act of 1885 all demanded response from party organizations. 
The most important feature of the 1883 Corrupt practices Act in the context of this study
it ‘prohibited parliamentary candidates from directly purchasing the services (and sometimes
voters) to secure their victories. The work of volunteers was [thus] needed to replace those 
activities.’ 299  The main opposition to the
s allowed.’  Gorst, who possessed unparalleled knowledge of electioneering replied, 
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with a h
really n
reachin ut 
‘a class
money 
xpenditure was of the highest importance to both sides.’  Nevertheless, limiting election 
expenses was a serious problem, especially from a conservative point of view. W. H. Smith 
wrote to Salisbury voicing his fears that 
‘an election has had to be provided at somebody’s cost hitherto, and much of this is to be 
approaching our strength. The Radicals have the Trades Unions, the Dissenting Chapels, 
 
supporters only want to be left alone, to be allowed to enjoy what they have, and they 
prepare against the attack or to resist it. So to stave off the evil day as long as possible I 
the past: - but I am afraid I am a small minority in the Party in the House of Commons – 
 
ally 
tended ‘to mould into a compact body the more active and energetic portions of the newer and 
ore democratic school of Conservatism.’  The League crossed the boundaries of age and 
ender, members were “Knights” or “Dames”, and with the addition of “Associates” in 1885 it 
int of sarcasm, that ‘many members had extravagant ideas of what expenditure was 
ecessary to conduct an election.’ 301 The Act was never in any real danger of not 
g the statute book since as ex-Attorney-General Sir Hardinge Giffard bluntly pointed o
 had grown up with no political convictions, but the firm purpose of extorting as much  
as possible from candidates at election times, and that the principle of a limit to 
302e
prohibited in the future. The result will be, I am afraid, that we shall not poll anything 
and every society for the abolition of property and morality working for them. Our
think that they are so secure that they will make no sacrifice of time or pleasure to 
should wish to retain the power of fighting elections by paid agency if necessary as in 
who only think of one thing – lessening the cheque to be drawn on their bankers.’ 303 
Sir Stafford Northcote accepted the inevitability of the Act and began to seek a solution, he 
confided to his diary ‘what will come out of the Corrupt Practices Bill is a question. It will 
render it necessary for us to develop voluntary action much more that has yet been done, for 
there will be little money to spare for paid agents.’ 304 Fortunately for the Conservatives in 1883 
Drummond Wolff and Randolph Churchill had founded The Primrose League origin
in
m 305
g
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e 
arrow confines of Westminster. It offered only 
a small ploit the 
constra  could  
provide a source of unpaid, willing, and enthusiastic party workers at election time. 
The long overdue Representation of the People Act of 1884 equalised the franchise between  
County and Borough constituencies. Overall the electorate was increased by 67%, but in the 
counties the increase was understandably much higher at 162%  Such a measure alone would 
Tories as it would simply increase their majorities in their own  
eartlands. It had been pointed out in 1884 that 
‘the proportion of Conservative seats in the 1880 parliament was less than their 
Liberal proposals for an extension of suffrage in the Counties, as long as such an 
against them.’ 307 
Added to this reasoning was the evidence from the 1874 and 1880 general elections where ‘the 
county and small borough results showed, as both Disraeli and Salisbury realized, that the 
Conservative party need no longer fear a redistribution of seats contingent on the extension of 
the county franchise.’  308 
 
entation of the People Act becoming law until the 
edistribution Act of 1885 was passed. The chief effect of the Act ‘was to abolish the electoral 
 by 
the 
           
also bridged class boundaries. It provided a formal and institutionalised way to influence th
political opinions of the population outside the n
 dose of politics amongst many other entertainments and was ideally placed to ex
ints of the Corrupt Practices Act, if only because it was virtually self-financed, and
 
 
 
306
prove no advantage to the 
h
percentage in the elections. Thus it would be in the Conservative interest to accept 
extension was accompanied by a redistribution of seats which took away the built-in bias 
 
Consequently the Tories prevented the Repres
R
advantage of the South of England (two-thirds of the entire House of Commons being elected
one-quarter of the voters) and come closer to the ideal of equal electoral districts, although 
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t also 
d 
tion 
he Registration Act of 1885 meant that constituency party agents had to work very hard to 
keep working class voters on the registers. The fact that registration should depend on the 
activity, and be undertaken in the interests of a political party, was rightly criticised as an  
indefensible anomaly.’  As noted earlier registration of voters was a huge burden for 
constituency agents ‘by 1900 registration was governed by 118 Acts and over 650 Judicial 
judgements, 60 forms were involved.’  The procedure became so complicated, yet so 
important, that in 1891 the National Society of Conservative Agents was formed to organize and 
oversee the process. 
 
 
lly 
o the fact 
that their majority rested on their alliance with the rebel Liberal Unionists, in fact ‘the sharp rise 
           
theoretical distinction between boroughs and counties was preserved.’ 309 The electoral; 
“playing field” was now more level than it had ever been, at least in England, but the Ac
‘reinforced the power of the “Celtic Fringe”…The Welsh and the Irish were over-represente
relative to their populations.’ 310 The overall impact of these changes meant that organiza
became  more vital than ever before.  
 
‘T
311
312
Thus the outcome of these four Acts was that ‘parties had to form new local agencies for the 
increased number of constituencies – 426 in 1880 rising to 643 in 1885. Bribery and treating
were no longer viable…[and] the number of party workers who could be paid was drastica
reduced.’ 313 Aided by their reformed and revitalized organization under the direction of 
“Skipper” Middleton the Conservatives had been able to take advantage of the split in the 
Liberal party and achieve election victory in 1886. Salisbury, however, was sensitive t
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as 
ecover the 
d for that party.’ 315 This was somewhat 
unfair t
this the
Conser
could b
party h
maintai  all 
party a
erience gained by the late elections have shown that the only method by 
hich we can cope with the activity of the Gladstonian Party, is by placing able and 
e 
purpose of carefully watching the action taken by the Radical emissaries and 
gain 
the votes of the labouring classes. 
any 
gentlemen who will be prepared to undertake the work for the good of the party. 
canvassers and for general work on the day of the poll. The employment of gentlemen 
useful and a very great saving of expense. 
 
sprung upon us at any moment we may be prepared to take the field with a fair prospect 
 
                                                
in the number of uncontested constituencies [in 1886] (219, almost one-third of the House) was 
due partly to pacts between the Conservatives and their allies the Liberal Unionists.’ 314 He w
.also concerned with the issue of confidence, he wrote to Balfour ‘we shall not r
confidence of the country. For it is the central figure of a party in the Commons to which 
constituents are wont to look, if their confidence is aske
o Northcote who was a tireless, if uninspiring, platform speaker. Salisbury returned to 
me in 1891, when in a speech at Nottingham he said ‘if I were asked to define 
vative policy, I should say it was the upholding of confidence.’ 316 Such pronouncements 
e interpreted as insecurity, or indeed as a determination not to lose the advantage his 
ad gained. Certainly Middleton continued to exhort his party workers to 
n a high level of activity even after the 1886 election. In 1887 he circulated a letter to
gents which is worth quoting here in full. It said 
Dear sir, the exp
w
energetic volunteer workers to reside in each parish during the period of a contest for th
counteracting without delay the mostly false statements with which they attempt to 
With this object in view I shall be very glad if you can let me have the names of 
I am also anxious, if it be possible, to obtain the services of volunteer cyclists as 
cyclists has been tried on a small scale at the late elections and has been found most 
I shall be glad if you will give this your earliest attention so that should a by-election be
of success.’ 317  
 
.185. 
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trict principles. For example on the issue of working class candidates he wrote  
‘As far s,  
wherev  ‘I  
should 
Middleton to co-operate with a campaign which Lord Woolmer planned in 1892 for systematic 
ty 
 
press on the subject. For whereas Anglican 
Nonconformist denominations and Trade Unions did not hesitate to place their 
ty  
of “perfecting your organization, to furnish a complete and legitimate substitute for these 
 
 
 
                                                
The intention plainly was that the Conservative party organisation was to run like a well oiled
machine, and be ready at short notice to meet any eventuality. Moreover Salisbury proved 
himself amenable to any device that would help to keep the party in power that did not 
contradict his s
 as I am concerned my vote is entirely in favour of Conservative Labour Candidate
er they have a good chance of winning the seat.’ 318 A view confirmed by Northcote
be very glad to see two or three Conservative Working-Men in parliament.’ 319 ‘He urged 
heckling of  Gladstonian candidates.’ 320 And he concurred with Middleton that the timing of 
elections should coincide with harvestime so that agricultural labourers would be distracted 
from voting. 321 We can conclude that Lord Salisbury was well aware of the importance of par
organization,  
‘careful organization was even more important for the Conservatives than for the
Liberals, he argued, placing his personal im
clergy tended to keep their support for the Conservative party discreetly informed, 
organization at the disposal of the Liberals. Salisbury urged upon Conservatives the du
advantages.”’ 322 
His colleagues agreed and were at pains to ensure that the party organization understood that its
function was to support the parliamentary party and not to challenge it. ‘What we want is a 
professional and competent person who…knows how to turn to the best account the political 
forces which it is not his business to call into existence, which it is not his business to direct in 
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f  “Skipper” Middleton as party agent, and Akers 
Dougla d 
revolut tions 
of the C y the election of 1885 which was 
love 
number of unopposed seats, after that date the number of seats unopposed by the 
Conservatives to be returned unopposed (compared with only 10 Liberals); in 1900 the 
 
f 
 of the mood of Conservative groups in the country.’ 327 In as far, at least, as they were 
able to 
century
           
matters of policy, but which it is his business to bring to the polls when the day of trial 
comes.’323 To this end the twin appointments o
s as chief whip, in conjunction with the electoral legislations of 1883-1885 which ha
ionized the conditions of political life, ushered in a new era in the central organiza
onservative party. These factors are well illustrated b
‘the first to be more or less dominated by the party associations. In 1880 many candidates had 
stood on their own initiative, in 1885 very few were not nominated or actively supported by 
their local party groups.’ 324 The capable Middleton and Akers Douglas worked hand in g
‘providing Lord Salisbury with a party intelligence service upon which the latter came 
absolutely to rely.’ 325 The Conservative organization had obviously outstripped that of their 
opponents in terms of efficiency, for example 
‘whereas up to 1886 there was no marked difference between the two parties in the 
Liberals increased considerably. In 1895, for example, the Liberals allowed 114 
figure was 138 (compared to 22 Liberals).’ 326 
However, the iron grip that the leadership held over the party organization meant that ‘some o
the National Union conferences in the Salisbury – Middleton era appear to have been so docile 
that they failed to fulfil their responsibility to keep the parliamentary leaders of the party 
informed
gauge that mood. The same could be said of the parliamentary party ‘at the turn of the 
, the Conservative party in the House of Commons had a leader and it had whips, but it 
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lacked  328  
Had such machinery existed controversy over the timing of the “Khaki Election” of 1900, 
ferred to earlier 329 may have been avoided. As it was ‘Conservative Central Office’s official 
Campa  
many in the party found objectionable. Following victory in that election Salisbury had handed 
soned 
  
 
 
  
running down. This crisis was aggravated by the fact that the party organization had 
ormers 
led by Joseph Chamberlain.’ 332  
Their aim was to gain control of constituency associations and support MPs who were in 
sympathy with their views, and also to gain control of the NUOCA and use it as a weapon to 
influence party policy. This second strategy was reminiscent of Randolph Churchill’s campaign  
some twenty years earlier, however, Chamberlain presented a more serious threat. Churchill’s 
position ‘had been created by exploiting dissatisfaction both with the parliamentary leadership 
and with the organization of the party. When this dissatisfaction had been relieved by his own 
assumption of the leadership and by the re-organization of the party in 1886, he had no secure 
                                                
any form of organization that entailed Conservative MPs meeting on a regular basis.’
re
ign Guide for the Khaki Election had more than a whiff of gunpowder to it,’ 330 which
over the premiership to his nephew Arthur Balfour, but the legacy was something of a poi
chalice. 
‘Though he had played a crucial role in converting the party opportunity that Disraeli 
had created into actual power, and achieving thereby twenty years of Unionist 
domination of British Politics after 1886, Salisbury and his “old gang” had been unable
to keep up with the pace of change, unable and indeed unwilling to keep their party 
facing towards the future. And for that there would be a terrible price to be paid.’ 331 
Akers Douglas had been promoted to ministerial office in 1895  
‘and by the time Middleton resigned in 1903 it was clear that the party organization was
become the focus of agitation by a rising group in the party, namely the tariff ref
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n, on the other hand, faced greater political 
problem  
his inde red 
the sup 334 
Conser  offered a 
 
 
el,   
an attempt to salvage his own political fortunes at the expense of the conservatives and 
ination of the chancellor of the exchequer, Ritchie, to dish his proposal by 
interests of free trade was foremost in the manoeuvres, of dubious constitutional 
 
  
           
base from which to operate.’ 333 Chamberlai
s, but he was shrewd enough never to forget that the source of his influence was largely
pendent electoral base. Because of this ‘by 1906 the Tariff Reform League had secu
port of some 300 constituency associations and gained control of the National Union.’ 
vative commitment to Tariff Reform can partly be explained because it
revenue-raising measure which could spread the burden of increased taxation across all sections
of society, the bill for social reforms would not then be paid through class-based taxation. This
was obviously attractive to the better-off classes who were Conservative supporters.  
Nevertheless the Unionist party was split, this was evident specifically at the very highest lev
335 it has been suggested, for example, that 
‘Chamberlain’s single-handed advocacy of imperial preference bore the appearance of 
even of the other sections of the liberal unionists. This was the chief reason for the 
determ
refusing to put it in the budget. For Ritchie as well as being devoted to the theoretical 
propriety, to form an anti-Chamberlain cabal within the Cabinet.’  336  
The party whips were faced with the problem of how ‘to manage cliques and be aware how far 
leaders could go and still retain solid party support.’ 337 The party leadership was thus facing
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ttle groups, talking to each other 
r-worked by his own department.”’ Ibid. footnote p.69. 
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out after a cabinet meeting…what has actually been the decision…So I g
become more than informal – they are chaotic – breaking up into li
without any one to formulate or register the collective opinion.  Chamberlain would run the whole thing if 
he were not so ove
733
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ead 
 at all – CB’s victory in 
1906.’ 
the larg eals 
to the g  
been tr
charism
m 
 have 
e 
expected to take orders from the rank and file” – [and his associates] were the men that 
together all his ex-official colleagues to resolve the deadlock, fearing that the result 
n 
the self-made assumption that his mediatory role was indispensable. But unlike 
Conservative game, resisting as Salisbury in similar circum ances had resisted 
 
problems on a number of fronts, and appeared impotent in its efforts to solve them. ‘Problems of 
policy and leadership played a large part in the 1906 defeat, but there was also a widespr
feeling that the methods of party management were old fashioned.’ 338 That Balfour knew that 
his party was in disarray can be seen by his statement written some years later that ‘the greatest 
victory at the polls ever won by any party was won upon no policy
339  He had written immediately after the election, ‘it is curious that the Govt. which has 
est majority of modern times contains not a single individual whose personality app
eneral public.’ 340 It could not have escaped Balfour’s notice that the Conservatives had
ounced by opponents whom he thought were totally lacking in policy initiatives and 
a, or what this implied about his own party. 
Ironically although their policy had apparently been rejected by the voters the Tariff Refor
League emerged from the election as the strongest group in the party. ‘They demanded  
democratic reforms of the party organization vis à vis Central Office. These reforms would
made them even more influential in the party as Central Office strongly supported Balfour.’ 341 
He stubbornly resisted, turning to the party grandees for support. 
‘Lansdowne – whose attitude was summed up in his advice that “ The generals cannot b
Balfour consulted. Like Gladstone in 1885, he could not bring himself to summon 
might go against his personal inclinations: and like Gladstone he supported himself o
Gladstone he had no solution of his own. Instead he was playing a purely defensive and 
st
Randolph Churchill’s bid in the 1880s to democratise the party.’ 342 
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nd 
ree chosen 
 
 
 
nd 
 
and it 
           
However, because of the strength of his enemies Balfour was forced into concessions and 
reluctantly allowed a re-organization, the National Union assumed control of propaganda a
publications, while the constituency associations gained the right to select and adopt their 
candidates. The Chief Whip and three men of his own choice were to consult with th
members of the National Union and liaise between The national Union and Central Office to 
bring important issues to the attention of the party leader. Re-organization could not help with 
the Conservative debacle over Lloyd George’s 1909 “people’s budget” and ‘the two electoral
defeats in 1910 343 resulted in further demands for reform of the party machine, but perhaps 
because the Tariff reformers had gained the policy concessions they wished, the demands were 
concentrated on improving the electoral efficiency of the party.’ 344  which had sunk to a new
level. For example, a disgruntled Sir Joseph Lawrence wrote ‘we lost Lancs. and York: - 
principally the former by rotten candidates… Fancy that popinjay Ian Malcolm with his perfume
and dilettantism…in a constituency where people walk in clogs and women wear shawls on 
their heads at meetings.’ 345 As a result ‘in February 1911 Balfour appointed the Unionist 
Organization Committee (UOC) under the chairmanship of Aretas Akers Douglas a former 
Chief Whip…The responsibilities of the Chief Whip were to be limited to those of 
parliamentary management, and his other burdens would be shouldered by a Party Treasurer a
a Party Chairman.’ 346 The UOC reversed many of the reforms of 1906. ‘Organization, finance, 
the provision of speakers and the provision of literature were vested in Central Office which 
thus regained the latter two functions.’ 347  It has been argued that when Middleton had resigned
in 1903 his successor had declined the post of Honorary Secretary of the National Union 
                                      
343 The Liberals lost their overall majority but retained power with the support of the Irish nationalists. 
 2nd February 1910, in Neil Blewett, (1972) op cit. p.272. 
. (Eds.) (1994) op cit. p172. 
7 Zig Layton Henry, (1978) op cit. p.662. 
344 Zig Layton Henry, (1978) op cit. p.662. 
345 Sir Joseph Lawrence to Sir Leo Maxse
346 Stuart Ball (1994) in Paul Whiteley et al
34
 92
 
one of these changes significantly modified the role of either 
rganization.’ 348 But this is to ignore the fact that one new official, ‘the chairman of the party 
 
icy 
 
l-
y 
 
y. 
f the 
           
was this which helped precipitate ‘considerable shuffling and re-shuffling of responsibilities 
between the Central Office and the National Union in the course of the re-organizations which
took place in 1906 and 1911, but n
o
organization, a politician with cabinet rank was to replace the Chief Whip as head of Central 
Office and was to be appointed by the leader of the party.’ 349 Another, the Party Treasurer was
to control finance. Thus, in a very real sense electoral efficiency gained the ascendancy over 
democratic principles, and the National Union, which had appeared to be flexing its muscles, 
reverted back to its original role of guaranteeing effective organization in the constituencies and 
representing, as far as possible, their interests to the leaders, but having no influence in pol
making.  In fairness to the Tory leadership, it must be pointed out that attempts to democratise 
the Liberal party’s organization had suffered a similar fate. ‘By the end of the 1890s the 
National Liberal Federation had totally abandoned its claim to shape Liberal policy: and in 1906
formulation of the Liberal programme for the landslide election victory was left to Campbel
Bannerman, the party leader.’ 350 
 
With Balfour’s resignation in November 1911 the Tory Party entered uncharted waters. No Tor
Party leader had ever before stepped down whilst in opposition. 351 Also, possibly for the first
time, the new leader carefully considered accepting the position because of the state of the part
‘Bonar Law’s alleged dictum “I am their leader. I must follow them” indicates something o
deliberation with which his choice was made, as does his reported remark to the Prime Minister 
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y 
rong leader to direct and control it. High Politics still held 
ay. As the free trade controversy rumbled on F. E. Smith wrote to Lord Derby ‘surely the 
right course is to avoid all public controversy at all costs and try to swing the party into a 
tenable position by private influence legitimately exercised.’ (original emphasis) 353 Not that such 
machinations were to be made public knowledge; Lord Derby’s brother wrote to him that ‘it 
seems…that the only possible way to do things is to discuss privately the question of the food 
taxes…and to pass publicly a vote of confidence in Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne.’  
Donald Southgate concludes that ‘it is not suggested that mere organization could have achieved 
victory either in 1880 or 1906, but defeat was surely made more severe by a falling-off in 
organizational efficiency.’ 355 The Conservatives appeared to have learned that lesson well. If 
nothing else conservatism is pragmatic. They would regain a share of power in 1915 as part of 
ar-Time coalition, the party would then remain the dominant electoral force until the end 
ar in 1945.  
he question whether party organization deserves to be ranked alongside ideology and high 
politics as part of the Conservative party’s electoral armoury will be addressed in the 
onclusion. It can be stated at this juncture, however, that ideology appeared to be very difficult 
in February 1912, “I am afraid I shall have to show myself very vicious, Mr Asquith, this 
session. I hope you will understand.”’ 352 Rhetoric and invective were still considered necessar
in the public sphere. The Conservative Party organization had developed and evolved since 
Disraeli had started the ball rolling in 1852, it had challenged the leadership and failed, and yet 
the party still looked towards a st
sw
354
the W
of  another World W
 
T
c
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to transmit directly to the electorate; l rhetoric was impossible to judge 
bef
The party organization, at grass roots level, could at least communicate any information it 
 
and the effect of politica
ore elections, especially in new constituencies where there was no history of voting patterns. 
uncovered to the party leadership when channels were established for it to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONSERVATIVE APPEAL FOR ELECTORAL SUPPORT. 
This study has, so far, gone to great lengths to establish a justified and legitimate methodology; 
to explain exactly what Conservatives actually stood for in our period of study; and how the 
Conservative Party continually modified its organization as conditions constantly changed and 
evolved. It is now time to consider how all these factors translated into votes. How the party 
directly appealed to an expanding electorate, especially the then most numerous sector, the 
working class. Integral to understanding this process will be the role trade unionism and extra-
parliamentary organization played in later Conservative strategy. Before carrying out this task it 
 95
 
 
 is futile.’ The Conservatives during our period 
aced a similar dilemma, how they addressed that dilemma is one subject of this chapter. 
      
Chapter one of the study has shown that there is overwhelming evidence that the realm of high 
politics during the nineteenth and early twentieth century was the exclusive preserve of a limited 
oligarchy who jealously guarded their privileged positi be gainsaid that 
the individuals who made up the membership of this oligarchy were the pre-eminent political 
personalities of their time, or that their political significance was immense. As Maurice Cowling 
has observed ‘power is exercised and decisions made, not by vast movements of opinion, but  
 
specifically by individual men.’ 356 However, it would be wholly misleading to suggest that 
these men operated in complete isolation and free from outside influence. ‘Since others followed 
where they led, innumerable opportunities arose for the exercise of creative power, but they 
were limited by the situations in which they found themselves, and reflected as much as they 
created
 
 has also been made clear that high politics was concerned with rhetoric and manoeuvre. 
‘Rhetoric is the weaving of a narrative tale deliberately employed as a persuasive device…In 
politics plification of complex ideological patterns for the 
           
will be useful to reiterate both the ground-rules and findings of our investigation, and to show
how circumstances, trends, and perceptions may dictate that principles and beliefs must 
sometimes be modified if they are to have any useful impact. Former Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, told the 1995 Labour Conference (Labour were then in opposition), that ‘power without
principle is barren, but principle without power
f
on. Moreover it cannot 
 the climate in which they worked.’ 357  
It
, rhetoric may in addition involve sim
                                      
356 Maurice Cowling, (1963) op cit. p.22.. 
357 Maurice Cowling, (1967) op cit. p.311. 
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bout the business of government. ‘But at the centre of power [in the nineteenth century] an 
oligarchy persisted which was not very different from that of the eighteenth century.’  Policy 
was indeed formulated at the highest possible level; but during our period the votes essential to 
enable the execution of that policy needed to be garnered from across a much wider social  
spectrum. This becomes evident when it is noted that 
‘Of the seven changes of Ministry from party to party between 1846 and 1867, no less 
change of ministry has taken place, except during the two World wars, other than as a 
 
towers”. ‘The result of the electorate’s choice…[was decided] as it happened, by majorities of 
much the same size drawn alternately from the two major parties.’  In 1885 it was noted that 
‘more and more…every year the battle of politics is transferred from Westminster, and is waged 
in the constituencies.’   The terms and conditions of that battle will be investigated here. 
 
sake of public presentation.’ 358 Political manoeuvre highlights the ‘relationships between 
situational necessity and the intentions of politicians’ 359 when parameters are constantly under 
revision and a balanced response in the face of changing circumstances is demanded. High 
politics thus can be seen as the “politics of the possible”; about people and individuals; and 
a
360
 
than six had no connection with the results of a general election. Since 1867 no such 
result of, or an immediate prelude to, a general election.’ 361 
Over time it became apparent that leaders could no longer operate and dictate from their “ivory  
362
363
Chapter two of this study contained a necessarily long and complex investigation of what 
Conservatives stood for in our period. We were able to conclude that it is possible to identify 
with some certainty two substantive core concepts in conservative ideology. Firstly, an innate 
                                                 
358 Michael Freeden, (1996) op cit. p.35.  
     
pire, Longman, London and New 
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361 G. N. Sanderson, (1966) op cit. p.351.       
 
362 G. N. Sanderson, (1966) op cit. p.352. 
363 P. H. Bagenal, (1885) The Tory Politics of The Marquis of Salisbury, London. Quoted in Richard 
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convinc
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historia ond Reform Act of 1867 less as a bold attempt 
 
ratagems 
                                                
dislike of and resistance to change, however inevitable, unless such change may be 
characterized as “organic” and “natural.” Secondly, the endeavour to make unavoidable 
subservient to a belief that the forces which guide and control people and society are not man
made, and, therefore, ought not to be dependent upon the vagaries of human impulse. ‘The 
process is abetted by substantive flexibility in the deployment of decontested concepts, so as to 
maximize under varying conditions the protection of that conception of change.’ 364 This 
ultimately provides conservatism with its flexibility, adaptability, and its pragmatism. This 
conclusion is not, of course, unchallenged, for example, ‘others such as Eccleshall and Cowling,
rather than assembling a coherent dogma, have struggled to locate a core impulse to 
Conservatism which lay…in its vindication of inequality.’ 365 This is a valid observation
“vindication of inequality” can easily be accommodated within our definition as a “decontested
concept”, albeit an important one. For example, ‘Disraeli’s gamble of extending the franchise t
the urban masses was, therefore, justified in the interests of his party; it won the 
nd in the longer term strengthened rather than weakened the electoral position of
’ 366  Consequently, an orthodox reading of his motives in 1867 could be that he 
ed his party to back a radical extension of the franchise on the grounds that it would 
 conservatism in the long run; but equally compelling is the assertion that ‘nowadays 
ns regard Disraeli’s triumph over the Sec
to mobilize new Tory voters than as a careful stratagem designed to make the party’s existing
supporters count for more in the election of MPs.’ 367  Neither interpretation need challenge our 
ideological conclusions. The additional questions to be answered will be what other st
 
364 Michael Freeden, (1996) op cit. p.345.  
logy and Representation of the Union with Ireland’, in Francis 
.  
urnal 
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366 E. J Feuchtwanger, (1968) op cit. p.82
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ted 
 
nd 
redistribution, though it brought Britain close to the radical principle of equal sized 
member seats created strongholds for Conservatives in suburbs, seaside resorts, and in 
l cities; and, second, the proliferation in the 
number of separate constituencies maximized the scope for plural voting, from which the 
Tories, as the representatives of propertied men, stood to benefit most. Between 1885 
  
Conservatives by about four to one.’  
ompromise? Certainly, but unavoidable change managed in accordance with conservative 
ideology. ‘Ideologies do not go away,’ 369 nevertheless by employing his own pragmatism, and  
the flex
conserv ed by Salisbury, although both coveted the 
class 
 
 the 
                                                
were employed, both to ensure the support of existing supporters, to woo the new voters crea
by successive extensions of the franchise; and how far Conservatives were prepared to 
compromise their principles to achieve those ends? A good illustration of such compromise is
the action of Lord Salisbury, a vocal anti- democrat, concerning the 1884-1885 Franchise a
Redistribution Acts. Although in opposition at the time, he managed to balance 
‘a Liberal franchise reform against a bill to redistribute the constituencies. This 
constituencies, helped the Conservatives in two ways: first, the new pattern of single-
the residential enclaves of hitherto radica
and 1914 there were around half a million plural voters who were believed to favour the
368
  
C
ibility of Conservative ideology Disraeli had created a concept of one-nation- 
atism; a conviction not shared or promot
power of office. This chapter will, therefore, also investigate how Conservatives managed to 
disseminate their chosen message and secure support from an ever-expanding working 
electorate. An endeavour inevitably hampered by the realization that, ‘Conservatives have 
always believed the [trade] unions posed a political and industrial threat…Historically, the 
Conservative Party has tried to distinguish between the working class and trade unions, but, as
trade unionism proved difficult to divorce from the working class, it was difficult to attack
unions without attacking the working class.’ 370 
 
y and The Trade Unions’, in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball, (Eds.) 
lations in Britain 1880-1950, Oxford University Press. 
368 Martin Pugh, (1988) op cit., p.256. 
369 Iain Mackenzie, (1994) ‘The Arena of Ideology’, in Robert Eccleshall et al. (1994) op cit., p.22.  
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Changes to Conservative Party organization were examined in chapter three, and it is obvious  
that many of the changes that took place were designed to help boost electoral support. For  
example, 
‘the National Union [was] founded in 1867 for the specific purpose of organizing 
and where the party had to gain ground if it was ever to escape from the minority 
 
rtly 
 this 
praise, but, 
g that 
 the full acknowledgement they merited Gorst continued to campaign 
for mor  
keeping
                                                
 
 
 
 
Conservative support in the urban areas, where the franchise had been greatly extended 
position it had occupied since 1846.’ 371 
That said, party organization was to be kept on a tight rein; Disraeli was adamant that the party 
hierarchy would not be threatened, or that the carefully nurtured notion of “one nation 
conservatism” be compromised by appeals made specifically to any one class of voters. Sho
after its foundation he felt it necessary to admonish the National Union for transgressing
principle, saying ‘I have never been myself at all favourable to a system which could induce  
Conservatives who are working men to form societies confined merely to their class.’ 372 
Within these confines, however, organization was correctly seen as imperative to electoral 
success. The Conservative victory in the 1874 general election was attributed largely to the 
improved party organization put in place by John Gorst; for which he received much 
tellingly, little tangible reward. It has been argued that the party structures put in place after 
1867 were ‘artificial growths, fostered by the few to involve and socialize the many into the 
discipline of the party.’ 373 Artificial or not, they had proved their worth, and despite feelin
his efforts had not received
e organizational effort. In 1877 ‘he spoke of the importance to the Conservative Party of
 its organization in perfect order. He drew a distinction between political organization 
 
 The Age of Disraeli: 1868-1881: The Rise of Tory Democracy, Longmans, 
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ongmans, London, p.xi. 
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and par
former devolved the real battle.’  This distinction is salient to understanding how the 
onservative Party directed its appeal to voters. Party management was confined to the environs 
f high-politics, political organization was concerned with grass-roots activism and vote 
gathering. This is not to say that party leaders were disinterested in the activities directed at 
proselytising the Conservative message, but it did argue that party leaders must take account of 
the information and opinions that came from grass roots activists at the sharp end of 
electioneering. There was an understandable consensus that organization alone could not win 
power, but there was also the realization that poor organization could preclude electoral victory. 
Following the Conservative defeat at the 1880 general election Gorst made this point in a 
suitably nuanced manner, 
‘it was not fair to say’ he said, that in recent years ‘the Conservative organization went 
their organization had gone ‘to utter ruin,’ or that their defeat was mainly attributable to 
t 
greatly improved, and that as compared with the organization of their opponents they 
 
 
 
Even b
would 
power, ake 
 for granted that a party leader with a policy to expound must go amongst the people to 
           
ty management, the latter of which he characterized as skirmishing while upon the 
374
C
o
to pieces,’ he was glad of the opportunity to state publicly that it was not fair to say that 
defective organization. ‘It was, however, right to say that their organization had no
were certainly left far behind.’ 375 
This chapter, therefore, will also examine the strategies, ruses, and machinations of the  
Conservative Party organization as it strove to make up the ground lost to its opponents.  
 
efore the Reform Act of 1867 it was evident that those who engaged in high politics 
need to take their message to the people if they harboured serious hopes of achieving 
 they needed to be seen as well as heard. ‘Gladstone was the first major statesman to t
it
                                      
374 NUCCA minutes, 11th annual conference, Southsea, 30th June 1877, Quoted in Richard Shannon,  
ly 18 0, Quoted in Richard Shannon, (1992) op cit. p.382. 
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y 
fice 
s to 
on all leading politicians, not only Conservatives. 
 Crystal  
g 
 
Gladstone had set the trend and it was imperative that the Conservatives made the most of this 
 
 
expound it. His speeches in South Lancashire in 1865 and 1868 offered an entirely new type of 
party leadership.’ 376  The Conservatives had no comparable orator of equivalent standing 
nationally, and their defeat at the 1868 general election only served to highlight this deficiency. 
Furthermore, ‘in the election of 1868 there was no “swing of the pendulum”. There was merel
an increase to about 110 of the 1865 Liberal majority of about seventy. But the enlarged 
electorate had decisively rejected the minority Conservative Government that had held of
since 1866 – the first decisive rejection of any ministry since 1841.’ 377 The resultant change
Conservative Party organization have been dealt with in Chapter three of this study, but another 
equally important change was forced up
‘From 1872, the famous speeches – famous in their day and in the history books – are, 
on balance, extra parliamentary speeches. Parliamentary speeches of general political 
significance are few compared with those of the Manchester Free Trade Hall, the
Palace, “peace with honour”, the Midlothian Campaigns, the tariff reform  
campaign…The extension of the franchise made extra parliamentary speechmakin
necessary; the continuing limits on the electorate made it effective.’ 378 
new weapon. By and large, ‘Disraeli made few speeches outside the House of Commons’, 379  
but at the prompting of his lieutenants, mainly John Gorst, he took up the challenge, and the few
speeches he did make were momentous. At Manchester, on 3rd April 1872, during a visit that 
had taken two years to arrange, 380 he set out his vision of conservatism, but also utilized the
opportunity to point out that the Liberal Party, which had been in power since 1868, had 
practiced policies in both domestic and foreign affairs that deserved public opprobrium. At 
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as obliged to give way.’ Quoted in John Vincent, (Ed.) (1994) op cit. p.102.  
378 H. C. G. Matthews, (1987) ‘Rhetoric and P
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th380 The Earl of Derby noted in his diary o
‘it had been fo
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of nobles, it is not a democratic multitude; it is a party formed from all the numerous 
conditions and different aims give vigour and variety to our national life. Liberalism’, he 
Toryism, on the other hand had three great objects, ‘to maintain the institutions of the 
people.’   
With hindsight this speech was little short of a tour de force, it succinctly summed up the Tory 
doctrines, attacked the Liberals, made clear the difference between the two parties,  and gave a 
vision f ly 
popular
383 
384
ballot box. The answer to this conundrum illustrates the Janus-faced nature of Disraeli’s appeal 
to the p
                                                
Crystal Palace, on 24th June 1872, he admitted that his party too had made errors in the past, and 
set out its future path in greater detail. 
‘The Tory party’ he said, ‘unless it is a national party, is nothing. It is not a confederacy 
classes in the realm – classes alike and equal before the law but whose different 
contended, had ‘endeavoured to substitute cosmopolitan for national principles.’ 
country…to uphold the Empire of England…[and] the elevation of the condition of the 
381
  
or the future. He was attempting to tap into the national zeitgeist by ‘adopting a new
 course rather than pioneering a novel notion, so far from creating the sentiment, he 
382merely recognized it and sought to exploit it.’  He was appealing, in a large degree, directly to 
those members of the electorate who were not “natural” Conservative voters. This was to prove 
a hugely successful ploy, in fact it has been argued that ‘it is to the continuity of a broad (and 
broad minded), dominant popular culture that the Tory party appealed with the most success.’
But there were caveats to this new brand of conservatism, ‘Disraeli was introducing his party to 
the politics of mass mobilization, but hardly to those of mass participation, and certainly not to 
those of mass arousal.’  . Preservation of the status quo was one of the overriding principles 
that the Conservative party stood for, one of their ideological priorities, the last thing they 
wanted was a whole tranche of new voters seeking to assert their rights or make demands via the 
eople, 
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 man] to assert his 
claims from below, but to assure him of the satisfaction of his needs by beneficent 
 
To ach   
which h
ageho tion had identified deference as a major aspect 
, ay, 
cept 
bol in 
 
                                                
‘the 1872 speeches were designed not to invite him [the working
agency from above…Manchester and the Crystal Palace, rather than welcome the 
working man into the political arena, sought to persuade him of the merits of staying out 
of it – except to vote Conservative.’ 385 
ieve these seemingly incompatible goals the Conservatives were tapping into a resource
ad been identified among the lower classes, that of “deference”. As early as 1867 Walter 
B t in his classic work The English Constitu
of English society, and Disraeli and his colleagues astutely sought to exploit the phenomenon 
for their own interests. ‘The deferential voter would literally believe that those of a higher social 
class would be best fitted to represent his interests and his area in parliament. This was the 
deference of a man who “knew his place.” 386 This apparent contradiction of seeking to woo the 
working man to conservatism  whilst at the same time seeking to exclude him from politics m
at first, appear irrational, but can be explained by a contingent principle of conservative  
ideology and their newly discovered synergy with the electorate. Thus 
‘it would be quite misleading to argue that all Tory speeches were non-rational or 
intended to be so, but it would be fair to say that Tories in general distrusted the con
of politics based on rationality, that they perceived the growing significance of sym
politics, and that they had, especially in the heritage of Disraeli, a clear and early 
understanding that, as Graham Wallas observed, “the empirical art of politics consists
largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of sub-conscious, non- 
rational inference”. The themes of monarchy, religion, race and imperialism fall 
conveniently into this category.’ 387  
 
The success of the Conservative party in the 1874 general election would appear to vindicate 
Disraeli’s vision of one-nation-conservatism, and also to prove the effectiveness of extra-
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detailed and illuminating explanation of working-class d
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Conservatism…When we look at the poll in the City of London, in Westminster, in 
rey, in Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield, in the 
metropolitan boroughs and in the home counties, in all the centres of middle-class 
 
The up ly 
enfranc -class ‘the ratepayer democracy of the growing cities, faced with a Liberal 
 
h, 
from feelings of deference to a governing elite of superior social status only describes 
ich is determined by other factors. Electoral 
                                                
parliamentary speech-making. A. V. Dicey remarked after the election that because deference 
was still so widespread and powerful, ‘democracy in England is as yet, it should be noted, by n
means wholly democratic.’ 388 This may be so, but just as organization alone cannot win 
elections, neither can rhetoric or deference. The Tories had been successful in consolidatin
those they considered as natural supporters. Frederic Harrison concluded after the election, 
‘The real truth is that the middle-class or its effective strength has swung round to 
Middlesex, in Sur
industry, wealth and cultivation, we see one unmistakeable fact, that the rich trading 
class, and the comfortable middle-class has grown distinctly Conservative.’ 389   
per-class, of course, had always been susceptible to conservatism, but now the new
hised middle
Party increasingly inclined to social intervention, seemed to have moved towards the  
Conservatives as the party of property and cheap government.’ 390  
The tendency of the upper and middle classes to develop conservative leanings inevitably had a
“knock-on” effect regarding working class support. There were self-evidently ‘many reasons 
why it might be felt “politic” to vote for the local landowner, plutocrat, or other man of  
influence.’ 391 Even so there were other influences at work which assisted the Tories. The 
symbolism of Disraeli’s triumphant trip to Lancashire, culminating in his Manchester speec
was not lost on the working men of industrial Britain; who, furthermore had a well developed   
culture all of their own.  
‘The notion that Conservative support, especially among working class voters arises 
attitudes associated with a social identity wh
 
action’ in Fortnightly Review, Vol. 15, March 1874, pp. 298 
tuart Ball, (Eds.) (1994) op cit. p.584. 
388 Quoted in Donald Read, (1979) op cit., p.173. 
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391 Robert Waller in Anthony Seldon and S
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In shor
weight of influence rather than coercion, above all in Lancashire.’   Importantly that influence 
was not always politically motivated. It was noted at the time ‘in Lancashire for example rival 
factories contested elections on other than political grounds, “politics resolve themselves into 
partisan warfare, and the real objects of political parties are totally forgotten in the zest of local 
clanships.”’ 394  It was common to ‘hear of “Tory Mills” and “Liberal Mills”, or “Tory Shops” 
and “Radical Shops”…The borough [Blackburn] is divided…there are no relations and no 
contact
the Chu  the 
onservatives a political advantage, especially among working men, especially when religion 
was a major factor in the electoral equation.  
‘Protestantism articulated a widespread popular dislike for the narrowness and 
sometime opposition of temper, combining it with elements of class 
f 
the people”, differentiated from the congregational ethos of Nonconformity by its parish 
 
ch 
ty.’ 397 The Conservatives’ 
ideologies can reinforce an existing social identity and help to make it politicall
significant by assisting the organization of mass political parties with particular politic
images.’ 392 
t, the working class could not be bullied, but even so evidence points to ‘the staggering 
393
s but that of foe with foe.’ 395 The explicit and vehement support given by the Tories to 
rch of England, and the confluence of Nonconformity with Liberalism, also gave
C
restrictiveness of Nonconformity. It also took the form of a Tory populism that 
s capitalized on this 
feeling…The notion that the Church of England was the National Church, “the church o
system and the pastoral care of all was an idea that received considerable support.’ 396  
The “church of the people” also offered greater freedom than strict Nonconformity, a fact whi
resonated with many working men, ‘Nonconformity’s obsession with temperance lay at the root 
of this opposition of feeling, giving it a special value for the Tory par
                                                 
392 Andrew Gamble, (1974) op cit., p.204. 
cial Conditions and Political Prospects of the Lancashire Workmen’, in Fortnightly  
New Series) Oct. 1868, p.439 Quoted in Patrick Joyce, (1980) op cit. p.201. 
393 Patrick Joyce, (1980) op cit. p.218. 
394 W. A. Abram, ‘So
Review, Vol. 4 (
395 Patrick Joyce, (1980) op cit., p.206.    
396 Patrick Joyce, (1980) op cit.  pp.241 and 253.     
397 Ibid. p.254.    
 106
es 
r 
large parts of the electorate the politics of the market were nothing other than an adjunct 
 able 
to respond to politics as participatory, local and convivial, and to maintain these 
ng the mass electorate.’ 398 
 
Thus th
their ‘d
footbal
Liberal politics.’399  It was true that the new voters had freedom of choice under the protection 
of the 1872 Ballot Act, but nevertheless ‘the lower down the nineteenth century social scale was 
the voter, the more likely was he to incline – or succumb – to the political complexion of his 
primary neighbourhood.’  The inclusiveness of the Conservative message meant that in many 
urban communities of the time that political complexion was Tory.  
 
Once in power Disraeli’s administration passed legislation that improved the working man’s 
en to him as a peer…caused surprise. It took the form of an 
open letter to the Duke of Marlborough as Viceroy of Ireland and concentrated almost 
e-
           
association with the brewing industry was useful in the years before the 1883 Corrupt Practic
Act, simply because 
‘political largesse was a continuation of the politics of the market by other means, but fo
to the politics of influence…The Conservatives seem in general to have been better
elements in political conduct as a means of managi
e Conservative party was able to capitalize on a range of favourable local influences  
eliberate identification with key aspects of urban popular culture, such as the pub, 
l and racing, was intended to distinguish them from the “moral reforming” style of 
400
 
legal status and employment rights, ‘the considerations which persuaded…Disraeli to take a 
major step in the reform of labour law seem to have been largely ones of electoral expediency, 
though there may also have been some gratitude to those sections of the enfranchised working 
classes which had voted Tory in 1874.’ 401 This was not to be enough, however, to secure 
another term in office. In his election manifesto in 1880,  
‘the only direct appeal op
entirely on the danger of Irish separatism…[he] was using the threat from the Hom
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everse.’ 
our foe concluded Disraeli, though Salisbury heard tales that the 
Anglican clergy had failed them 403
Lookin
might i
fulfillin und 
 
ty  
ord 
Rulers to focus on what he saw as his strongest claim to re-election, that he had raised 
the power and prestige of the country – when Gladstone, he said, had done the r
402  
 
Having had his finger on the pulse of the nation in 1874, he had been unable to keep it there. He 
blamed the 1880 defeat on overconfidence and poor organization, but there were other possible 
reasons. ‘The economic situation …had certainly hit the government hard in both counties and 
cities. “Hard Times”…has been 
, “either by actively voting against or at least by skulking”.’  
g to the future, Salisbury was particularly perturbed that ‘the size of the Liberal majority 
ndicate a shift of grim proportions in a radical direction in the desires of the electorate, 
g his forebodings in 1867.’ 404 In any event the reality was that the Conservatives fo
themselves back in opposition, and following Disraeli’s death in 1881 the party was thrown into 
further turmoil, with not even the choice of his successor being a foregone conclusion. Lord 
Salisbury, who was eventually to take over the leadership, knew that some things needed to be 
persevered with. For example,  
 ‘he blamed Gladstone for introducing extra-parliamentary speaking [and] despite 
loathing the whole process and considering it personally demeaning, Salisbury realised 
that the advancing democratic tide meant that he could not allow Gladstone to 
monopolize British platform oratory. Between 1880 and 1886 Salisbury appeared more 
than seventy times all over the country…he was to excel at platform oratory.’ 405 
Oratory alone, however, would never be enough to restore the fortunes of the Conservative par
after the blows of losing  a general election,  their charismatic leader, and their political 
direction. Becoming leader, under these circumstances, was something of a double-edged sw
for Salisbury. On the one hand, 
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to identify a common interest with the ruling parliamentary elite as members of a 
who proved to be the chief practitioner, and certainly the beneficiary, of this approach to 
British people could not automatically be translated into Conservatism; it had to be 
 
irness, however, others of his rank and status had similar reservations, for 
exampl
for dem  
in publ  in the privacy of high 
 
408 
ary 
at all costs. He  
           
‘at this time many middle-class as well as working-class voters were being encouraged 
patriotic British nation increasingly under threat from outside…it was Lord Salisbury 
politics.’ [On the other hand], ‘Salisbury recognized that the latent conservatism in the 
cultivated and mobilized for political purposes.’ 406  
Populism was anathema to Salisbury who made no secret of the fact that he distrusted 
democracy. In fa
e, ‘Lord Hartington and Lord Rosebery among the Liberals might feel little more love 
ocracy than did Salisbury; but without too great a strain on their consciences they could
ic express a watery sympathy with popular government, while,
party councils and high office, they attempted to restrain it.’ 407 Salisbury had opposed many of 
the policies and organizational reforms that now made up Disraeli’s legacy, but the core values
of his conservatism  remained official policy. ‘In particular, Tories propagated such causes as 
the defence and expansion of the empire, the monarchy, the church establishment, the defence 
of religious education, the union with Ireland, private property, and the House of Lords.’ 
Despite this, a major stumbling block was that many senior Conservatives were still very w
of the prospect of creating a modern party with a mass membership to compete with the 
Liberals. ‘The Tory defeat in 1880 only deepened the dilemma: if they resisted the creation of a 
popular Toryism, they might simply continue to lose elections, yet if they tried to go down the 
Liberal road, they might well destroy the whole character of Conservatism.’ 409 Salisbury was 
the embodiment of traditional Conservatism and was determined that its substantive core 
concepts would not be compromised, its ideological integrity and coherence must be preserved 
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political needs of the Conservative Party. After 1867, he recognised that the interests of 
tely 
conscious of the Conservative Party’s failings, principally its traditional willingness to 
 
iew 
re 
 
as amenable to a 
quietist stance”, that is he was ‘prepared to accept that State action was helpful to social 
problems, but on a piecemeal basis, with proposals being assessed on their individual merits.’413 
Allied to this concession to state interventionism, he instigated a policy that on every possible 
occasio
not ben
should 
                                                
‘made a sharp distinction between the general philosophy of Toryism and the short-term
the former were not always realised through the vehicle of the latter…[he] was acu
ditch its principles when the prospect of office beckoned.’ 410 
Liberalism, especially after the election victory in 1880, had accustomed the electorate to v
the government as basically beneficent. 411 In fact, ‘from 1884 a central assumption of British 
politics, which the Conservative party did not dispute, was that finding an answer to the social 
question was bound to be an electoral imperative…[however] ‘“Libertarian” Conservatives we
implacably opposed to big government and a “dependency culture”’ 412 Wholesale state
intervention would never be seriously considered by Salisbury, but he w
“
n ‘Conservatives laboured the point that redistribution of the property of the rich would 
efit the poor, but that their security lay in the property of the rich. “What is of all things 
important to them is that capital should flow, that employment should exist, that wages 
fertilise the channels of commerce.”’ 414 In this way Salisbury was able to accommodate most 
factions within his party, and at the same time dangle several carrots to the working class 
electorate. Even so, he, like some others, but unlike Disraeli, had always conceived of the Tories 
as a minority party. Because of this ‘at various times Peel, Derby, and Salisbury had each 
concluded that true Conservative policy was best pursued from the opposition benches, a view 
 
410 Andrew  Roberts, (1999) op cit. p.849. 
  
Stoughton, London, Vol. 3, pp.65-66,  
411 For a more detailed explanation of this view see Richard Shannon, (1996) op cit. pp. 182-183.    
412 E. H. H. Green, (1996) op cit., pp.227 and 229.
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The Conservatives, and Salisbury in particular, were helped out of this dilemma by a little 
recognised dimension of Victorian politics, namely that 
‘despite the enthusiasm of historians for reading a “two-party system” into nineteenth 
e 
to leaders capable of drawing support from beyond a single party…Change of political 
parties.’  
 
 
ver a 
ffects 
he People Act, the Irish Home Rule Party led by Charles Parnell 
was for d 
the Bri o major 
parties. e as yet neither Liberal nor 
ry 
           
that took for granted Tory strength in the Lords.’ 415 The salience of this strength in the House of
Lords, however, would be difficult to communicate to many somewhat unsophisticated grass-
roots Tories, especially those of the working class, therefore, the pursuit of power was 
imperative to stave of any danger of the party declining or breaking up. 
 
century politics at every opportunity, success in the parliamentary game had often gon
fortune had not always depended on shifts of “public opinion” between two monolithic 
416
Salisbury was well aware that it would be difficult to independently achieve an overall 
parliamentary majority in the House of Commons, but needed to be cautious as to whom he was
perceived to be aligned with. There had, for example been ‘“Lib-Lab” MPs in Parliament from
1874 onwards, but never any “Tory-Labs.”’ 417 . Thus when Gladstone’s government fell, o
vote on a budget issue in June 1885, Salisbury  formed a minority government and, since the 
parliament was nearing the end of its office, began to plan for an election. It is, of course, in the 
arena of inter-party negotiations that high politics comes into its own, and, following the e
of the 1884 Representation of t
ecast to capture the vast majority of Irish seats. That same Act had also greatly increase
tish electorate making the forthcoming election a test of the popularity of the tw
 ‘Home Rule was not a major issue in the campaign becaus
Conservative leaders had wanted it to be,’ but it had been discussed in private, and ‘Salisbu
                                      
415 Bruce Coleman, (1988) op cit. p.207.          
416 Ibid. pp.204-205. 
417 Henry Pelling, (1968) Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain, Macmillan, London, 
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ladstone 
favoure , 
he did h
Using this advantage, and with Salisbury’s knowledge, his ‘Irish minister, Lord Carnavon, was 
cretly discussing a Home Rule pact with Parnell.’ 419 This was a useful ploy to tempt the 
Home rulers into believing that they may possibly exact some concession from the sitting Tory 
govern
Salisbu
 
neither the Irish, the British public, nor the Liberal party should know it, or Salisbury’s 
something worthwhile might be got out of the Conservative party was the most 
 
understandably playing the same game seeking to further their own cause. The Home-Ruler  
Timothy Healy wrote to the Liberal Henry Labouchere explaining their strategy. 
‘If we supported your party next time, the Lords would throw out or render useless any 
not to be friendlier with the Liberals, but they are almost powerless to help us, even if 
 
r  
 
                                                
rejected overtures from Gladstone to enact it.’ 418 Although Salisbury knew that G
d Home Rule, and that he and his party would never seriously countenance such a move
ave the advantage of being in charge of the, albeit minority, incumbent government. 
se
ment. ‘Though there was no formal deal – indeed studied ambiguity was essential for 
ry as he strove to hold his cabinet together and to keep his following in the country 
blissfully ignorant – Parnell advised Irish voters in Britain to support Conservative candidates, a
move reckoned to be significant in some twenty borough constituencies.’ 420 These 
machinations represent high politics at its most effective in terms of electoral power-broking, 
they also illustrate its inherent duplicity 
 ‘Whether Gladstone’s behaviour in being a convinced home-ruler but taking care that 
behaviour as a convinced anti-home ruler in encouraging the Irish to hope that 
reprehensible political manoeuvre is a nice question.’ 421  
It would, however, be misleading to cast the Irish in the part of innocent dupes, they were  
 
 
Bill the Commons passed…If that institution were abolished we should be great fools 
they were sincere, so long as the Lords are all powerful.’ 422 
As the general election drew nearer, Healy made it clear that all other considerations counted fo
 
418 Bruce Coleman, (1988) op cit . p.172. 
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o use discussing it from any other than the expediency standpoint. We have to make 
the best fight we can for a small country, and clearly, if we could put the Tories in and 
hold them dependant on us, that is our game. With the House of Lords behind them and 
423 
 
ice 
he 
of 
 
off 
 
k 
s 
On 16  December 1885 Herbert Gladstone had briefed the Liberal newspaper The Leeds 
Mercury, that his father was sympathetic to the idea of granting some form of home rule to  
Ireland. This information was leaked to the Conservative national newspaper The Standard, 
                                                
nothing. He wrote to Labouchere again 
Its n
our help, they could play ducks and drakes with the Union, were they so minded.’ 
The whole Home Rule issue added extra impetus to Salisbury’s determination to achieve off
in the interest of furthering Conservative principles. ‘If Irish Home rule were to be stopped, t
election needed to be won, and Salisbury ditched the convention by which peers stayed alo
from elections to the Lower House’ 424 by delivering a series of extra-parliamentary election 
speeches. When he repudiated the pact brokered by Carnarvon, his Irish minister resigned, but 
Salisbury was unrepentant, he wrote to Carnarvon ‘I am representing more than anything else
the mandate of the country to resist Home Rule. The country does not understand nuances…The 
point on which we differ has become the paramount question of the day.’ 425 No doubt Salisbury 
was sincere, and believed what he said, but nevertheless he was careful to ensure that news of 
Carnarvon’s resignation did not leak out before the election. Salisbury’s brinkmanship paid 
when after the election the Liberal lead of 86 seats over the Tories was exactly cancelled out by
the 86 seats of the Irish Home rulers who nominally supported the Conservatives. He thus too
office in a hung parliament, hardly a satisfactory state of affairs, but at least the Conservative
retained power and a trump card; Salisbury already knew that the Home Rule issue was to come 
to his aid. 
 
th
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423 Healy to Labouchere 16th October 1885. Ibid. p.129. 
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nt 
 
nd 
not escape the notice of Joseph Chamberlain who wrote that ‘the  
situatio
against  
rive all his former supporters either out of politics or over to the Tories.’ 427 Liberal opposition 
 time 
hich 
These 
o a 
conserv
membe
                                                
which promptly published an exposé on 17th December. This affair became known as the 
“Hawarden Kite” and presented the Conservatives with a golden opportunity to cement their  
currently tenuous grasp on office. Salisbury engineered a Commons defeat for his governme
over an unimportant amendment to an agriculture Bill on 27th  January 1886 and seized the 
opportunity to resign ‘in order that Gladstone’s party, rather than his own, would split over Irish 
Home Rule. (The Carnarvon affair was not revealed for some decades)’ 426 Having had his ha
forced Gladstone duly introduced a Home Rule Bill in March 1886. It failed in June when 93 
Liberals voted with the opposition thereby bringing down the government. Salisbury’s deft 
handling of high politics did 
n is a curious one. There is a majority for the Liberal party, and an immense majority 
 the policy of its leader. Mr. Gladstone’s view appears to be to widen the split, and to
d
to the Bill had been orchestrated by Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Hartington, ‘but at the
the association was for temporary purposes – the defeat of the Home Rule Bill, against w
the two leaders mustered ninety-three “dissident liberals”, and the preservation of the 
parliamentary seats of these followers in the ensuing general election by an agreement with the 
conservatives. It was only after a year that this agreement became a written compact’ 428 
Liberal anti-Home Rulers assumed the title of Liberal Unionists and organized themselves int
separate party: their agreement with the Conservatives was that ‘seats held or contested by 
atives, or by liberal unionists, in the election of 1886 should continue to be held by 
rs of the same party within the Unionist alliance, and that the contesting of other seats or 
 
426 Iain Mclean, Alastair McMillan, Denniss Leech, (2005) op cit. p.467.        
s a cle gives a comprehensive overview of the Alliance 
427 Chamberlain to Harcourt 19th July 1886, quoted in Peter Fraser, (1966) op cit., p.108. 
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dispute
 an 
ele toral pact operated with remarkable smoothness and 316 Tories and 79 Liberals 
supporting either Hartington or Chamberlain were returned on the Unionist side, giving a 
 
It woul
Salisbu ell and his 
 Parnell 
ic 
since it  
 
onservatism. This was the time when Conservatives 
rs.’432 
suggested   
           
s about candidates should be determined by the joint decision of the two heads of the 
parties in the house of commons.’ 429  Salisbury and the Conservatives had thus cemented
alliance, utilising the support of another party to retain their grasp on power. After the defeat of 
Gladstone’s Home rule Bill 
‘the c
majority of about 120 over the Liberals and Home Rulers. Not a Tory majority but 
certainly a Unionist majority.’ 430   
d be wrong to assume that the Conservatives had taken their victory for granted. 
ry had set up a Special Commission to investigate links between Parn
colleagues with those who perpetrated outrages on behalf of Irish nationalism. His ‘intention 
was to connect in the minds of the British public the indelible idea that if not necessarily
himself, then those around him, especially other Irish MPs, condoned and even initiated 
outrages, including murder.’ 431 His opponents ought not to have been surprised at this tact
 represented established Conservative policy and another weapon in their armoury.
‘During the period between the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and the outbreak of the Boer
War in 1899, it was imperial conflicts and disasters that provided the most plentiful 
material for the apostles of popular C
acquired the habit of impugning the patriotism of their political opponents and  
portraying them as, at best, feeble friends of Britain’s enemies, or, at worst, traito
 
This aspect of policy, especially after the “Hawarden Kite”, gave the Tories a chance ‘to 
regroup on a “national” course reminiscent of Disraeli’ 433 In this respect even terminology and 
rhetoric were deemed worthy of close attention. At a special conference of the NUCCA it was 
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431 Andrew Roberts, (1999) op cit. p.452. 
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more so.’ A delegate, Ashmead Bartlett, ‘suggested the advantage of informally 
pointed out, ‘assist many of our patriotic Liberal friends, who would be happy to 
, ‘that this 
would grow into a new usage (although never to be mechanically adopted); for there was 
 
Bartlett
 
which w
 
Initiatives such as this, of course, whether implemented or not, could only enhance their 
governments the firmest base in majority sentiment, though it was a clear majority only 
s 
emphasized the centrality of Home Rule as an issue. When other issues came to the fore 
 
,  
hich he 
 own: 
 
                                              
‘that the names Tory and Conservative, always an important obstacle, might become  
dropping into the usage of Loyalist, Unionist, or, preferably National. This would’ he 
collaborate with the “great National party.” Let it be hoped’ Bartlett urged
obvious need for the electoral support of patriotic Liberal MPs.’ 434 
 went on to form a Patriotic Association which transformed ‘jingoism into a patriotism 
as organized and respectable, and at the service of the Conservative Party.’ 435 
electoral  prospects, but could not disguise weaknesses elsewhere in Conservative policy. 
‘Of all the issues between the parties, Ireland was the one which gave Salisbury’s 
in England, not in Scotland, Wales, or, of course, Ireland itself. Conservative publicist
Conservative support fell away.’ 436 
This was the case in the 1892 general election. The Liberals incorporated the Newcastle 
programme into their manifesto, a detailed schedule of projected reforms; controversial but 
explicit. Salisbury could only respond with an Address to the Electors of the United Kingdom
‘but his purpose was less to set out a detailed programme than to define the issues on w
thought the election would turn.’ 437 He knew that he could not compete with the Radicals on  
their own terms, and was willing to concede their own ground to them, and stand upon his
even at the expense of losing votes and disappointing his Liberal Unionist allies. 
‘Salisbury’s electoral pessimism (since 1887 the opposition had been making 4 or 5 
gains a year in by-elections and they made 5 in 1891) was strengthened by his belief that 
the democratized “socialist” legislation of his second administration had fatally alienated
old-fashioned supporters…Consequently rather than fighting on the legislative 
   
434 Ibid. p.203. Taken from the minutes of The NUCCA Special Conference, Westminster Palace Hotel, 
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kept as far as possible free of these “doctrinaire issues to fight, in 1892 as in 1886, on the 
  
 270, the 
ith 
were 
n 
uture attempts to enact Home Rule 
would 
democr s, simply 
‘excusi
arbitrar
Salisbu succeeded. 
0  
Salisbury’s apparent complacency was vindicated when in ‘1893 the Upper House dismissed 
Gladstone’s second Home Rule Bill by 419 votes to 41, even though the Liberals had won a 
majority at the recent General Election with this at the top of their programme.’ 441  
Unfortunately for the Liberals, however, ‘in the election of 1892…the swing towards the  
Liberals merely reduced the Unionist majority over the Liberals from about 200 to about forty, 
and left Gladstone and Rosebery completely dependent upon Irish support..’ 442 The Irish 
achievements of his administration or on Chamberlain’s ideas for old-age pensions, he
issue of Home Rule.’ 438 
The Conservatives lost narrowly in 1892, Conservatives won 268 seats, the Liberals
Irish Nationalists 81, and the Liberal Unionists 47. Gladstone thus formed a government w
the support of the Irish Nationalists. Salisbury appeared unconcerned, it had been difficult to 
assert conservative principles whilst relying on the support of the Liberal Unionists, who 
liberal in most things other than Home Rule. He confided to his nephew shortly before the 
election of ‘his strong conviction that I can get better terms for property out of office than I ca
in office.’ 439 He was also secure in the knowledge that f
be rejected by the Conservative majority in the House of Lords. His distrust of 
acy meant that such an attitude posed no problems for his conservative principle
ng some of the anomalous characteristics of the Upper House by pointing out the 
iness and folly of treating the Lower as a steadily reliable index of public opinion. 
ry drew the conclusion that “it is the English Constitution as a whole, that has 
The illogical provisions of one part of it have balanced the illogical provisions of another.”’44
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cure their goal unless it received support from the Tories in 
the Hou
time. M
d Home Rule Bill his main ostensible 
reason for remaining in public life had vanished…Finally, the step which he had 
campaign against the House of Lords – found little or no favour with the mass of his 
 
ady 
 
 
He sen
t to 
e effect that may 
be produced upon public opinion by any amendments which lead to the loss of those 
although such amendment may be in itself perfectly defensible, the electors are likely to 
ch they have been reached…I 
ink that amendments made by the House of Lords in any Bill now before it should, if 
                
realization that they would never se
se of Lords meant that the Liberal administration was effectively living on borrowed 
ost of the Liberal party acknowledged this and  
‘When Mr. Gladstone resigned on 3rd March 1894, a number of factors contributed, in 
unequal degrees to this event. First, the gradual “closing of the doors of the senses” of 
which he had complained since 1892, had latterly proceeded apace. This tragic 
development counselled and must in all probability soon compel retirement. Secondly, 
with the rejection by …[the] Peers of the secon
proposed as affording the sole exit from this impasse – an immediate dissolution and 
colleagues. He hoisted the signal. They put the telescope to the blind eye.’ 443 
The Conservative fear of Home Rule had, for the time being, been alleviated, but “the signal 
Gladstone had hoisted” in his last speech to the House of Commons on 1st March 1894 still 
required attention. He had said ‘the question is whether the work of the House of Lords is not 
merely to modify, but to annihilate the whole work of the House of Commons.’ 444 As alre
noted Salisbury himself appeared ambivalent to the implications of such a challenge, but not so 
his allies the Liberal Unionists. Chamberlain was concerned that if the Tory Peers emasculated
every piece of Liberal legislation that came before them, even partisan Conservatives would
begin to reconsider the constitutional position of the House of Lords. 
t Salisbury a memorandum 
‘In considering the action to be taken by the House of Lords in regard to the Bills sen
it by the House of Commons it is of course necessary to bear in mind th
Bills. The Gladstonians will naturally throw the whole upon the House of Lords, and 
look at general results rather than at the methods by whi
th
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443 J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, (1932 Two 
444 Quoted in Michael Bentley, (1984) op cit., p.282
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r 
 
Salisbu
at The Working Class Dwellings Act of 1885, County Councils, The Technical Instruction Act 
of 1889, The Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890, The Public Health Act of 1890, free 
elementary education, and The Shop Hours Act of 1892, added up to a significant programme of 
social reform, which would bear comparison with anything the Liberals were currently planning.  
‘Although Salisbury generally did not like change and thought it usually for the worse, if 
established interests were not too badly damaged he was willing to countenance it for a specific, 
verifiable public benefit and also occasionally of course, for electoral advantage.’   Such an 
attitude is completely in accordance with Conservative ideology as identified in this study; 
however, others within his party were less enlightened and remained stubbornly reactionary.  
‘He realised that there could be no finality in politics…There are several passages in 
e 
condemns them, not because he always disagrees with their views, but because their 
 rather than from reason.’ 447 
 
hamberlain, unsurprisingly, pushed for a positive and extensive programme of social reform,  
 
 
either party. The working classes are not divided on party lines as absolutely as the 
bers do not actually 
make up their minds till the time of election comes around and are then very much 
 a 
 
This m
           
possible have considerable popular support behind them, or should be of such a characte
as not to endanger the passing of the Bill.’ 445  
ry was prepared to acquiesce, up to a point, and Chamberlain was at pains to point out 
th
446
which he turns roundly on the squires, the specimens of “the political dado.” H
opposition to change comes from instinct
C
arguing (and incidentally showing remarkable prescience) that 
‘elections are carried by the shifting vote of a minority, who do not strictly belong to 
middle and upper classes, and my experience is that very large num
influenced by the issues presented to them at the moment. Gladstonianism has been
failure. If Unionism or Conservatism gives them the promise of better results they will 
come over in large numbers and turn a small into a sweeping majority.’ 448 
ay well have been sound advice, but the Liberal Unionists were very much the junior  
                                      
445 Chamberlain to Salisbury, 25th January 1894, quoted in, J. L. Garvin, (1933 Two Vols.) The Life
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ith the Conservatives, and Salisbury was unlikely to compromise his 
s 
ere 
alist 
cross the floor [of the House of  
Commons]’ 451 whilst preserving its integrity.  
 
Salisbury knew that the Liberals were disunited, and that the electoral pact with the Liberal  
Unionists meant that the Conservatives could concentrate their energies upon key seats, thereby  
putting pressure upon the Liberals’ organization and finances. Moreover, 
‘Conservatives in 1895 would continue to promote the “social amelioration of the 
ld be constituted 
as “revolutionary changes.” The Liberals crippled themselves from the outset by divided 
h  
           
 
                                                
partner in their alliance w
principles to that extent and at the same time alienate old-style Tories. 449Added to this, of 
course, was the fact that although acting in tandem with the Conservatives, Chamberlain and hi
party had always sat on the opposite side of the House of Commons, the same side as that wh
the working men’s representatives sat. Socialism was a growing force and although ‘the soci
threat was potential rather than real.. none the less it was a bogy which frightened many 
capitalists over to the right.’ 450 It has also been suggested that ‘the socialist threat to property 
that emerged in the course of the Liberal ministries of 1892-1895 provided just the tide of 
opinion that Chamberlain wanted to carry his party a
  
people” but would countenance no “ambitious programmes” which cou
aims. Rosebery wanted the House of Lords issue to the fore. Harcourt pushed the 
Newcastle Programme… Morley insisted on sticking to the moral imperative of Iris
 Home Rule.” 452 
 
he 
54. 
lowed the Unionists, and specifically Salisbury, to dictate the issues 
 
) Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition Since 
867, Macmillan, London, p.86. 
449 It has been argued that ‘the measure of success of “Disraelian” social reform [was]…paradoxically, t
absence of social policy as a central theme before 1900 and the continued primacy of institutional 
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ndeed 
It has been noted that ‘the political salience of imperialism was likely to be greater in periods 
like the late Victorian era when the rival party failed to develop a credible and coherent 
alternative based on domestic, reform politics.’  Approaching the 1900 general election, the  
Liberal Party had indeed begun to regroup, but the Conservative-Unionist alliance, and Joseph 
Chamberlain especially, somewhat cynically, exploited the nation’s patriotism over the Boer 
War in South Africa. Lloyd-George told the House of Commons in July 1900 
‘I venture to say that there is no worse eye-glass than the ballot box; and it is through 
facts…The Rt. Hon. Gentleman is so essentially a political manager that he is always 
that he has made up his mind that if the war cannot be a military success, at any rate he 
 
e 
 commanded nationwide attention. Salisbury did not speak at all, 
                                              
The result was a landslide victory. The Conservative-Unionist alliance gained a majority of 234 
over the Liberals, thereby dispensing with any need to placate the Irish Nationalists, or i
the Liberal Unionists. Chamberlains influence had declined ‘making it easy for Salisbury to 
resist the coherent programme of social reform which he had sketched out to direct the new 
government’s strategy,’ 453 Salisbury had reason to believe that he could look forward to a 
relatively untroubled period of office, but within a couple of years ‘after the 1897 Jubilee what 
appeared, superficially, to be a stable national consensus based on patriotism and imperialism 
soon showed itself to be a  brittle phenomenon.’ 454  
 
455
that glass that the Rt. Hon. Gentleman [Chamberlain] has been looking at all these 
electioneering. He is a kind of political agent, and so permeated is he with that instinct 
will make it an electioneering success.’ 456 
Nevertheless the Conservative-Unionist alliance won the election comfortably; and much of th
credit for that victory must go to Chamberlain; his speeches around his West Midlands 
stronghold ‘every other day
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dication that politics in general, and the Conservatives in particular, were undergoing a fin de 
siècle transformation. The ideology which had served the party so well in informing their policy 
decisions and in designing their appeal to the voters, was beginning to look out of date. More 
importantly, perhaps, their Liberal Unionist allies did not necessarily subscribe to the core 
concepts of that ideology. 
 
. He was 
anging  
                                                
contenting himself with a dispirited manifesto. Balfour spoke little and weakly. However unfair
it was to speak of “Joe’s War,” this was certainly his general election.’ 457 The Liberal party 
were understandably saddened by their defeat, but infuriated by the way the campaign had
conducted. Campbell-Bannerman wrote that ‘the lowering of the standard of public life is a far 
worse evil, because more permanent, than toryism, jingoism, or any other heresy; panem et 
circenses; money spent in the country, flags to wave, bluster to shout for – that is the object: let 
right and freedom go and be hanged! The commencement de siècle morals, apparently.’ 45
Campbell-Bannerman’s complaint ought not to be dismissed simply as “sour grapes” for this 
was to be the last hurrah for the old-style imperialist appeal. It has been argued that ‘the appea
ire changed over time. With the ending of the Boer War in 1902 the issue ceased to hold  
tage in British politics.’ 459 This may well be an exaggeration, but when Tariff Reform 
e Conservative party, “the appeal of empire” became a more problematic issue, and 
 a less potent weapon for the Tories to exploit. Furthermore this was not to be the only 
in
In 1902 Lord Salisbury, ageing and worn out retired, he was to die the following year
succeeded as prime minister by his nephew Arthur Balfour, who had to preside over a ch
and volatile new political environment. ‘A good deal of the political history of the later   
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e 
f 
isunited; and secondly because the working classes were more concerned with bread and butter 
issues which could be settled locally.  The issue of Tariff Reform was to reverse this trend. 
‘The tariff reformer appealed to working class support on the grounds that the condition 
required tariff protection against foreign rivals, and that only imperial preference could  
o 
the welfare of the working class. Since to adopt a system of preference would entail a 
compensation in the form of more work at better rates of pay, with a promise of old age 
 
 
e. 
           
nineteenth century can be told in terms of the adoption and adaptation of the institutions of th
politics of opinion to serve the ends of the politics of influence.’ 460 But times were changing;   
the Conservatives had been dominant in the late nineteenth century because firstly, the mass o
voters disliked Conservatives less than they disliked Liberals who they saw as weak and 
d
461
of the working man was dependent upon the prosperity of British Industry, that this 
prevent the disintegration of the empire, whose unity, strength, and markets were vital t
sacrifice in terms of higher food prices for the working man, the latter was to be offered 
pensions to be financed from tariff revenues.’ 462 
The main proponent of  Tariff Reform was Liberal Unionist  leader Joseph Chamberlain, 
Colonial Secretary in the Cabinet. After failing to get tariff reform adopted as official 
Conservative- Unionist policy, in 1903 he resigned his cabinet post and embarked upon a three
year campaign for British Imperial trade preference. Chamberlain’s decision must not be taken 
solely as a manifestation of his personal ambition. He was not a Tory, for him ‘change was not 
an object of distrust, to him there was nothing repulsive in a period of acute political 
controversy.’ 463 Such an attitude is, of course, anathema to Conservative ideology and 
Chamberlain’s strategy opened up deep fault-lines in the Conservative-Unionist allianc
Balfour was acutely aware that ‘though the vote of the working man might put the party into 
power, the means to attract it could easily alienate the wealthy man whose financial assistance 
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Leading his hopelessly divided party into the 1906 general election, against a Liberal party 
united under the banner of free-trade, Balfour’s Conservatives were decimated. ‘The massive 
electoral defeat suffered by the Conservatives in 1906 brought the crisis to a head. The Tariff 
Reform League emerged from the election in an overwhelmingly strong position in the party, 
even though their policies appeared to have been rejected by the electorate.’ 466  Moreover, there 
was no
dissens
were in m in the party was strong, 
t constituency associations and the National Union supported 
it, altho  
reform.
formula
embarr blems after 1907, 
was crucial.’ 464 Added to this was a fear that the working class ‘was always concerned about 
unemployment and higher prices and often expressed this in its political behaviour.’ 465  
 
 pretence of consensus, ‘tariff reform was a policy to which, because of internal 
ions the party was never able to fully commit itself.’ 467 But Chamberlain’s followers 
 the ascendancy  and consequently support for tariff refor
Balfour was forced to make concessions and point party policy in that direction. Balfour was 
losing control of his party in opposition. ‘The policy of tariff reform had been conceded by the 
party leadership not because mos
ugh this was a factor, but because most Conservative MPs had been converted to tariff
’ 468 It became clear that the leader of the party no longer enjoyed the sole right to 
te policy alone, and no longer enjoyed the full backing of his party. ‘Balfour’s 
assing defeats at the 1904 and 1905 [Party] Conferences, and his pro
sprang largely from his reluctance to express consistently any clear conviction on the issue of  
paramount concern to the party [tariff reform]’ 469  If Balfour was losing touch with his party, it 
is equally evident that his party was losing touch with the electorate. By the 1900s ‘as class 
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mastery over the country has shown more and more clearly that they have not kept up 
time…the absolute necessity for the recognized leadership of men who understand the 
difference between the work of guiding the country and the ignoble function of 
 
 
a 
that had now passed. His most famous pronouncement on the tactics of the new 
nionist 
Party should still control, whether in power or in opposition, the destinies of this great 
 
When t
ranks a m that Balfour patently lacked, unfortunately he 
 the 
                                                
became the primary issue in political mobilization, the Conservative Party’s loss of work
class support seemed destined to accelerate to the point where the party would be reduced to a 
permanent minority.’ 470  From his beleaguered position Balfour appeared to have no answer to 
the difficulties which beset his party. A contemporary commentator, a former Irish Nationali
MP, noted that 
‘Every effort the Conservatives in office have lately been making to hold their full 
with movements of thought and are not able to understand the true requirements of the 
competing for power by imitation and compromise.’ 471 
Balfour may, or may not, have been aware of his own limitations, and of the damage that the 
reactionary element within his party could wreak upon their electoral prospects. What appears
indisputable is that although he  
‘may have been conscious of the “New Age”, his approach to it looked back to an er
opposition remains the declaration he made to a Unionist rally that “the great U
Empire”. In other words the obstructive powers of the overwhelmingly Conservative 
hereditary peerage of the upper chamber would form the basis of Balfour’s response to 
the radical quasi-socialist excesses of the Liberal government..’ 472 
he Unionists entered opposition it appeared that they may indeed have had within their 
an who could provide the popular appeal 
was not a Conservative, and did not feel bound by conservative ideology. Even so ‘whatever
merits or drawbacks of his fiscal policies, Joseph Chamberlain had at least made the crucial 
jump from aristocratic paternalism to popular politics, so necessary after the systematic 
widening of the franchise in the late nineteenth century…but Chamberlain’s personal ambition 
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 of 
There had been many signs that the Tories were heading for disaster prior to the election which 
Balfour either chose to ignore, or considered unimportant. ‘Chamberlain had been anxious that 
the representative associations of the party should be reviewed, especially with the object of  
popularising them and of securing the involvement of the working classes.’  Intriguingly, 
however, Chamberlain himself had chosen to disregard an early experimental opinion poll 
which indicated that his own fiscal policy was not securing working class support. In 
 
  
aled that one fifth of the persons interviewed had never heard of the 
scheme at all; but the rest were practically unanimous in their hostility to Tariff Reform.’ 
 
e 
76 
 
was permanently quelled by the crippling stroke which paralysed his body after the election.’473 
This was a massive blow to the Conservative Unionist alliance, having lost the sure, steady
leadership and gravitas of Lord Salisbury, they now effectively lost the charisma and impact
Joseph Chamberlain, who even in the election debacle of 1906, had displayed that he was 
almost unique among leading Unionists regarding his popularity among the working classes.  
 
474
‘July –August 1903 The Daily Mail sent out “walking inquirers” to various parts of the 
Kingdom with instructions to find out by questioning individual members of the public
exactly what the country’s attitude to Chamberlain’s movement was. The first report 
based upon 2,000 interviews about Chamberlain was published in the Daily Mail of 29th
August 1903. It reve
475 
Around the same time, Winston Churchill wrote to the Duke of Devonshire (formerly Lord 
Hartington) joint leader of the Liberal Unionists, that ‘we are on the eve of a gigantic political 
landslide. I don’t think Balfour and those about him realise at all how far the degeneration of th
forces of Unionism has proceeded, and how tremendous the counter current is going to be.’ 4
Balfour now had to deal with that “counter current”, a situation exacerbated by his own declared
policy that the House of Lords would be used as a Conservative veto to block any Radical 
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I am 
ra.’ 477 Given that Balfour knew how 
critical
apparen
moving
 
a single class who feared the implications of Chamberlain’s intrusion with his concepts 
party, the landholding interests remained strong and it was a striking fact that throughout 
 
manual worker.’ 478 
Furthermore, this situation was compounded by the stranglehold that these “men of a single 
class” had maintained over the party organization. ‘At the inaugural meeting of the National 
Union, Mr. (later Sir) John Gorst took the chair. Subsequently no commoner held the office of 
Preside
5 Marq
within 
d for 
change from the now powerful Liberals. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman used his last platform 
           
Liberal legislation. He was, in fact, fully aware that the political landscape and climate was 
undergoing radical change. He wrote to Lord Knollys that ‘we are face to face (no doubt in a 
milder form) with the Socialist difficulties which loom so large on the Continent. Unless 
greatly mistaken, the Election of 1906 inaugurates a new e
 the situation was, even with the benefit of hindsight it is difficult to comprehend the 
t naivety of his approach. His networks in the world of high politics and information 
 up from the grass roots of the party must surely have set alarm bells ringing, that his 
party, finding itself in a hole, ought to stop digging. In his defence, however, he was severely 
constrained by the configuration of his party. 
‘The trouble was that the existing power structure of the party was dominated by men of
of “democracy”. Although business interests were gaining ground within the Unionist 
the first decade of the twentieth century the parliamentary party contained not a single
 
nt before 1914. The 34 who were elected president from 1868-1914 included 5 Dukes,  
uises, 15 Earls, and 9 Barons.’ 479 Thus it may be asserted that the power of reaction  
the party remained unassailable. This is a compelling argument, but even if valid, it still 
illustrates that the Conservative Party had strayed from one of its core principles i.e. that if 
change was inevitable and had popular support, then it must be managed in Conservative 
interests rather than confronted. Confrontation only provoked a more vehement deman
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has been said, “the House of Lords for over 100 years has never contributed one iota to 
eal; and 
during that time it has protected every abuse and sheltered every privilege.” He [then] 
 
 
ert 
 was 
secured a greatly increased total of votes over their 1900 figure – 2,463,606 in 1906 as 
than 
doubled, rising from 1,520,285 in 1900 to 3,111,929 in 1906. Such a shift of voting in an 
ore 
fundamental agencies than party appeals and programmes; the mass electorate had found its 
r leader Ramsay MacDonald for the mutual 
withdra . 
The arr
                                                
speech at Bristol on 13th November 1907 to attack the House of Lords, and highlight the 
differences dividing the Conservative-Unionist alliance.  
‘Do not take my word for it’ he said, ‘I will give you the words of another. This is what  
popular liberties or popular freedom, or done anything to advance the common w
pleased his audience by telling them that these were the words of Joseph Chamberlain.’ 480
The torch was duly taken up by Campbell-Bannerman’s successor as prime minister, Herb
Asquith. In a speech delivered at the National Liberal Club on 11th December 1908 he invited 
‘the Liberal Party…to treat the veto of the House of Lords as the dominating issue in politics – 
the dominating issue, because in the long run it overshadows and absorbs every other.’ 481 An 
influential faction in the realm of high politics was obviously calling for change and this call 
was seemingly echoed at grass roots level. Although the general election of January 1906
not primarily a contest over Tariff Reform or reform of the House of Lords, the Unionists 
nevertheless were routed,  
‘obtaining only a quarter of the parliamentary seats…Thus while the Unionists actually 
against 1,676,020 in 1900 – the combined total of Liberal and Labour votes was more 
electorate which had only increased 7½ per cent in these years marks the operation of m
feet.’ 482 
 
It may be added that the Liberals had taken steps to ensure that the radical vote was not split to 
the advantage of the Conservatives. In 1903 Herbert Gladstone, Liberal Chief Whip, had 
negotiated a secret agreement with Labou
wal of one out of two candidates in two member seats, of which there were still many
angement operated well in the election of 1906, leading to the election of 29 LRC 
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(Labou free run of 
their ow
950s.483 Balfour and his colleagues failed to see the warning signs that they were losing touch 
both within their own party, and with the force of popular opinion. Their twin policies of  
supporting Tariff Reform, and using the House of Lords as a Conservative Party veto were to 
combine one with another to devastating effect. That said, the party organization made attempts 
to reconcile the traditional Conservative abhorrence of state intervention with growing demands 
for social reform. The National Union Conference in November 1907 passed a resolution that 
‘the socialist movement can be met by the insistence upon the constructive policy of the 
Unionist Party and especially upon fiscal reform, as the only practical means of carrying out a 
scheme for the provision of pensions for the aged deserving poor and other social reforms.’  
The  fiscal policy referred to was, of course, Tariff Reform. This can be seen as the beginnings 
of ‘the Conservative approach which became dominant in the Edwardian period [which] was 
explicitly collectivist. In contrast to their Libertarian colleagues, Conservative collectivists did 
not see extensions of the state as either actually or potentially Socialist, but insisted that state-
cial 
tive 
reconsider trade questions as they affected working men. The basic thrust of the tariff 
 
than offset by the greater prosperity of the economy as a whole. Relief from 
                                                
r Representative  Committee) candidates, but also leaving the Liberals with a 
n in many other constituencies. This arrangement was to remain secret until the 
1
484
sponsored social reform was the best antidote to socialism.’ 485 How that “state-sponsored so
reform” was to be financed became an important political issue, within which the Conserva
leadership had little room to manoeuvre.  
‘Tariff reform was displayed as evidence that Conservatives were finally willing to  
message was disarmingly simple: that any increases in the cost of living would be more
unemployment or underemployment would be swift and dramatic, and even workers 
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nder newly 
adjusted “fairer” terms of trade..’  
If this message was to be successfully transmitted to the working class electorate then a huge 
effort n
increas that number in 
906: the circulation of Monthly Notes on Tariff Reform doubled to 120,500, and 38,500 copies 
of the League’s updated notes for speakers were distributed.’  This may have contributed to 
why ‘by late 1908, the Unionist Free Traders had virtually been reduced to a negligible 
force.’   The position then became consolidated. ‘The Tariff Reform League had mobilized the 
full weight of its considerable forces by providing speakers for more than 15,000 meetings in 
1909-1910 and disseminating more than 80,000,000 leaflets and pamphlets during the same 
period.’  Imperial issues in general still remained central to the Conservatives; and added to 
this  Tariff Reform became increasingly attractive; promising, as it did, to spread increased 
taxation across the whole of society, not just the better-off classes.  
 
icy of 
 
to 
ff reform as a revenue-raising alternative to rampant socialism.’ 490 This argument, 
owever, was double-edged since, the budget measures undermined Chamberlain’s position that 
                                                
who were regularly employed might see wages rise as their firms prospered u
486
 
eeded to be made. To this end ‘the distribution of [Tariff Reform] League propaganda 
ed dramatically: over 6,000,000 leaflets in 1908 compared to one-fourth 
1
487
488
489
Alongside this campaign the Conservatives were faced with a continuing Liberal pol
negating the veto power of the House of Lords. The two issues began to converge. ‘As the 
economic position worsened around 1908, the case for tariff reform became apparently stronger
and when the Liberals produced their apparently vote-winning budget of 1909 it was possible 
present tari
h
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class, approximately 10 per cent of the population; the rest by the other 90 per cent of the 
 
working men were well aware that “the world’s increasing riches were  
 
 
lly 
o 
Balfour and his colleagues had been hopelessly out-manoeuvred, both on fiscal policy and the 
issue of the House of Lords. ‘Lloyd George’s peoples budget of 1909 forced the hand of the 
           
tariffs were the only means of financing reform. The Conservative predicament was 
compounded by the fact that under the plans of the 1909 budget  
‘approximately 75 per cent of the tax increase would be paid by the income-tax-paying 
population. In an era in which real wages were stationary if not declining and in which
passing them by” a budget so conceived was likely to arouse their support.’ 491   
The battle lines had been drawn, on the Liberal’s terms and ‘a  party led by Balfour, with 
Chamberlain on the side lines, could not compete with the crusading spirit with which Lloyd-
George presented his budget as a “a war budget” to “wage implacable war against poverty and
squalidness’” 492 Using the rhetoric of war against the Unionists was, perhaps, ironic given the 
furore that had surrounded the Conservative tactics in the 1900 “Khaki” election. Another 
problem for the Conservatives was that the proposed Liberal measures of raising revenue to 
finance social reform was inherently more attractive to the majority of the electorate than tariff 
reform, which would have the effect of placing a large burden on the working classes, especia
through the inevitable levying of food taxes. Even though Labour unrest was primarily due t
the fact that real wages were not keeping place with the cost of living increases, the 
Conservatives could not exploit this, ‘Liberals were still able to taunt the Unionists with the cry 
that the latter intended still further to increase the price of food. Many recognized that the folly 
of running food taxes against land taxes could have disastrous repercussions for the Unionist 
party’ 493  
 
                                      
491 Neil Blewett (1972) op cit., p.70. 
492 D. J. Dutton, (1981) op cit., p.876.  
493 Ibid. p.874. 
 
 131
 : 
as 
ght 
 
get, and it 
 were 
he 
inst it. 
fore, to the interests of the opposition to let it pass.’ 497 Of course, once the Lords 
had rej
1910 w   
but the rity. 
                                                
Conservative dominated House of Lords to flout constitutional convention.’ 494 The budget was 
passed in the House of Commons on November 3rd 1909 by a large majority, amid rumours that 
the Lords would reject it, which they comprehensively did. ‘Both the size of the total vote [350
75] and the majority for rejection had been surpassed only once in the previous one hundred 
years. [the Home Rule Bill of 1893 was defeated on a second reading by 419 : 41] The vote w
almost entirely along party lines. Only four Liberals voted or paired against the Bill, only ei
Unionists supported it.’ 495  Balfour had led his party into a confrontation it could never win, but
there is evidence that confrontation was neither inevitable, nor the best course of action. ‘The 
Liberal Cabinet, as a whole, refused to believe that the Lords would throw out the Bud
was steadily set about through the summer of 1909 that Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne
in favour of passing it. But Mr. Lloyd George persisted in believing the contrary. “they will 
throw it out all right” he would always say cheerfully enough: and the only shadow that would 
pass over his face would come when some one would half convince him to the contrary.’ 496 
This was the game of high politics being played for the highest stakes. Winston Churchill’s 
reading of the situation is worthy of note; ‘that his hope and prayer was that they would throw 
out the Bill, as it would save the government from certain defeat if the election were put off. T
Budget once it became law, would be immensely unpopular, and everybody would be aga
It was, there
ected the budget a dissolution was inevitable. The ensuing general election of January  
as deemed inconclusive, and the following election of December 1910 was equally close,
 Liberals, with the support of Labour and the Irish Nationalists had a working majo
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departu ple, ‘in 
1910 fo s 
in form  actuality a product of the nineteenth century.’  Balfour himself was also tied to 
g class 
 
he    
genuine desire and capacity to direct and inspire his troops, but by then the party was 
st of 
the advantages gained by the change of leadership…although the period before the war 
recovery…The party had little that was positive to offer.’  
The details of the constitutional crises are not relevant in the present context of this study 498 b
the budget was passed, support for Tariff Reform began to ebb away, and the Parliament A
1911 largely nullified the built-in advantage of the Conservative Party in the House of L
Leo Maxse voiced the opinion of many Conservatives, ‘it is unpardonable, Balfour must go, or 
Tariff Reform will go – that is the alternative.’ 499 As alluded to earlier Balfour had endure
much criticism and embarrassment at Party Conferences ‘the precise extent to which these 
machinations prompted Balfour’s resignation on the eve of the 1911 Conference is unclear
it is at least arguable that Balfour, already worn down by years of internecine squabbling, was
helped to reach his decision by the prospect of another troubled conference for which
ons of censure continued to come in from the associations.’ 500 In many ways the 
re of Balfour as party leader coincided with a change in British politics. For exam
r the last time the general elections were conditioned by an electoral system which wa
 and 501
the nineteenth-century, he ‘thought electorally in 1885, or pre 1885 terms of old issues, old 
connections, old communities. Regional agents reported with alarm on the loss of workin
support.’ 502 Their concerns, however, fell upon deaf ears, Balfour and Lansdowne could not
adjust to changing circumstances and led their party down blind alleys and into dead end 
policies.     
‘In Bonar Law, of course, the Conservatives would find after 1911 a leader with t
engaged in policies and strategies, the sterility of which was sufficient to nullify mo
was one of visible recovery for Unionism, it was by no means an entirely healthy 
503
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eadership lost its 
ost skilful manipulator of high politics, those who succeeded him were far less adept at 
his 
h 1906, 
. 
ri itime 
th y 
(original emphasis) 506  There was, however, one association, ironically founded by rivals to Lord  
Salisbu e 
           
It is evident that with the passing of Lord Salisbury the Conservative party l
m
managing the subtleties and nuances inherent in the system. It is also evident that these 
shortcomings had a profoundly detrimental effect upon Conservative electoral fortunes, but t
cannot have been the only reason for the failure of the party machine. It has already been 
accepted t at better organization alone would not have avoided defeat in either 1880 or 
but equally it has been noted that defeat was surely made more acute by a degeneration in 
organizational efficiency. Party organization has been dealt with elsewhere in this study, but 
extra-party organizations, many with an imperial dimension, also had a part to play
‘The 1880s marked the beginnings of a significant upsurge in pressure groups with a 
Conservative complexion such as the Fair Trade League (1881) and the Imperial 
Federation League (1884)…The launch of the Navy League in 1895 opened the 
floodgates to a string of associations: The National Service League in 1902, The Tariff 
Reform League in 1903, The Union Defence League in 1907, The Impe al Mar
League and The Anti-Socialist Union in 1908, and the Budget Protest League in 1909.’ 
504 
 
Groups such as these often proved to be useful adjuncts to the party machine, but because e
all had specific well-defined goals, often they provoked disagreements and proved to be 
divisive. Collectively these pressure groups ‘constituted a nationalist agitation. They would 
probably have adopted the terms patriotic and patriotism to describe their chosen means and 
eventual object.’ (original emphasis) 505  Unfortunately, because of the extremist nature of their 
rhetoric they often alienated as many people as they attracted, ‘clearly tariff reform as a 
euphemism for protection was no more successful than national service for conscription.’ 
ry, that successfully made a major contribution to Conservative unity, and promoted th
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party’s interests on a very wide scale indeed. It was The Primrose League.  
 
The Primrose League was founded in 1883 by Henry Drummond Woolf and Lord Randolph 
Churchill, with the declared object ‘to rectify the failure of Conservative and Constitutional 
Associations to suit the popular taste or to succeed in joining all classes together for political 
objects.’ 507  The League was hugely successful attracting hundreds of thousands to its 
nationally organized “habitations”. Its non-discriminatory basis made it an attractive moveme
for many who had little or no political conviction, if only to engage in its many social activities
‘Woolf was instrumental in opening the League to women and to Christians of all 
denominations including Catholics, groups that had hitherto not been much in evidence in the 
ranks of organized Conservatism.’ 508 So wide was the net spread that eventually the Primrose 
League ‘was for everyone except Atheists and enemies of the British Empire.’ 509 One 
contemporary described the League as an attempt to mould ‘into a compact body the more 
active and energetic portions of the newer and more democratic school of Conservatism.’ 
The League conferred titles such as “knights” and “dames” upon its members, and lean
heavily upon ceremony and symbolism, albeit in a somewhat light-hearted manner; it promoted 
traditional values, and was staunchly patriotic. In fact ‘the League’s strength as a Conservative
organization lay in its refusal to apologise for being traditional.’ 511  Social gatherings were 
organized for practically any justification that had a national or patriotic connection, however 
tenuous ‘for however trivial the functions might be, they were considered justified if they
                                                 
507 th
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h, (1985) op cit. p.24.     
 Grand Council Minutes 15  December 1883, including ‘A Short History of the Formation of The 
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expose  
League  
a new a
eagues effective contribution to the modernization of right wing politics in Britain. In the 
tic 
rather 
 
 
resonance in Lord Salisbury’s conviction that the Conservative Party was, in the final 
analysi
to ward
electora
 
                                              
d large numbers of people to a political message, albeit briefly and superficially.’ 512 The
, then, consisted of an alluring and compelling amalgam of old and traditional values, in
nd vibrant organization. Criticism of its quaintness, therefore, ‘should not obscure the 
L
context of late Victorian Britain its antiquarianism was scarcely unusual, nor was it necessarily a 
defeat for a Conservative movement at a time when the age of improvement was patently 
faltering.’ 513  The 1884 Representation of the People Act had given the vote to a great many 
people who, because of their comparatively lowly status, had little connection with politics or 
political parties, and who had no entrenched, class-based, political allegiance. It would be 
misguided, therefore, to underestimate ‘the significance of the Primrose League as a systema
attempt to make political loyalty an integral part of the lives of a large number of people 
than the private language of an elite.’ 514 The League spoke to and appealed directly to the 
people, it avoided dogma, and did not seek to promote any specific political policies; however,
this non-doctrinaire approach only served to increase its value to the Conservative cause. 
‘Ultimately the political significance of the League’s brand of patriotism-imperialism-
monarchism lay in its sheer woolly imprecision. By avoiding well-defined political options such
as imperial federation or compulsory military training it maximized the popular appeal.’ 515 It 
also found 
s, a minority party which always needed support from beyond the party faithful if it was 
 off criticism of its aristocratic connections, and actually achieve office when the 
te was predominately working class. The League had no such problems  
‘Opponents found it difficult to identify a target which might safely be attacked. This 
   
512 Martin Pugh, (1985) op cit.p.32. 
513 Ibid. p.18. 
514 Ibid. p.42.      
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se that 
 conservatism which 
ervaded both the Liberal Party and the emerging labour movements…when questions 
ld 
y 
 
 
lmost immediately after its formation the Primrose League came to the aid of the Conservative 
Party to make up a deficiency in its party machinery which no other organization could have 
provided. The Representation of the People Act 1884, and the Redistribution of Seats Act 1885, 
in themselves presented all the political parties with huge problems; but the Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Act of 1883 impacted especially upon the Tories. Overtly buying votes, either directly 
or by other enticements, was unrealistic and considered inappropriate even before 1883; but 
more importantly, the Act considerably reduced the number of party workers who could 
legitimately be paid for their efforts. The superior financial resources of the Conservatives had 
lways been an advantage at election times, but that advantage was now nullified and leading 
Conservatives were concerned that the Liberals would now have the upper hand. The Liberal 
party could call for volunteers from the Non-Conformist denominations and from trade unions, 
but the Conservatives had no comparable organizations, and the party leadership knew that the 
problem must be addressed quickly. The Primrose League was tailor-made to step in and fill the 
breaches.  
‘First and fundamentally, it not only aimed to recruit membership very widely, but also 
d it 
incorporated non-electors. Third, its membership entailed formal enrolment with a 
its activities were continuous and regular, not determined by the pattern of parliamentary 
 
the ruling elite. And finally, it moved beyond the political sphere into the social life of its 
members,’ 517 
 
           
was simply because the sentiments to which the League gave voice met a respon
extended far beyond official Conservatism and found an echo in the
p
of national interest assumed prime significance in the public mind, Conservatives cou
draw deeply upon a fund of bipartisan sentiment across the lines of class and party.’ (m
emphasis) 516  
A
a
succeeded to a large extent in erasing the boundaries of sex, class, and age. Secon
signed pledge and payment. Fourth, it adopted an educative and propaganda role. Fifth, 
elections. Sixth, its meetings were gatherings of the rank and file members, not merely
                                      
516 Martin Pugh, (1985) op cit p.92.         
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previously lain dormant and unrecognized. Also, and equally importantly  
‘the league, as a separate body from the Conservative party, could freely and legally 
Conservative cause. In this way Conservatives managed to preserve a good deal of 
pressures exerted through national legislation.   
Furthermore as an essentially a Conservative movement, with thousands of enrolled members, 
and a n
for the 
at had never really happened before in British politics.’  The Primrose League can 
justifiably be seen as an indispensable contributor to Conservative electoral successes, as well as 
being spectacularly successful in its ostensibly primary role of disseminating the conservative 
message. 
 
When the Conservative Party became characterized by schism over tariff reform and 
intransigence over the rights and powers of the House of Lords in the early twentieth century, 
the value of the league to the party was overlooked; a fact illustrated by the fact that ‘it was not 
officially affiliated to the Conservative Party until 1914.’  The League did indeed cross 
boundaries. Working class families quite possibly joined habitations out of personal choice, not 
simply because they were afraid not to because of the local political complexion. How, else can 
one understand the actions of the Lancashire workers who voted Conservative, but also 
participated in trade unions and strikes. How indeed? But by widening the analysis it is possible 
to speculate as to why ‘many Lancashire spinners were Conservative in politics’  This had 
           
Thus the Primrose League tapped into a source of latent Conservative support that had 
 
spend huge sums of money on food, drink, and entertainment designed to benefit the 
traditional British political practice at the local level, notwithstanding the modernizing 
518
 
ational organization  ‘it provided a mass movement which would canvass the electorate 
Conservative Party in between, as well as simply during general elections, something 
519th
 
520
521
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illed 
million and a quarter at the peak …in 1874-1875 (about 600,000 were regular unionists 
 
But the real reason for the apathy of trade unions was the firmly rooted belief in laissez 
 
to 
 
f 
again below a 
 
                                                
little to do with trade union membership, ‘from 1867 to 1876 the union leaders made almost 
continuous advances, which seemed to be so great that direct political action was unnecessary.’ 
522  Added to this was the fact that the working class was not an homogenous whole, ‘sk
artisans often considered themselves to be of a status well above that of manual labourers, and 
could thus be said to have formed a “Labour Aristocracy”’ 523  Thus 
‘Trade Unionists considered themselves to be a minority elite, numbering perhaps a 
as distinct from temporary adherents) and not much more than ¾ million in 1878-1879.
faire which was almost universally held by all classes.’ 524 
Given such a consensus it is unsurprising that at this time ‘the political wishes of the great  
majority of the organised working-class electorate were accomplished within the prevailing  
party system.’ 525 
 
Thus, whilst being ideologically opposed to trade unionism, Conservatives felt they had little 
fear from it. ‘The Victorian acceptance of trade unions had been aided by their character: 
industrially and politically moderate organizations, dominated by skilled workers, which had a
limited impact on the economy and polity.’ 526 Trade unionism, however, began to expand 
rapidly into the realm of common manual labourers who held more radical views than their 
skilled counterparts. The movement ‘went from strength to strength. In 1880 the membership o
the TUC was less than ½ million- admittedly a bad year. After 1893 it was never 
million, and after 1912 it was never below 2 million.’ 527 The formation of the Labour  
Representation Committee (LRC) on 27th February 1900 was a clear indication that many trade 
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522 H. J. Hanham, (1978) op cit. p.323. 
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524 H. J. Hanham
525 Patrick Joyce, (1980) op cit. p.312. 
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e 
l 
. The Conservative response focused 
on the l
unrest.’
courts. ion impossible by restricting 
 
tion to 
                                                
unionists now believed that the prevailing party political system could no longer accommodate
their aims and goals. Significantly ‘the unions which joined the LRC first…tended to be union
of the unskilled.’ 528 As noted earlier ‘the democracy were Tory for reasons other than 
democratic participation and social reform… [but] Set fair on the road of Disraelian, bourgeois
Conservatism, the party left little room for manoeuvre.’ 529 Even the support of the skilled elite
was now ambiguous, ‘in the Oldham cotton strike of 1885, for example, the Tory clubs provided
strike relief.’ 530 This was an early manifestation of a different attitude within trade unionism.  
‘From the late 1880s onwards, the unions’ character, their disruptive capacity, and the natur
and scale of their political involvement changed.’ 531 With “little room for manoeuvre” the 
Conservative party found itself on a collision course with trade unionism. ‘By 1900 the mutua
hostility of Conservatives and unions was well established
egal basis of trade unionism, their party political role, and the problem of industrial 
 532  The Conservative policy of accommodation with the unions found support in the 
The Taff Vale Judgement of 1901 made effective strike act
the right to picket, and making union funds  liable to actions for damages. Unsurprisingly the 
unions were outraged; Balfour was convinced that the judgement was both legally and morally
correct, but he had reservations, arguing ‘that union benefit funds should be protected from 
actions for damages.’ 533  Unfortunately the lack of room for manoeuvre again precluded any 
constructive dialogue. Politically Balfour could offer nothing more than a Royal 
Commission (1903-1905) to investigate the impasse. Disillusioned by the Conservatives lack of  
support, the unions unsurprisingly boycotted it. The Royal Commission favoured legisla
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the Lib
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of the m
political battle for popular support on two fronts. Firstly,  
way 
to the new. The old-age pensions, school meals, and insurance for health and 
families readily appreciated. The Tory leaders dared not oppose the Liberal welfare 
 
ecause of the growing involvement of the middle-class in running and  
financi   
unionis
do to st uch of the 1910s Bonar Law’s party found itself 
holly deserved, and the 
define union rights, rules, and regulations. This was the favoured policy of the Conservatives, 
but one vehemently opposed by the unions. ‘Balfour appeared willing to accept the electoral 
consequences of legislation but the 1906 electoral defeat ended any developments along 
lines.’ 534 The incoming Liberal government immediately passed legislation, the 1906 Tr
Dispute Act, to overturn the Taff Vale Judgement; the Act granted the unions immunity 
damages from strikes and trade disputes. When the courts again attacked union practices in the
1909 Osbourne Judgement, which found that political expenditure from union funds was illegal,
erals again responded with legislation. The 1913 Trade union Act ‘permitted union 
l expenditure provided it was financed from a separately raised fund approved by a ballot 
embership from which objectors could “contract out”’ 535 The Tories were losing the 
‘the Edwardian period stands out as the crucial moment when the old pattern gave 
unemployment, introduced by Asquith and Lloyd-George, were benefits that working 
legislation for fear of losing their working-class vote.’ 536 
On the other hand ‘to try and win working class support by a programmatic appeal risked…a 
major political crisis, b
ng party organization.’ 537 The Conservative party plainly regretted the growth of trade
m which it saw as being central to its electoral dilemma, but, there was little they could 
op it. It has been suggested that ‘For m
identified, by implication, with the hard-line, wage-cutting, strike-breaking, and black-leg aspect 
of industry.’ 538 This perception, however, may not have been w
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observa
the poo
he solution is beyond the sphere of the politician.’ 539 Such an attitude, of course, is in 
omplete accordance with Conservative beliefs that society, and its attendant faults and 
inequalities, are organic not made by politicians. However, to make public a belief that 
Conservative politicians were incapable of addressing such social evils would hardly be good 
r the party’s image, or encourage voters to offer their support. Furthermore there is evidence  
 to 
pilot working class political consciousness into less dangerous waters. The Conservative 
 
up to 1914, and the fading of industrial unrest after 1912 supported Bonar Law’s 
d 
[therefore] that there was considerable working class support for Conservative politics.’ 
 
 ‘hold 
 
Not being in power, of course, this was only a 
policy 
nist 
s 
ould be empowered to set up arbitration tribunals in 
e event of an industrial dispute.’  
Whilst in opposition this, at least, gave the Conservatives some breathing space, and gave them  
the opportunity to re-group. Conservative leaders were able to  
 ‘avoid making any commitment to anti-unionism, by allowing them to distinguish 
           
tion requires qualification. The new Marquis of Salisbury wrote in 1907 that ‘the vice of 
r, the selfishness of the rich, the hardness of the middle class are moral evils’ and that 
‘t
c
fo
‘that the working class was not inevitably anti-Conservative and that it was possible
Party’s electoral recovery in the two elections of 1910, Labour’s poor by-election record
conviction that, if the country wanted social reform, it would not vote Conservative an
540   
Nonetheless, they were forced to acquiesce in the evolving status quo. A Unionist Social 
Reform Committee was constituted in February 1911, the idea being that the state would
the balance of power and…defend the consumer and the national interest and help unions and
employers solve their conflicts peacefully.’ 541 
initiative, but  
‘Following the great industrial disputes of 1911-1912 the committee appointed a sub-
committee to report on industrial unrest. Its conclusions emphasized that the Unio
party had never believed that the state should remain indifferent to working condition
and urged that the Board of Trade sh
542th
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their members. Non-intervention could be justified by arguing that industrial relations 
as 
likely to do more harm than good.’  
Such woolly and ambiguous policies are, however, the policies of opposition. The Tories, under  
Bonar Law, seemed to have nothing innovative or positive to offer the electorate; although, in 
fairness it must be noted that ‘since 1900 the wishes of the [Conservative] leadership have been  
consistently frustrated over the development of trade unionists’ organization.’    
t 
 
l 
of the passing of the great days of Tory 
democr
fighting
‘With the imminent passing of the governments Home Rule Bill, the Unionists were 
obsessively concerned with the situation in the House of Commons to the exclusion of 
the impact of their policies in the country. Even the party chairman warned that “if we 
do nothing for the people in the ways immediately touching their lives, while the 
Radicals and Socialists profess to do all, then the masses as a whole…will gallop to 
Socialism as hard as they can.”’ 546 
 
owever, despite the parlous state of the party, and the perceived threat to society, there were 
any who still longed for strong leadership as an essential component in a bullish attempt to re-
stablish old-style Tory values. ‘The one demand of the Party…is that the White Flag…shall be 
                                                
between legitimate and illegitimate union behaviour and between union leaders and       
had evolved from the practical experience of those involved, so outside interference w
543
 
 
544
 
The electoral defeats of 1906 and 1910, the rise of the Tariff Reform campaign within the 
Conservative-Unionist alliance , and the  rapid expansion of the trade union movement had led 
to some re-assessment by the Conservative Party. Nevertheless ‘by the outbreak of the Grea
War, the Unionist party had forgotten some of the lessons of electoral success taught by Disraeli
and Lord Randolph Churchill. The candidature of Sir John Gorst as a Liberal in the genera
election of January 1910 was perhaps symbolic 
acy.’ 545 The party lacked a clear direction and was ideologically trapped in the past, 
 old battles that it now could not win.  
H
m
e
 
rote to the Times on 6  February 1907 saying that the 
ons of vested interests and the protectors of monopoly and 
6 Ibid. p.884.          
543 Andrew Taylor, (1994) op cit. p.503. 
544 Stuart Ball, (1994) op cit. p.215.  
545 D. J. Dutton, (1981) op cit. p.884. cf. Gorst w th
Conservative party had become ‘the champi
privilege.’          
54
 143
hauled down: that our parliamentarian away from the positions they are 
pledged to hold and that the Party in  a clear and unhesitating call to 
 
for electoral reasons. They ‘engaged in extreme rhetoric, 
ersonal abuse, they legitimated and sanctioned recourse to armed resistance, and attempted all 
ar 
 
 
 
 
 
s shall cease running 
the country shall receive
arms, so that we may know precisely where we are.’ 547 The problem was that the party did not 
know precisely where it was, or indeed where it was going. The Conservatives desperation for
an issue to rally around is demonstrated by the decision of the party leadership, after 1912, to 
exacerbate the Ulster Crisis, purely 
p
manner of parliamentary trickery.’ 548 The party was at a low ebb. The outbreak of World W
One, of course, changed everything. It presented unprecedented challenging problems which the
Liberals could not be expected to face alone; this ‘enabled the Unionists to wear again the 
Disraelian mantle of patriotism and nationalism.’ 549 This, famously, had been the central plank 
of their peacetime policy - the people, as a whole, not only their own supporters, equated 
patriotism and nationalism with Conservatism. 
‘Not surprisingly the party emerged as the dominant partner in the coalition government
that brought the war to a conclusion. But for the Great War, however, might not the 
second decade of the twentieth century have witnessed the “Strange Death of Tory 
England”’? 550     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
    
nd 
s evidence, 
owever, is not without problems.  
m
 
t 
ey 
eory, 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The evidence presented in this study has investigated how the Conservative Party evolved a
developed after the passage of the 1867 Reform Act. Some changes were freely entered into, 
others were forced upon the party by circumstances. Drawing conclusions from thi
h
 
The methodology adopted to conduct this study is broadly influenced by the “Peterhouse” 
school of thought whose work generally ‘e phasised the elite’s autonomy from the electorate, 
press, and even their own party machines.’ 551 In the context of this study strict adherence to 
such an approach would have imposed unacceptable constraints. Even so, Maurice Cowling has
countered accusations that the scope of the Peterhouse method is too narrow by arguing tha
public opinion was important to politicians, but in a subordinate role. Political leaders were 
proactive in the formation of public opinion rather than reactive to its pressure. They tried ‘not 
merely to say what the electors wanted to hear but to make electors want them to say what th
wanted to say in the first place’ 552; political rhetoric was designed to draw new electors into 
‘the thought-world inhabited by existing politicians.’ 553 Peterhouse, therefore, at least in th
accepted that  complex relationships existed between electors, party rank and file, the 
parliamentary party,  party leaders, and external influences. It is the nature of those relationship
which the conclusions arrived at here seek to inform. 
 
An important pitfall is ‘the danger for the historian in recovering objective circumstances with  
 
 op cit. p.5.         
551 Andrew Jones, (1972) The Politics of Reform, Cambridge University Press, London, p.12. 
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nt example of the ill-fitting 
lationship between party and ideology.’ 555 This is unsurprising considering that mass political 
 
ntive 
 
ives as the 
natural” party of government. Defeat in the general election of 1868 did not result in any 
any real degree of precision..[in] that it gives the misleading impression that because this is what 
we know about them now, this was also what they knew about themselves, then. But that is 
rarely if ever the case.’ 554 It is, therefore, crucial that modern mind-sets and values are not 
superimposed onto personalities and events that took place in a previous age. To do so would 
result in conclusions based upon pure conjecture rather than reasoned evaluation. 
 
Ideologically conservatism displayed a remarkable resilience during our period, although it has 
been noted that ‘the late nineteenth century provides an excelle
re
parties were a comparatively new phenomena. Disraeli successfully piloted a far-reaching and
radical extension of the franchise through parliament, which inevitably involved a re-appraisal 
of conservative values. Old style Toryism gave way to pragmatism and flexibility deemed 
necessary to cope with the new demands of the 1867 Act. Nevertheless the core substa
concepts of conservatism - the resistance to change, however unavoidable, unless it is perceived 
as organic and natural, and the attempt to subordinate change to the belief that the laws and 
forces guiding human behaviour have extra-human origins and, therefore, cannot and ought not
to be subject to human wills and whims - remained strong. External pressure for franchise 
reform had built up over a period of years, to the extent that change became unavoidable, 
Disraeli realised this and managed the change in the best interests of his party and his beliefs. 
His concept of one-nation-conservatism enabled him to present the Conservat
“
ideological concessions, only in a greater effort to disseminate the Conservative message, most 
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st 
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er 
 
in integrity, 
democr
to run a r 
alisbury the Conservatives were, in essence, a minority party. Salisbury, therefore, was faced 
with the dilemma of re-asserting old-style Tory values, which had proved unpopular with the 
electorate in the past, but at the same time seeking office for what he himself acknowledged was 
a minority party. Undaunted, he was committed not only to achieving power, but in doing so on 
his own terms, using his own conception of conservatism to guide his party.  
 
The Co
their pa
            
notably in his famous keynote speeches at Crystal Palace and Manchester. Victory in 1874 mu
partly be attributed to the attraction of that message. Disraeli, however, felt that he had exploite
the flexibility of conservative ideology as far as was possible, at the time; indeed ‘the party of 
constitutional order and institutional authority, even for the most honourable of reasons, came 
close to subverting both.’ 556 Consequently, from an ideological perspective, Disraeli could off
nothing new to the electorate at the 1880 general election. Disraeli’s rhetoric of 1874 had been
proved to be just that, he did not deliver. His administration had failed to prepare a considered 
programme of reforms and, therefore, failed to legislate one.  
 
The twin blows of losing the 1880 general election and Disraeli’s death in 1881 placed great 
demands upon the party, but the core of its ideology had to remain inviolable to reta
it was only the priority and prominence given to contingent values and concepts that were 
capable of revision. The new leader, Lord Salisbury, made no secret of his distrust of 
acy. He had opposed the 1867 Reform Act, and had once said that ‘democracy is no way 
n empire.’ 557 He also disagreed with Disraeli’s idea of one-nation-conservatism, fo
S
nservatives, even though in opposition, engineered the best arrangements possible for 
rty during the passage of the 1884 Reform Act and the Redistribution Act which  
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ocracy, he 
 
tances 
eli. 
 
since the Great Reform Bill [1832] they established themselves as the party of 
respectable working class of the towns with the rule of those above them.’  
His brand of high politics had more scope and a wider impact than that of his predecessor. 
Adherence to the core concepts of conservative ideology, it appeared, had paid huge dividends  
for the party. Conservatism had remained faithful to its ideological core substantive concepts, 
and effectively shuffled the priority given to contingent values as circumstances demanded. For 
accompanied it: nevertheless, the passing of those Acts ‘tilted the balance of the constitution  
more markedly and more irrevocably than ever away from notables to numbers’ 558  Although 
innately anti-democratic Salisbury knew that the will of the people must prevail: dem
argued, encouraged party politics, which encouraged class antagonism. Ways must be found, he 
said, to enable ‘the generality of the nation’ to express its ‘cool and deliberate judgement.’ 559
Utilizing its ideological pragmatism the Conservative party adapted to the new circums
enabling Salisbury to give ‘substance to a new democratic Toryism talked about since Disra
He did it in three ways: by developing the indispensable rhetoric; by his oversight of the 
machinery of a mass party; and by rhetoric translated into legislation.’ 560 The Working Class 
Dwellings Act of 1885, County Councils in 1888, The Technical Instruction Act of 1889, The
Housing of the Working Classes Act of 1890, The Public Health Act of 1890, free 
elementary education, and The Shop Hours Act of 1892, added up to a significant programme of 
social reform, which illustrated that, unlike Disraeli’s, Salisbury’s rhetoric had some substance.  
‘There was no “crisis of Conservatism” while Salisbury led the Tories. For the first time 
government…the language he employed was designed to associate the literate and 
561
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d to be managed in the best interests of  conservative ideology. However, in one sense the 
core su
origins
against iod of 
dominance, was a watershed decade of change and reform. Understandably, from an ideological 
t were 
lves 
ite its 
ade 
an economic downturn. The trade union movement which previously had been more concerned 
                                                
example, Salisbury was able to pass interventionist social legislation on the grounds that it was
necessary, not for ideological purposes, but because deprivation was damaging to society as a 
whole. The party had no dogmatic attachment to laissez faire economics, therefore, 
interventionism, albeit at a low level, became a contingent value. Similarly, although he did not  
 favour democracy, Salisbury realised that its advancement was inevitable, thus he adroitly
resisted the 1884 Reform Act until an acceptable Redistribution Act was negotiated to 
accompany it. The change was seen as unavoidable, even natural and organic, therefore, it 
neede
bstantive concept that the laws and forces guiding human behaviour have extra-human 
 and, therefore, cannot and ought not to be subject to human wills and whims, worked 
 the party. The 1880s which saw the beginning of the Conservative Party’s long per
perspective ‘they did not understand in detail the economic, social, and political forces tha
responsible; and they misjudged the speed at which these developments would work themse
out.’ 562 Rapid, uncontrolled change was anathema to conservatism, and the party, desp
best efforts, was incapable of accommodating the pace demanded. By the time of Salisbury’s 
resignation in 1902 the party was, in effect, “behind the times.”  
 
Salisbury’s successor, his nephew Arthur Balfour, was like his uncle from a patrician 
aristocratic background. He inherited a party that was now perceived as old-fashioned, and he 
faced ever increasing demands for radical change. Increasing international competition for tr
was seriously affecting the economy, exacerbating an already deep agricultural depression, and 
 
2 David Cannadine, (1990) op cit p.31. 56
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ith social issues had deemed it necessary to add a political dimension to their activities with 
ce  
onomic decline, 
and as ur 
was 
ately out of his depth in a democratic world…He was a bad platform 
speaker…was inattentive to the party rank and file. He was unable to cope with 
en 
less impressive as leader of the opposition [after defeat in the 1906 general election]. He 
supporters, and left his party divided, defeated and demoralised, and without any clear 
 
f the 
 rather 
welfare ought to have dictated that such unavoidable change needed to be managed rather than 
opposed. If the Budget had been allowed to pass 
majority in that House could have been exploited, at a later date, to tailor economic legislation  
            
w
the formation of the Labour Representation Committee in 1900. There was a gathering labour 
movement which sought fundamental social welfare legislation which would involve 
intervention by the government at an hitherto unprecedented level. The previously solid allian
that had existed with the Liberal Unionists began to break down when their leader Joseph 
Chamberlain left the government to champion Tariff Reform as the answer to ec
a means of financing social welfare. The party was rent by schism. Unfortunately Balfo
‘a patrician ultim
Chamberlain and Tariff Reform; he could not keep the party together, and he was ev
lost three successive general elections, was driven from the leadership by his own 
successor.’ 563  
Undoubtedly Balfour had many faults, but he was constrained by his interpretation of the 
substantive core concepts of conservative ideology. He failed to recognise that some o
changes demanded were, in the long term, unavoidable: and failed to comprehend that 
interventionist legislation, on a collectivist basis, could be seen as a natural progression
than as an attempt to subvert the Conservative notion of the organic evolution of society.     
Even so, in the debacle over Lloyd George’s 1909 Budget, Balfour failed to exploit the 
flexibility of Conservative ideology. The inevitability of the rise in government financed social 
the House of Lords, then the Conservative 
                                     
563 David Cannadine, (1990) op cit p.226. 
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ore in keeping with conservative values. 564 By rejecting the Budget outright, the House of  
ver, 
 for a 
Henry Chaplin, and Lords Londonderry, Salisbury, and Derby. He thought them 
 
Governments would create dismay and perhaps even resentment among the rank and 
 
he unstoppable march of democracy dictated ‘as Lord Eustace Perry later recalled, [that] 
                                                
 
m
Lord’s veto was lost and an invaluable Conservative Party asset was lost forever. Moreo
opposition to Lloyd George’s social measures only served to alienate the working class, and 
some of the party’s own grass roots support. Contemporary evidence suggests that the need
change in attitude, and in ideological interpretation, was recognised at the time. 
‘In 1911, Lord Crawford attended a Tory shadow cabinet meeting, at which he found 
“excellent though discredited politicians, whose inclusion in future Conservative
file.’ 565 
T
Balfour’s administration “created for the last time, the illusion of government by a group of 
ruling families.”’ 566 The Conservative party realised too late that this was a natural and 
irreversible evolution, a change that needed to be accommodated and managed. ‘But after 
Balfour’s patrician detachment and ineffectual vacillation, middle class firmness and 
aggressiveness was exactly what the party wanted, and such a leader [Bonar Law] was more in 
tune with the background and feelings of the party rank and file in the Commons.’ 567 
Unfortunately although the tone of the party changed under Bonar Law’s influence its tenor did 
not, it continued to be essentially negative. ‘Whatever may be said of the party’s recovery in the 
period before the outbreak of war, it was by no means an entirely healthy recovery…The party  
 
564 It has been convincingly argued that Balfour’s rejection of the Budget was more the result of serious 
miscalculation rather than simple obduracy. See, R. F. Mackay, (1985) Balfour: Intellectual Statesman, 
Crawford Papers: The Journals of David Lindsay Twenty-Seventh Earl 
 
Oxford University Press, pp.232-236.  
565 John Vincent, (Ed.) (1984) The 
of Crawford and Tenth Earl of Balcarres, 1871-1940 : During the Years 1892-1940, Manchester 
University Press, pp. 191-192. 
566 David Cannadine, (1990) op cit p.208.  
567 John Vincent, (Ed.) (1984) op cit. p.260. 
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had little that was positive to offer.’ 568 
 
Thus, retrospectively at least, the trajectory of the Conservative Party’s fortunes can be 
interpreted with reference to the degree with which decisions were informed by conservative 
ideology. Whether those decisions were taken with ideology in mind must remain open to 
debate: it is even open to question whether decision makers of the time would have been 
familiar with the idea of ideology. However, their involvement in high politics dictated that th
policy preferences needed to be informed by the contemporary ethos of their party; and 
moreover, their machinations needed to reflect that ethos. 
 
The personnel involved in decision making, obviously, also had a direct effect on party fortun
In the realm of high politics, leadership and how it is exercised, is crucial. Disraeli’s rivalry with
Gladstone, and his thirst for power, characterized his political career. He demonstrated his gra
of high politics when he successfully managed to out-bid Gladstone in 1867 and secure the  
passage of the Second Reform Act; having shown consummate skill in convincing his own party
that the radical changes he proposed would prove beneficial. 569 He assumed the leadership in 
February 1868, having in his own words ‘climbed to the top of the greasy pole.’ 570 He survived 
losing the December 1868 general election and re-vamped the party organization in preparat
for the next attempt. Having engineered the 1874 election victory, making an important personal 
contribution with his extra-parliamentary speeches, he declared that ‘the country required a lit
                                     
568 David Dutton, (1992) His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition: The Unionist Party in Opposition 1905-1915, 
th March 1867, ‘Cabinet on reform bill, long but all agreed: many 
ng cabinet, chiefly on reform: but all agreed.’ Quoted 
ke, (1966) op cit., p.487. 
Liverpool University Press, p.265. 
569 Lord Stanley noted in his journal, 12
details gone into.’ And again on 18th May 1867, ‘Lo
in John Vincent, (Ed.) (1978) Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and Memoirs of 
Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869, Harvester, Sussex, pp. 294 and 309. 
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 of British imperial and strategic interests, needing to  
support
moral t
believe an Empire. The latter’s pamphlet The Bulgarian 
d 
erhaps the greatest.’ 572The Times of 21st August 
877 described Gladstone’s impromptu speeches, having taken place when parliament was not 
nd 
 
g 
ach 
more energy in regard to foreign policy and a little less energy in regard to its home policy.’571
This maxim was to prove costly when he and Gladstone clashed over Britain's Balkan policy in 
1876. Disraeli saw the situation as a matter
 the Ottoman Empire against Russian expansion. Gladstone, however, saw the issue in 
erms, because Bulgarian Christians had been massacred by the Turks and, therefore, 
d it was immoral to support the Ottom
Horrors and the Question of the East, published in September 1876, sold 200,000 copies an
prompted a spate of protest meetings. In a fatal error of judgement Disraeli dismissed the 
pamphlet as ‘of all the Bulgarian horrors, p
1
sitting, as a ‘new invention in the way of political agitation.’ 573 His more populist approach 
resonated with the electorate, many of whom were unfamiliar with the niceties of international 
diplomacy. When Gladstone embarked on his "Midlothian campaign" in 1879 he repeatedly 
referred back to the issue denouncing what he called "Beaconsfieldism". ‘The General Election 
of 1880 was…fought chiefly on the foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield’s Government’ 574 a
unsurprisingly, given the effectiveness of Gladstone’s campaign, the Conservatives lost. Disraeli
became ill soon after and died in April 1881. He had been successful in high politics until bein
out-manoeuvred by his old rival, an equally skilled practitioner. Despite his reputation as a 
dilettante 575 Disraeli had commanded great authority within his party, Sir Michael Hicks-Be
recalled that he ‘kept a watchful eye on all his colleagues…I have known Lord Beaconsfield 
                                                 
571 Quoted in Edith Henrietta Fowler, (The Hon. Mrs. Robert Hamilton) (1912) The Life of Henry Hartley 
Fowler, First Viscount Wolverhampton, GCSI, Hutchinson & Co., London, p.112. 
 Donald Read, (1979) op cit. p.166. 
 
572 R. W. Davis, (1976) op cit. p.199. 
573
574 Edith Henrietta Fowler, (1912) op cit. p.112. 
575 For example, after losing the 1868 general election, he worked secretly upon his novel Lothair all 
through 1869, only then did he address the problem of his party’s organization. Archie Hunter, (2001) op
cit. p.82. 
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 ringing endorsement certainly, but one that cannot mask the fact that after reversing his 
party’s dismal electoral record in 1874 Disraeli could not maintain the momentum, and once 
again his party found itself in opposition. 
 
Lord Salisbury had disagreed with Disraeli often, but concurred with his old leader’s maxim that 
party unity was paramount. Consequently after Disraeli’s death he made no attempt to gain sole 
control of the party, but was content to operate as leader of the opposition in the House of Lords 
while Sir Stafford Northcote led the House of Commons. Even so it was Salisbury who took the 
lead in ensuring that the terms of the 1884-5 electoral reforms were the best available to the 
Tories. ‘The decisive factor in committing the party to the transformation  was the settlement of 
1884, with its recognition of the city and industrial primacy, and the premium thus placed on 
urban support for Conservatism’  It must be emphasized, however, that his success in doing 
so may well have owed as much to luck as to judgement. In the absence of modern research 
methods, such as opinion polls, both parties relied very much on instinct rather than reliable 
information. For example, Liberal negotiator  Sir Charles Dilke was reported to have said to a 
                                                
enforce his own view on the Cabinet after all its members but one had expressed a different 
opinion.’ 576 Perhaps more importantly he had become the embodiment of his party, the Liberal
MP Sir Henry Fowler paid tribute saying  
‘We cannot note the passing away of this great man without noting the passing aw
an era. For the last three-quarters of a century, certainly since the death of Pitt and Fox, 
no two men have so completely impersonated the two great political opinions which
divide the bulk of the people of this country into two great political parties, as have Lo
Beaconsfield and Mr. Gladstone.’ 577 
A
578
 
576 J. P. Cornford, (1967) op cit. p.305. 
 
nsformation of Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth Century’ in 
p.66.. For a more detailed record of events see Andrew Jones, 
2) The Politics of Reform 1884, Cambridge University Press, London. 
577 Edith Henrietta Fowler, (1912) op cit. p.136. 
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iberals. 579  Even the press of the time were unsure  
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 further the Conservative cause as he saw it.  
 
did 
opposite view, spending much of his time working on ‘legislation or diplomacy, coping with the 
            
colleague at the end of the Committee stage ‘I have left the Tories not more than twelve seats in 
London’. At the following  November 1885 general election London returned thirty-six Tories 
to twenty six L
‘The Times and the moderate journals did not like it, and by contrast the Radica
became convinced that it would play powerfully into their hands. They assumed that th
increased number of seats for large urban centres…would mean a huge increase in 
Radical representation. These places were the “source and centre of English political 
opinion,” the mainstays of Radicalism. Yet they falsified all Radical predictions wh
they went Tory in the elections of 1885.’ 580 
 
Even if he benefited from good fortune in this instance, Salisbury’s handling of the Home R
crisis illustrate that his talents in the field of high politics were considerable. His use of inside
information regarding Gladstone’s intentions, his use of Lord Canarvon in making tentative 
overtures to the Irish Nationalists, his timing of dissolution, his embrace of the Liberal Unionist
and his subsequent control over them, all portray an astute understandin
to
 
Lord Salisbury was often pre-occupied with foreign policy and some thought that this led to him
being too permissive. Hicks Beach was of the opinion that ‘certainly as Prime Minister he 
not exercise the control over his colleagues, either in or out of the Cabinet, that Lord 
Beaconsfield did…Lord Salisbury frequently allowed important matters to be decided by a 
small majority of votes, even against his own opinion.’ 581  Of course, Prime Ministers are 
always pressed for time: Disraeli’s solution was to spend little time on policy, preferring to 
leave that area to his lieutenants, and devote himself to man-management. Salisbury took an 
                                     
579 Herbert Asquith, (1928 Two Vols.) op cit. Vol. 1, p.90. footnote. 
1 J. P. Cornford, (1967) op cit. p.305. 
580 Peter Fraser, (1966) op cit. p.57. 
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ner. 
government by appearing to dissociate himself from his colleagues actions. Salisbury 
actions had detrimentally affected his candidature for promotion to Postmaster General. 
is ability was recognized, as was his ambition, but if he could not toe the line his 
 
In addi
1890s n ver 90 per 
Althou
adept a  
always
 
potent, even if ‘political activity, whether reported in the Times and Hansard or not, did not 
            
Queen when and how best he could, and with party hardly at all.’ 582 That said, there is
that when the issue at stake was party unity, he exercised his authority in no uncertain man
For example, 
‘[John] Gorst, as Under-Secretary for India had several times embarrassed the 
admonished him for desiring greater independence of action than was fitting, and that his 
H
advancement would be severely impaired.’ 583 
tion, his influence over the whole parliamentary party was equally effective, ‘by the 
ine out of ten Conservative members voted in the government’s lobby in o
cent of all divisions.’ 584 Even beyond his own party, he was in control, as demonstrated by his 
successful resistance to repeated demands from Liberal Unionist leader Joseph Chamberlain to 
formulate a “programme” of measures to be fought under at elections. 
 
gh he steadfastly refused to publish a political programme for elections, Salisbury was 
t using the press as a tool in his high politics machinations. Parliamentary speeches had
 been covered by newspapers, often in full, as a matter of course, but the advent of 
extensive extra-parliamentary speechmaking  created a new arena of competition for politicians. 
Randolph Churchill, for example, openly cultivated the press, ‘the Central News Agency graded
his speeches as “Class 1”, for verbatim reporting – a privilege shared only by Chamberlain, 
Gladstone, and Salisbury’ 585 Salisbury was thus well aware that the power of the press could be 
                                     
 582 Michael Bentley, (2001) op cit. p.287. 
583 Salisbury to Gorst 7th September 1891, quoted in H. J. Hanham, (Ed.) (1969) op cit. p.92. 
584 Martin Pugh, (1996), ‘1886-1905’, in Anthony Seldon (Ed.) (1996) How Tory Governments Fall: The 
a, London, p.203. 
 Churchill: A Political Life, Oxford University Press, p.219. 
Tory Party in Power Since 1783, Fontan
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mean what those untrained in the exercise of power thought it meant.’ 586 When Lord 
Carlingford realised in 1885 that the major newspapers, most notably the Times, were not 
reporting his speeches, he knew that his political career was over. He concluded that,  
‘that kind of speech is wasted when not allowed to reach the public.’ 587 All politicians cou
the press                                                   
‘The Birmingham Post was a loyal Chamberlainite journal, and Chamberlain had, 
moreover, the ear of T. H. S. Escott who wrote for the influential Conservative Standard 
(with a circulation of some 150,000). Dilke was in close contact with Frank Hill, editor 
of the small-selling but important Daily News, and both he and Chamberlain kept in  
confidential touch with John Morley, editor of the Pall Mall Gazette.’   
 
The relationship was very much a two-way arrangement. Morley wrote to Dilke, when in office, 
that ‘it would be worth silver, gold, and jewels if I could have ten minutes with you about three 
times a week.’   The cachet of office gave more access to the press but care was needed to 
ensure that newspaper coverage was advantageous. Salisbury 
‘needed the papers, like any other politician, using them to protect the image of a party 
and an alliance which preserved the old values while being uniquely capable of 
reinterpreting them for an industrial democracy. A Times man with good connections 
described Salisbury as the prime minister most cessible to the press: careful about the 
information he furnished, he gave it freely when he saw fit, and it was valuable.’  
 
He received assistance in his endeavours from an unlikely source. ‘As Queen Victoria emerged 
from her withdrawal to achieve immense popularity during the last thirty years of her reign, so 
she also revealed a growing preference for Conservative governments. Nor did her prejudices 
ain a private matter between herself and her ministers.’  Because of the power of the press 
                                                 
586  A. B Cooke and John Vincent (1974) op cit. p.166. 
587 A. B. Cooke and J. R. Vincent, (Eds.) (1971) Lord Carlingford’s Journal Reflections of a Cabinet 
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 press became predominately Unionist, having previously 
been ov
success
Snow, 
                                                
the Queen’s preferences became widely known, and influenced at all levels. The Rev. Whitewell 
Elwin wrote in 1895 that his wife, ‘Fanny, tells me that our servants take in three Society 
Papers, and they like to have their news and sentiments fresh from the Queen herself, or her  
associates.’ 592 Evidence, perhaps, that the deference, previously so astutely exploited by  
Disraeli, was still a powerful influence. 
 
Salisbury’s mixture of skill and luck in the field of high politics served his party well, but by the 
time of his retirement the party had become stale and old-fashioned; Queen Victoria had died as
the new century had begun, signalling the dawn of a new era. His successor, Arthur  
Balfour, rather than seeking to revitalise the party remained firmly entrenched in nineteenth 
century practices and attitudes. Chamberlain wrote to him as early as 1894 ‘you do not read th
newspapers…but may not this disregard of the Press be carried too far?’ 593  This neglect of th
press assumes even greater importance when ones opponents take the opposite view, for 
example, Sir Edward Gosse noted in his diary that Rosebery did not deign to direct ‘his addres
to the House but speaks directly to the Press Gallery.’ 594 In fairness to Balfour it must be noted 
that newspapers, then as now, were politically partisan; and whereas it may be true that ‘after
the 1886 [Liberal] split the British
erwhelmingly Liberal.’ 595 It is equally true that the Liberals regrouped very 
fully and by the 1900s the widely read and influential Manchester Guardian, under C. P. 
had .become ‘the newspaper par excellence of the New Liberalism.’ 596 Unfortunately his 
disdain for the power of the press was not Balfour’s only shortcoming in the field of high 
 
592 Rev. Whitewell Elwin to Lady Emily Lytton, 4th October 1895, quoted in Randolph S. Churchill 
n to Balfour December 1894, quoted in Blanche E. C. Dugdale (1936 Two Vols.) op cit. 
 E. J. Feuchtwanger, (1985) op cit. p.277. 
(1959), p.40. 
593 Chamberlai
Vol. 1, p208. 
594 Gosse’s diary February 1905, quoted in John Wilson, (1973) op cit. p.423. 
595 H. C. G. Matthews, (1987) op cit. pp.46-47. 
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sdowne 
n.’ 597 He seemed oblivious 
 the suggestion that ‘Liberals believed in Gladstone as a constitutional authority of 
the Radicals on their lines. Imagine asking an agricultural labourer to express an opinion 
B. or 
Asquith as Prime Minister. That is what hitherto a General Election has decided. But the 
 
                                                
politics.  He could not negotiate or compromise, even with his erstwhile friend Joseph 
Chamberlain, over the problems associated with Tariff Reform; he antagonised the trade union 
movement by his open support for the Taff Vale and Osbourne judgements; and alienated many 
important people with his notorious pronouncement, following defeat in the 1906 general 
election, that “the great Unionist Party should still control whether in power or opposition.”
attitude, although in large part a legacy of Salisbury’s previously successful “referendal theory
gave the Liberal campaign against the House of Lords greater impetus. Even during the 
constitutional crisis over the Veto Bill Balfour appeared devoid of insight, writing to Lan
that he did not believe ‘that men like Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Crewe would 
find any satisfaction in acting the part of bullies in the Royal Closet’ and that ‘they were so 
completely in the hands of the Irish and of the Labour Party, that they would probably be forced 
to ask for pledges quite inconsistent with the spirit of the constitutio
to
unimpeachable rectitude and considered themselves to have received from him, as a sacred 
legacy, the duty of curbing the Lords.’ 598 He attempted, vainly, to counter the threat to the 
House of Lords by touting the idea of referenda for important issues, but even at the time this 
was seen as little short of a panic measure. Lord Esher wrote that  
‘the Tories are getting deeper and deeper into the mire. All this comes of bidding against 
on any great legislative measure. He is competent to say whether he will have A. J. 
Referendum is democracy run mad.’ 599  
It is perhaps ironic that his predecessor achieved so much for the party as an avowed anti- 
 
597 Balfour to Lansdowne 27th December 1910, quoted in R. B. McCallum, (1936) Asquith, Duckworth, 
10. in Maurice V. Brett (Ed. For Vols. 1 &2) and Viscount 
. 
London, p.78. 
598 Ibid. p.79. 
599 Esher to M. V. Brett  30th November 19
Oliver Esher, (Ed. For Vols. 3&4) (1934 Four Vols.) op cit. Vol. 3, p.37
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gs in one basket” a point not lost upon his colleagues. The Fourth Marquess 
 Salisbury sent a memo to Austen Chamberlain and Andrew Bonar-Law warning that ‘we are 
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democrat, and Balfour achieved so little advocating plebiscitary democracy. He was also g
of “placing all his eg
of
asked to risk everything upon the next throw…If we fail this time the power of the House of 
Lords must go, and with it the Union, the Church, the whole realm of religious interests to 
which we are attached, and the banner against Socialism.’ 600 Lose they did, and although this 
prediction turned out to be overly pessimistic, it graphically illustrates that Balfour’s own 
colleagues felt that the Conservative party was unsafe in his hands. His inadequacy as a 
practitioner of high politics was confirmed when he resigned the leadership without endor
or even suggesting a successor. ‘Bonar-Law [was] elected as a “compromise” candidate to avo
splitting the party by a battle between Austen. Chamberlain and Walter Long… “The fools” 
Lloyd George, “have stumbled on their best man by accident”’ 601  
 
“Best man” or not, Bonar-Law at least tried to instil some urgency and purpose into his party
He adopted a combative style designed to attack those opponents who had
ecessor, and who appeared to enjoy almost every parliamentary advantage. His strateg
o designed to unite the often quarrelsome Tories around a recognizable issue, Ulster 
sm, thereby rallying those whose disillusionment had possibly made Balfour’s leadership 
 from the start. Unlike Balfour, he eschewed notions of restraint and behaved as i
prosecuting a war, attracting the most committed and dynamic Unionists and seeking to inspir
more moderate factions. 602 His methods brought his party under control, but the corridors of 
 
600 4th Marquess of Salisbury to Austin Chamberlain and Bonar-Law 1st December 1910, quoted in Neil 
Blewett, (1972) op cit. p.159. 
601 R. T. McKenzie, (1955) op cit. p.31.    
602 See R. J. Q. Adams (1999) Bonar Law, John Murray, London, p.72 
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o promote his one-nation-conservatism. The end result was victory in 
874, but then cavalier complacency leading to the 1880 defeat. Lord Salisbury, in modern 
 
f 
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real power remained off-limits to the Conservatives until the First World War altered the 
political landscape.  
  
The importance of high politics to the Conservative party’s electoral fortunes appears evident.  
Disraeli, whilst politically astute and unswerving in his lust for power, concentrated his prac
of high politics inwardly towards his own party. Initially to gain acceptance for his radical 1867
Reform Act, and then t
1
terms, “networked” very effectively. He proved to be a superb political manipulator who 
orchestrated events in a quiet, stable, even staid manner. He was adept at using the press and 
other people and parties to further his own and his party’s ends. Unlike Disraeli he kept his 
finger on the pulse of developments until advancing years began to dull his political nous. 
Consequently he presided over a period of unprecedented Conservative electoral dominance but
left a tired and worn out party to his successor. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to 
argue that Balfour had little chance of repeating the success of his uncle.  
‘The Conservative success of the 1880s and 1890s was in many ways too much an 
historical success, that is to say it was dependent on a particular set of conditions; any 
alteration in those conditions would destroy its basis. In particular the Conservatives 
were vulnerable to any one of three developments: the more positive challenge which 
would come from a Liberal revival, an anti-Conservative reaction, and the emergence o
a third political party. The electoral difficulties of Edwardian Conservatism came about 
as a result of the conditions arising for all three factors to occur simultaneously.’ 603 
 
He also faced a resurgent Liberal party which had learned the lesson that party unity was the 
vital pre-requisite for electoral success; and his own party split over the issue of Tariff Reform. 
That said, his clumsy and incompetent handling of the problems that faced him only serve
                                      
603 E. H. H. Green (1995) The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics. And Ideology of The 
British Conservative Party, 1880-1914, Routledge, London, p.137. 
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ot improve under Bonar-Law’s leadership. ‘The party’s tendency to endorse 
iolent resistance in Ulster, and Law’s much vaunted “new style”, which seemed to consist 
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MPs 
and Peers referring with some aloofness to ‘the new foreign political organization of the 
           
further damage the Conservative cause, as clearly illustrated by his total failure to achieve a 
single electoral success. 
 
The situation did n
v
largely of abusing Asquith, were symptomatic of the Conservatives inability to discover a real 
sense of direction.’604 
 
It has been accepted by this study that organization alone cannot win elections, yet it surely  
cannot be coincidence that periods of intense re-organization coincide with times of electoral  
success. ‘It is worth underlining the fact that the parliamentary leaders of each of the parties h
originally called their extra-parliamentary organizations into being primarily as vote-getting 
agencies.’ 605 This may appear to be a trite observation, but it highlights the fact that post-1867 
“vote-getting” assumed a much higher profile than in previous years. Disraeli realised this whe
he employed the capable John Gorst to create the Conservative party electoral machine. Gorst’
efforts proved to be ‘the critical organizational counterpart to Disraeli’s rhetorical courting of 
urban electors.’ 606 Specifically organizing to target the new urban electorate was rewarded
success in 1874. It was no accident, therefore, that after the organization put in place by Gorst 
was allowed to stagnate, the Tories lost the following election in 1880. The Liberals had caugh
up, and surpassed the Tories in their organization, but Disraeli was reluctant to emulate their 
system. At a meeting on 19th May 1880 he addressed five hundred assembled Conservative 
                                      
604 E. H. H. Green (1995) op cit. p.333. 
605 R. T. McKenzie, (1955) op cit. p.9.  
606 Angus Hawkins, (2005) ‘The Disraelian Achievement 1868-1874’ in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, 
(Eds.) (2005) op cit. p.40. 
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alisbury appointed Middleton and Akers-Douglas to rebuild the party organization. ‘There was 
no need for interference with its method. That was the classic period in Conservative 
electioneering. Under Mr. Akers-Douglas as Whip, and Captain Middleton as Chief Agent, the 
organization attained a completeness which could hardly have been improved upon.’   This 
revolution in organization was handsomely rewarded. ‘The period 1886 until the 1906 general 
election is rightly seen as one of twenty years of Conservative dominance, turning the tables 
upon the 40 years of Liberal supremacy which had followed the Conservative Party rift over the 
Corn Laws in 1846. The Conservatives had won only two elections [1841 and 1874] in the half  
century olden 
era of C merous 
tributes
associa
onsecutive years. Organizers had little or no way of gauging public opinion on a national scale. 
The only national poll was the general election itself, after which, of course, it was too late to 
make adjustments. Middleton and his allies, therefore, concentrated upon using the limited tools 
they had available at local level, and the greatest of these was registration. Canvasses were 
           
Liberals.’ 607 It has been argued with respect to Disraeli’s party reforms that ‘many of thes
steps were tentative and made little impact at the time. Certainly they did n
tr rmation of politics from the old to the new. A greater watershed in British politics came 
880s.’ 608  
S
609
 since the 1832 Great Reform Act.’ 610 There can be no doubt that much of this g
onservative party dominance was attributable to organization. ‘There are…nu
 by individual MPs to the effectiveness of their local associations.’ 611  It was the local 
tions which held the key to the Conservative’s electoral success for almost twenty 
c
                                      
607 E. J. Feuchtwanger, (1968) op cit. p.143. 
608 Andrew Gamble, (1974) op cit. p.19. 
609 R. T. McKenzie, (1955) op cit. p.265. 
061  Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball, (Eds.) (1994) op cit. pp. 18-19. 
1 R. T. McKenzie, (1955) op cit. p.64. 61
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that the Liberals had made very considerable gains, to which they were only doubtfully 
n 
the Conservatives raised a fund to enable them to purify the registers, and by confining 
eral 
strength by 2,772 voters at the October 1880 registration.’  
In this instance the Liberals launched a counter-attack, and by mid-October 1884 the electorate 
613  
n.” 
 
614
conducted, and objections to registrations were organized based upon the results. A good 
example of the process took place in Manchester between 1880 and 1885. 
 ‘Between 1874 and 1880 the Conservatives had neglected the registers, with the result 
entitled, and easily won two of the three seats at the general election. After the electio
themselves to cases about which there could be little dispute they reduced the Lib
612
 
in the constituency was 8,945 smaller than in 1880, a total made up of both Tory and Liberal 
supporters, as well as neutrals.  An important point to note, however, is that the Liberals own
1883 Corrupt practices Act severely limited the number of paid election workers available to the 
parties. The Conservatives could utilize the willing, even eager, volunteers of the Primrose 
League to maintain local pressure on the registers, the Liberals had no comparable organization. 
The issue was considered so important that  
‘Salisbury took a close interest in the business. A Registration Committee chaired by  
Smith was established at Central Office. Middleton, in 1889, sent Salisbury “as 
requested a copy of the report on Registration submitted to Mr. W. H. Smith in the 
Spring” Middleton reported to Salisbury in October 1889 on the extent of the 
committee’s enquiry and its examinations of party agents. Smith told [Akers] Douglas a 
little later “Salisbury expects us at 12.30 on Monday re. registration and organizatio
Of this new world of “wire pulling” Salisbury later confesses that he did not “like its 
appearance very much, but gradually inured himself to it as a necessary of a new state of
things.”’  
 
Like it or not Salisbury realised the tremendous value of the system and ‘tight registers and low 
polls…[became] classic maxims of Conservative electioneering…Sam Fitton, the Conservative 
agent demonstrated that a technique of getting more than twice as many objections sustained as 
                                                 
612 H. J. Hanham, (1978 ed.)  op cit. p.235.      
 
Smith to Akers Douglas 11th December 1889, and the Times 
annon, (1996) op cit. pp. 312-313. 
613 H. J. Hanham, (1978 ed.) op cit. p.235.  
614 Middleton to Salisbury 25th October 1889, 
20th March 1896. All quoted in Richard Sh
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 This 
 the 
valuable Tory organizational assets which, when properly 
xploited, paid huge dividends. 
 Just as 
.  
 
ne  
 have 
upport among the propertied sections of society.’ 618  
oreover, although the franchise was not yet universal. 'the vast majority of the electorate was 
eight 
                                                
did his rival agent could make a vital difference in many a more marginal constituency.’ 615
“vital difference” is illustrated by the fact that Conservative support ‘remained remarkably 
stable between the 1880s and 1914, while that of the Liberals bounced up and down; even in
Edwardian period the Tory vote stood within the 43% to 46% range’ 616   Tight registers and 
“getting the vote out” were in
e
 
Organization was obviously vital to the Conservative electoral machine, but ‘when Middleton 
retired in 1903 his successor declined the post of Honorary Secretary of the National Union 
which resulted in considerable shuffling and re-shuffling of responsibilities between Central  
Office and the National Union.’ 617 The continuity and co-ordination that had existed under 
Middleton was broken, and his comprehensive oversight of the organization was lost.
organization alone cannot win elections, lack of it cannot shoulder the whole blame for defeat
However, it is worthy of note that organizational changes made after the catastrophic defeat of
1906 were characterized by power-broking and internal power struggles rather than by  genui
attempts to develop ways of mobilizing the Tory vote. ‘The pre-1914 electorate in Britain 
included only some 60% of adult males, so that a party like the Conservatives would still
done well simply by amassing its s
M
to be found in manual occupations, yet they did not deny their support to the Conservatives.’619 
Of Henry Pelling’s  ‘eighty-nine overwhelmingly working class constituencies, twenty 
were more often Conservative or Liberal Unionist than Liberal or Labour in the elections of 
 
615 Richard Shannon, (1996) op cit. p.313. 
r, (1994) op cit. p.582. 
616 Martin Pugh, (1988) op cit. pp.259-260. 
617 R. T. McKenzie, (1955) op cit. p.267. 
618 Martin Pugh, (1988) op cit. p.271. 
619 Robert Walle
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wn 
o 
ver, public  
 
1885-1910.’ 620 With their core vote properly managed, and more attention paid to crucial  
marginals, as in the Salisbury era, the party, even led by the louche Balfour, ought to have 
garnered considerably more success than it actually did. The reason may be that ‘in general 
Balfour studiously avoided giving any attention to party organization until the election defeats 
of 1910 forced his hand.’ 621 
 
It can be concluded that Disraeli’s ideological vision alone could not build upon his 1874 
election victory; the organization that had masterminded that victory was allowed to run do
and the result was defeat in 1880. Lord Salisbury offered no new ideology but rather returned to 
the basics. His astute management of high politics split the Liberal vote and ensured electoral 
success; but to maintain that success he relied upon scrupulous and meticulous organization t
maximise the votes available to him. Balfour, faced with major problems was easily 
outmanoeuvred by his opponents in the realm of high politics. His vacillation and indecision 
offered no clear leadership, with devastating effects to his party. But even then, it is clear that 
his neglect of organization made matters much worse than they otherwise would have been. 
Furthermore, ‘the period prior to 1914 provides little evidence that the Unionists had enjoyed 
even the levels of success of their Liberal rivals in coming to terms with the demands of 
governing a mass democracy.’ 622 
 
It was their ideology and interests which gave the Conservative Party direction. Howe
opinion which would have provided landmarks by which to steer the party was largely 
unknowable, certainly on a national level. It was left to party leaders to utilise their skill in high
                                                 
620 Robert Waller, (1994) op cit. p.582. Figures taken from Henry Pelling, (1967) The Social Geography of 
British Elections 1885-1910, Macmillan, London.   
621 David Dutton (1992) op cit. p.132. 
622 Ibid. p.278. 
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litics, by 
ce 
 flexibility 
r’s lack of ideological vision, and his ineptness in high 
olitics, were undoubtedly culpable in his dismal electoral record. Bonar Law struggled in vain 
 focus his party’s ideology, and his high politics became characterized by invective rather than 
ompelling rhetoric. Attempting to assess whether high politics or ideology was of greater 
portance to the Conservatives during our period of study, is highly problematical; 
rthermore, the question must be asked, whether it is feasible to do so. The two are so 
extricably reciprocal that success or failure in either area, inevitably enhanced or diminished 
e other. The only touchstone is electoral success. The record suggests that only when ideology 
and hig  tandem was success achieved. 
politics to navigate a course for their party through constantly evolving political circumstance
Importantly though, the impact of ideology, or even its accompanying political rhetoric, on new
and often uneducated voters was impossible to gauge; whereas the salience of high po
its very nature, was beyond the grasp of the ordinary elector. Thus, paradoxically, the influen
of both of these crucial elements was impossible to determine a priori, even though the 
significance of both to the Conservative cause can hardly be exaggerated. The relationship 
between the two was almost symbiotic in nature, each being informed and governed by the 
other. The relative importance of these big guns in the Conservative armoury was largely 
contingent upon circumstances. For example, Disraeli’s exploitation of the pragmatic
he saw in conservative ideology was crucial to election victory in 1874; whereas it is equally 
evident that his failure to translate his high politics rhetoric on social reform into legislation 
contributed to his defeat in 1880. On the other hand, Salisbury’s deft high politics kept his party 
in the ascendancy during his time as leader; while simultaneously, his strict adherence to the 
core concepts of conservative ideology was successfully mediated, for popular consumption, by 
his willingness to deploy decontested concepts, such as limited state intervention, to bolster the 
Conservative’s electoral appeal. Balfou
p
to
c
im
fu
in
th
h politics were cogently deployed in
 167
 Party organization provided the only t between party leaders and 
ra nce alongside high politics and 
ideo
Neverthe rucially acted as the oil that lubricated the Conservative machine to keep it 
run
tal e 
iz almed and at the mercy of political currents over 
hi
party organization in the nineteen
on  
influence high politics and policy form
o f
ma to engineer electoral success, the Tory party 
organization proved that when it as far from 
imp
tip those scales one way or the other.   
 
 
 
 
     
 intelligible link and condui
g ss roots support. Even so it, perhaps, cannot rank in importa
logy, if only because its form and direction was dictated by those two elements. 
less, it c
ning smoothly and effectively. When organization was allowed to deteriorate the machine 
s led and electoral impetus was lost. When organization was seriously neglected the machin
ed and the Conservatives were left becse
w ch they had little or no control. H. J. Hanham has argued that ‘the chief characteristic of 
th century was its impotence.’ 623 In the sense that 
C servative party organization failed to influence the ideological direction of the party, or to
ulation, and thereby the course that the leadership chose 
t ollow, this is undoubtedly true. However, as regards the vital role of managing support, and 
ited tools available king the best use of the lim
was given the attention and resources it merited it w
otent. It represented a make-weight in the electoral scales, and like all make-weights could 
 
 
 
                                            
623 H. J. Hanham, (1978 ed.) op cit. p.347. 
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